Court: Washington Supreme Court; June 3, 1999; Washington; State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Washington addressed the legal obligations of the Washington State Department of Corrections (DOC) regarding the use of inmate labor for electrical work in prison facilities. The case arose from challenges by several chapters of national and local electrical unions against DOC's practices and the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries' (DLI) decision not to enforce certain statutes.
The court ruled that DOC is required to comply with electrical licensing and worker safety laws. However, it found that statutes concerning inmate labor allow DOC to bypass competitive bidding and prevailing wage requirements for public works projects. DOC had been using inmate labor for construction and renovation work without engaging in competitive bidding and paying a gratuity of one to five dollars per hour instead of the prevailing wage. While DOC maintained some workplace safety rules, these protections were not uniformly applied to all inmate workers.
DLI, responsible for enforcing labor statutes, had not explicitly exempted DOC from these laws but had generally viewed them as inapplicable. DLI required only electrical installation permits and inspections, and it approved the electrical work performed by inmates despite many workers lacking proper licensing.
The appellants, collectively known as NECA/IBEW, filed a complaint asserting that DOC's practices violated multiple statutes, including those related to electrical licensing, workplace safety, prevailing wages, and competitive bidding. They sought legal relief to stop DOC from using inmate labor for electrical work, enforce competitive bidding, ensure payment of prevailing wages, and compel DLI to enforce relevant laws against DOC.
On January 23, 1997, DLI drafted a policy asserting that RCW 19.28 mandates compliance with electrical licensing for the DOC, indicating that inmates performing electrical work cannot be exempt from certification. However, this draft was never officially adopted or implemented. On March 7, 1997, the trial court dismissed NECA/IBEW's claims of DOC violating prevailing wage and competitive bidding laws and also dismissed DLI from the lawsuit, determining that DLI was not a necessary party since it had discretion over inspections and citations. NECA/IBEW's motion to reconsider DLI's dismissal was denied on April 4, 1997. Subsequently, on September 19, 1997, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DOC, ruling that NECA/IBEW lacked standing to represent inmate workers under WISHA and affirming DOC's authority to employ inmate labor for electrical work despite RCW 19.28's licensing requirements. Appellants appealed this decision.
NECA/IBEW contends that DOC must adhere to the electrical licensing provisions of RCW 19.28 before assigning inmate labor for electrical tasks. RCW 19.28.120(1) prohibits any entity from engaging in electrical work without a valid contractor license. The statute defines an "electrical contractor" as any entity involved in electrical installations or maintenance. DOC has been assigning inmates to perform a range of electrical work at correctional facilities, directly falling under the scope of RCW 19.28. The law requires an electrical administrator to be designated prior to commencement of electrical work and mandates that workers hold a journeyman electrician certificate. The definition of "electrical construction trade" includes various electrical installation and maintenance tasks. Exemptions to the licensing requirements are narrow, primarily applying to work done on one's own property or by certain employees in specific contexts. It is evident that DOC is not compliant with the licensing and certification provisions, as it lacks certified administrators and many of the inmates assigned to electrical work do not possess the necessary journeyman electrician certificates.
DOC claims exemption from compliance with RCW 19.28 based on its interpretation of RCW 19.28.610 and its discretion over inmate labor under RCW 72.09.100 and RCW 72.01.110. Although DOC acknowledges that RCW 19.28 aims to protect the public from unsafe electrical work, it argues that unlicensed individuals can perform electrical work as agents on behalf of a principal. DOC does not assert that it fits within a specific exemption but likens inmates performing electrical work in prison to individuals working on their own property or employees on an employer's premises, as outlined in RCW 19.28.610(1). However, the statutory interpretation indicates that inmates are not covered by these exemptions since they are not working on their own property or as employees of an employer, nor is DOC classified as a utility.
Furthermore, DOC's interpretation of RCW 72.09.100 suggests that it has broad authority to bypass statutory restrictions that hinder inmate work programs, explicitly stating that the legislature intends for DOC to manage a comprehensive inmate work program. This includes utilizing inmate labor for construction or repairs of prison facilities under RCW 72.01.110. DOC believes that these statutes grant it discretion over inmate job assignments without needing regulatory prerequisites, such as technical certification.
The document emphasizes that the Supreme Court is the final authority on statutory interpretation, with the objective being to discern and implement the Legislature's intent.
