Court: Wyoming Supreme Court; October 13, 1998; Wyoming; State Supreme Court
Homeowners Terry and Kay Betts appealed a jury verdict finding them negligent in causing injuries to their housecleaner, Bonnie Crawford, who was awarded significant damages. The Bettses sought a new trial, arguing that the jury was exposed to surprise medical testimony from an expert that contradicted earlier opinions and that the trial court improperly denied their proposed jury instruction regarding Crawford's duty of care. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the trial court's decision.
The specific issues presented included whether a new trial was warranted due to: (1) the expert witness providing an undisclosed opinion; (2) contradictions between the expert's trial opinion and previous statements; (3) reliance by opposing counsel on the disclosed opinion in not retaining a rebuttal expert; and (4) the refusal to strike the surprise expert opinion. The Bettses also questioned whether adequate jury instructions were provided regarding their defense theory.
Factual context revealed that Crawford, while cleaning the Bettses' home, tripped on items left on the stairs, resulting in serious injuries. She filed a lawsuit claiming negligence, detailing her extensive injuries and ongoing medical issues. Dr. Peter Crane, designated as an expert witness, had provided testimony during a deposition that the Bettses believed was favorable to their defense. However, additional treatment notes from Dr. Crane were disclosed before trial, leading to the Bettses’ claim of surprise regarding his testimony.
The Bettses argue that they were not adequately informed about changes in Dr. Crane's medical opinions prior to trial. During the trial on November 3, 1997, Dr. Crane testified about the injuries Crawford sustained from a fall and referenced her 1994 MRI results. He indicated that the lumbar MRI appeared normal, while the brain MRI showed abnormalities that could suggest a tearing of nerve cells or demyelination, but he initially deemed these findings insignificant regarding Crawford's headaches. Dr. Crane acknowledged that new scientific evidence indicated such injuries could occur with milder head trauma without loss of consciousness, which he now considered possible in Crawford's case. The Bettses' attorney objected to this speculative response, leading the court to instruct the jury to disregard it. Dr. Crane later clarified that he believed the MRI results were compatible with Crawford's head injury. During cross-examination, he confirmed that in his earlier deposition, he opined that the MRI abnormalities were unlikely caused by the fall and did not connect them to headache symptoms. Dr. Crane also acknowledged that while some injuries heal, a significant percentage may not improve, and he had initially expected Crawford to improve based on his observations in August 1994.
During redirect examination, a witness discussed the abnormalities observed in a patient's MRI scan, noting the significance of gadolinium dye used in the imaging process. The witness expressed uncertainty about the implications of the scan findings, particularly regarding diffuse axonal injury, and acknowledged that a radiologist's input would be necessary for a definitive conclusion. The witness indicated a belief that the abnormalities likely existed prior to the injury due to their lack of response to the dye, but reiterated the need for further verification.
Crawford sought to introduce Dr. Crane's medical records into evidence, but the Bettses objected, leading the court to withhold a ruling. The following day, the Bettses moved to strike Dr. Crane's testimony, arguing they were surprised by the testimony as they were unaware he had seen Crawford after 1994. In response, Crawford clarified that Dr. Crane's later research suggested potential connections between the brain abnormalities and the fall, although he later retracted that suggestion pending radiologist verification. The trial court decided not to strike the testimony.
During the trial, Crawford's closing arguments did not mention a brain injury but focused on future medical expenses stemming from disabling headaches. Conversely, the Bettses highlighted that Dr. Crane had previously believed Crawford was improving and had not seen her again until after the lawsuit was initiated. In rebuttal, Crawford stated that her return to Dr. Crane was prompted by her attorneys seeking further treatment, which was unsuccessful. None of the closing arguments asserted that Dr. Crane linked the MRI findings to a brain injury.