Legislative intent is determined primarily through the plain language of the statute. Although RCW 72.09.100 grants the Department of Corrections (DOC) authority to establish inmate work programs, it does not provide unlimited discretion. The statute outlines specific guidelines regarding the administration of these programs, including supervising entities, nature of work, voluntary participation, and compensation rates, indicating a clear legislative framework. While RCW 72.01.110 allows DOC to use inmates for construction work and bypass competitive bidding under certain conditions, it also imposes limits on the use of inmate labor. DOC argues that broad discretion is essential to fulfill legislative goals related to inmate job training and rehabilitation, and that compliance with certain statutes, such as RCW 19.28, would hinder these objectives due to cost implications. The agency seeks judicial deference in its administration of work programs; however, the legal challenges raised by NECA/IBEW focus on the assignment of unlicensed and untrained inmates to perform regulated electrical work, which raises concerns distinct from typical prison management issues related to discipline or security.
Licensing provisions in RCW 19.28 are deemed to take precedence over RCW 72.09.100, as they ensure that only trained and competent individuals perform electrical work, which is inherently dangerous. Relevant WISHA regulations (WAC 296-44, WAC 296-45, WAC 296-46) address health and safety concerns related to electrical tasks, which also apply to inmate labor. Defective electrical work by inmates underscores the necessity of these regulations. The ruling in City of Seattle v. State affirmed the dangers of electrical work and the public’s health and safety interests, determining that a city violated RCW 19.28 by assigning unlicensed individuals to such work. The same health and safety concerns apply to both low-income housing and prison facilities, emphasizing that compliance with RCW 19.28 is crucial for safe and competent electrical work. Requiring the Department of Corrections (DOC) to adhere to these regulations supports the quality of inmate labor and upholds public health interests, which outweigh inmate rehabilitation and cost-saving goals. RCW 19.28 explicitly prohibits unlicensed electrical work with limited exceptions. The DOC's claim to authority under RCW 72.09.100 to circumvent statutory restrictions lacks legislative backing, as such exemptions must be expressly provided. Additionally, there are no procedural safeguards to prevent misuse of authority by the DOC. Interpreting RCW 72.01.110 as granting DOC broad exemption powers would lead to unreasonable outcomes, contrary to statutory construction principles. Thus, noncompliance with RCW 19.28 is not within the DOC's discretion, despite its argument that the Legislature has tolerated its practices regarding inmate electrical work.
DOC defends its practice of assigning inmates to electrical work, citing legislative silence and a lack of objections from the Legislature over the past decade. However, legislative silence does not validate agency actions. DOC seeks deference to DLI's approval of this practice, but the court asserts that compliance with statutes is a legal question outside DLI's enforcement role. DOC claims that specific statutes regarding inmate labor should override general electrical licensing laws, contending that RCW 72.01.110 and RCW 72.09.100 are specific to inmate labor. Nevertheless, the court concludes that the specific provisions of RCW 19.28 regarding electrical licensing prevail, requiring DOC to adhere to these regulations when inmates perform such work.
The excerpt also addresses the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act (WISHA), which mandates safe working conditions and is enforced by DLI. The trial court ruled that NECA/IBEW lacks standing to sue DOC under WISHA, suggesting that inmates are not considered employees. However, NECA/IBEW asserts a direct financial interest, claiming that DOC's noncompliance with WISHA harms their competitive position for employment and contracts. Thus, NECA/IBEW has the right to challenge DOC's inmate labor practices under WISHA, as well as electrical licensing statutes. Finally, the document notes that while DOC acknowledges WISHA protections for Class II inmates performing electrical work, it denies these protections for Class III inmates engaged in similar tasks.
DOC contends that WISHA should not apply to all inmate workers engaged in electrical work, arguing that Class III inmates are not classified as 'employees' under the statute. According to RCW 72.09.135, DOC is mandated to establish minimum health and safety standards for state adult correctional facilities, which must meet constitutional and statutory requirements for the welfare of inmates and staff. While the statute allows DOC to adopt less stringent standards than WISHA, DOC does not claim this authority to support its argument. Instead, it asserts that WISHA protections should only extend to Class II inmates, who qualify as 'employees' due to their industrial insurance coverage, whereas Class III inmates are not considered 'employees.' Consequently, DOC's obligation to Class III inmates is limited to providing a safe work environment as required by the Eighth Amendment.
DOC has adopted an internal policy aligned with WISHA standards for both inmate workers and DOC personnel, indicating its intent to comply with WISHA. This policy implies that once DOC has adopted WISHA standards, it must extend these protections to all inmate workers.
Regarding public works projects, RCW 72.01.110 allows DOC to bypass the competitive bidding process when utilizing inmate labor for construction and repairs at correctional facilities. The statute’s permissive language grants DOC the discretion to employ inmate labor without soliciting bids from private contractors. However, DOC's discretion is subject to review under an arbitrary and capricious standard, meaning that its decisions must be reasonable and consider relevant facts and circumstances.
In Heinmiller v. Department of Health, the court established that the Department of Corrections (DOC) has the discretion to utilize inmate labor based on a determination that improvements to prison facilities can be done satisfactorily and at a lower cost to the state, without requiring competitive bidding. NECA/IBEW argued that competitive bidding is necessary to demonstrate that inmate labor meets these criteria, citing an instance where DOC allegedly opted for more expensive inmate labor despite cheaper bids from private contractors. However, the court clarified that RCW 72.01.110 does not mandate competitive bidding, and thus, the inquiry revolves around whether DOC abused its discretion in its judgment on the use of inmate labor. NECA/IBEW failed to demonstrate that DOC acted arbitrarily or capriciously, meaning no abuse of discretion was found.
Regarding compensation, DOC contended that it is not required to pay inmate labor the prevailing wage as mandated by RCW 39.12.020. Instead, RCW 72.09.100 allows DOC to pay Class II and III inmates a gratuity rate, which should not exceed the local prevailing wage for similar work. NECA/IBEW argued that Class II inmates should receive at least the prevailing wage, but the court disagreed, asserting DOC's authority to establish a gratuity scale that complies with statutory provisions. Consequently, RCW 39.12.020 does not apply to the assignment of Class II and III inmate labor for electrical work.
Lastly, NECA/IBEW's request for a writ of mandamus against the Department of Labor and Industries (DLI) to enforce electrical licensing and wage laws was dismissed by the trial court, which concluded that DLI was not a necessary party in the action.
The trial court determined that the Department of Labor and Industries (DLI) has discretion regarding inspections and citations under relevant statutes (RCW 19.28, RCW 39.12, RCW 49.17), including the authority to conduct investigations and inspections. The court emphasized that DLI's decisions about enforcement actions are generally discretionary and not subject to review, citing relevant case law. DLI's duty to conduct workplace inspections is not absolute, and NECA/IBEW argued that DLI's historical approval of the Department of Corrections' (DOC) practices and lack of enforcement against DOC justified a mandamus action to compel enforcement. However, the court clarified that mandamus can only compel action if an agency has completely failed to exercise discretion; once discretion is exercised, mandamus cannot dictate specific actions. The court concluded that DLI's decision not to enforce certain laws against DOC was not arbitrary or capricious, as it was based on DLI's interpretation that those laws did not apply to DOC's use of inmate labor. The court ruled that while DOC must comply with the electrical licensing and WISHA statutes, its authority to use inmate labor provides exemptions from certain competitive bidding and wage laws. A dissenting opinion argued against the majority's conclusion, stating that the courts lack jurisdiction over claims under WISHA due to the absence of a private right of action and that these issues should be addressed by the legislative branch rather than the judiciary. The dissent also highlighted concerns regarding the safety implications of using unlicensed inmate labor for electrical work.
Contractors initiated this action claiming a selfless concern for inmate and public safety, asserting their standing based on a unique financial interest in the litigation's outcome. They argued that compliance with State law would necessitate the Department of Corrections (DOC) to solicit bids for additional electrical work, from which the contractors would benefit. However, doubts were raised regarding the existence of a cause of action under the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act (WISHA) to support commercial competitiveness in electrical contracting. It was noted that no private right of action exists under WISHA, similar to the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), which has been consistently interpreted by federal courts. The OSHA framework establishes that employers have duties enforceable through criminal sanctions, civil penalties, and injunctions by the Secretary of Labor, without implying a private right of action for employees. WISHA parallels OSHA, allowing employee action only under specific circumstances involving the director’s failure to act. Such provisions are consistent with those found in OSHA.
An employee can only initiate legal action against the Director of the Department of Labor and Industries for failing to enforce the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act (WISHA) in an arbitrary or capricious manner, not against the employer. WISHA mandates that employers provide hazard-free workplaces and includes provisions for criminal and civil penalties, injunctions, and temporary restraining orders to enforce compliance. The statute was designed by the Legislature to enhance workplace safety through the Department of Labor and Industries' enforcement, with no indication that it creates a private right of action for employees or third parties against employers. In the current case, third-party appellants are attempting to assert a private right of action under WISHA within a prison labor context, which the court finds lacks jurisdiction, as the Legislature has not authorized such actions.
Additionally, the chapter of the Revised Code of Washington concerning electricians, RCW 19.28, empowers only the Director of the Department of Labor and Industries to enforce its provisions, without granting any private right of action. In contrast, other regulatory chapters, like the Uniform Disciplinary Act (RCW 18.130), do allow private actions, highlighting the absence of such provisions in the electrician regulation chapter.