Before jury deliberations, the Bettses proposed jury instructions regarding the assumption of risk but were denied by the court. The jury ultimately found the Bettses eighty-five percent negligent and Crawford fifteen percent negligent, awarding her $178,000 in damages. Following the trial, the Bettses appealed and sought to supplement the record with discovery documents, including Dr. Crane's deposition; however, their motion was denied both by the trial court and subsequently by the appellate court.
The Bettses argue that a change in Dr. Crane's trial testimony compared to his deposition constitutes prejudicial surprise, warranting exclusion and a new trial. Crawford counters that the Bettses had access to Dr. Crane's notes before trial, did not file a motion to limit his testimony, and did not request a continuance, thus failing to preserve the error for appeal. Crawford also asserts that the trial testimony did not significantly change and did not constitute surprise. The trial court's decision to admit the testimony is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, governed by WYO. R. CIV. P. 61, which allows for some errors unless they affect substantial rights or lead to a miscarriage of justice. The court found no grounds for exclusion, noting that the testimony did not present a new theory of recovery. The Bettses claimed surprise due to the introduction of brain injury evidence they could not adequately counter, but they did not request a continuance, which is typically required to address surprise. The trial court's decision also implied that the Bettses were not hindered in cross-examining Dr. Crane using his deposition. Furthermore, the Bettses’ case was not adversely affected by the testimony since Crawford focused on headaches related to a concussion without mentioning a brain injury, and the court struck speculative testimony. In a separate contention, the Bettses argue the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on Crawford's duty of care, specifically opposing the refusal of an instruction related to the assumption of risks by a servant in the context of their defense.
The proposed jury instruction referencing Owl Creek Coal Co. v. Goleb, Boatman v. Miles, and Eiban v. Widsteen was rejected. Instead, the trial court provided instructions that aligned with the Bettses' defense theory, attributing the accident and injuries to Crawford's negligence, while noting that some injuries were preexisting and unrelated. The court emphasized the duty of homeowners to exercise reasonable care for guests, an employer's obligation to provide a safe work environment, and the general duty of all individuals to use ordinary care, applying comparative fault principles. The standard of review for jury instruction errors requires reversal only if a substantive legal error prejudices the outcome. Jury instructions must be evaluated in the context of the entire trial to determine if they accurately present the law without confusing or misleading the jury.
Although the Bettses acknowledged that comparative negligence statutes limit the use of assumption of risk as a complete defense, they argued for its inclusion to ensure proper fault apportionment. They cited multiple cases to support their position, including Barnette v. Doyle, which clarified that assumption of risk does not serve as an absolute defense post-comparative negligence enactment, and Brittain v. Booth, which allowed for its use in fault apportionment. Crawford opposed this argument, asserting that the court's general duty of care instruction sufficed and that assumption of risk was improperly invoked, given precedents that have merged it into the comparative negligence framework. The Bettses misinterpreted Brittain's language regarding fault apportionment, as assumption of risk is now treated as contributory negligence under the comparative negligence system. Additionally, Barnette's discussion of assumption of risk in the employer-employee context further undermined the Bettses' position, indicating that this defense does not permit a cause of action against an employer.
In Wyoming, the court determined that assumption of risk does not negate an employer's duty, particularly following the establishment of the comparative negligence statute. The case of Halpern v. Wheeldon established a distinction between primary and secondary assumption of risk, with the former limiting duty in the context of recreation and the latter acting as a defense in cases of contributory negligence. Additionally, in Anderson v. Louisiana-Pacific, the court acknowledged that assumption of risk could still serve as a defense in strict liability cases concerning knowledge of danger, as the comparative fault statute does not apply to non-negligence actions. A concurring opinion in Anderson noted that generic assumption-of-risk language should not overshadow specific defenses relevant to the case. Consequently, the proposed jury instruction by the Bettses did not accurately reflect the law. It was also recognized that Crawford was an invitee and that Wyoming no longer distinguishes liability based on the common law classifications of invitee and licensee. The jury was correctly instructed regarding the Bettses' duty to exercise reasonable care, leading to the affirmation of the judgment.