The UDA establishes private causes of action for enforcing its provisions, similar to other business regulation statutes that allow aggrieved citizens to seek redress. Examples include RCW 18.74.095 for physical therapists and RCW 18.83.190 for psychologists. The Consumer Protection Act also provides a mechanism for individuals to pursue claims for violations of various business regulations. The Legislature retains the authority to define per se unfair trade practices through statutes, which are actionable under the Consumer Protection Act.
The absence of a private right of action under chapter 19.28 RCW suggests legislative intent against such rights, as indicated by the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. A three-part test derived from federal law is used to determine implied causes of action, which considers the intended beneficiary of the statute, legislative intent regarding remedies, and consistency with the legislation's purpose. Application of this test reveals that chapter 19.28 RCW was not intended for the financial benefit of electrical contractors but to ensure safety standards in electrical work, with enforcement authority granted solely to the Director of the Department of Labor and Industries.
Even if private rights of action existed, the claims would not be justiciable because they involve policy decisions better suited for legislative and executive resolution. Conflicts among statutes, particularly concerning inmate labor in electrical work on correctional facilities, underscore the need for deference to legislative intent and authority. The majority opinion would hinder the use of inmate labor for electrical tasks, which contradicts the legislative framework allowing for such deviations.
Inmate labor can be utilized for the construction and renovation of prison facilities as outlined in RCW 72.09.100, which supports a comprehensive inmate work program aimed at job training, rehabilitation, and efficient resource management. The Department is granted the authority to employ inmate labor for these purposes, provided it can demonstrate that such labor is satisfactory and cost-effective compared to traditional contracting methods. This authority is governed by RCW 72.01.110, which stipulates that the Department may award contracts or proceed with construction using inmate labor when deemed appropriate.
The majority's application of chapter 19.28 RCW and WISHA to inmate labor undermines the legislative intent expressed in RCW 72.09.100, effectively limiting the Department's discretionary powers. The Department has interpreted its statutes to exempt inmate labor from certain licensure requirements, a stance the Legislature has tacitly accepted. The conflicting policies present a challenge: while there is strong support for utilizing inmate labor in prison construction, applying external regulatory frameworks like WISHA could restrict this practice. The absence of a definitive policy from the Legislature and Governor necessitates a judicial resolution of this public policy conflict.
Resolution of the dispute is primarily within the authority of the Governor and the Legislature, as they are best positioned to mediate the conflicting interests involved. The Court's engagement in what essentially constitutes a sociopolitical issue would misinterpret its constitutional role. To assess the justiciability of the case, three principles should be considered: (1) whether the parties have genuine, non-theoretical stakes in the outcome; (2) whether judicial resolution impacts essential functions of another constitutional branch; and (3) whether the judiciary can provide clear and manageable standards for resolving the dispute and offering effective relief. In this case, the electrical contractors and union electricians have legitimate financial interests, confirming the existence of a real controversy. However, judicial resolution also significantly impacts the responsibilities of the executive branch, which oversees inmate welfare and rehabilitation policies, and the legislative branch, which has established laws regarding inmate labor and the safety standards for electrical installations. The most critical factor is the judiciary's inability to articulate coherent standards for future cases based on this decision, which merely reflects policy preferences rather than providing a substantive legal framework. The constitution dictates that policy should be established by the legislative and executive branches. Additionally, the document notes inconsistencies in the Department of Corrections' argument regarding the status of inmates as "employees" under different legal contexts, alongside references to relevant state laws governing public works and inmate labor classifications.
Class II inmates are compensated on a gratuity scale that cannot exceed the prevailing wage, while Class III inmates receive only a gratuity rate for their labor. The statute allows employees or their representatives to bring legal action against the director in superior court for safety violations. Relevant case law includes several instances where labor unions and contractor associations have successfully challenged non-compliance with prevailing wage laws and competitive bidding requirements. The Department of Corrections (DOC) acknowledges that the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act (WISHA) applies to some inmates performing electrical work, but it remains unclear how health and safety standards are enforced for other non-employee inmates engaged in similar tasks. The Department of Labor and Industries (DLI) suggests that state health and safety laws should be interpreted in light of federal case law regarding inmates' claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, which have generally been rejected. While OSHA regulations are not mandatory for federal prison industries, they are subject to inspection and advisory input from OSHA. The Eighth Amendment does not necessitate full compliance with OSHA standards, and various federal cases have noted the role of OSHA in prison settings. Washington law explicitly states that inmates working in correctional industries are not considered state employees; however, certain classifications of inmates are eligible for industrial insurance coverage, which implies a recognition of their employee status under industrial insurance statutes. Additionally, Washington law mandates that the hourly wages for labor on public works must be at least the prevailing rate for the trade in the locality.
Class I inmates are entitled to wages that match the prevailing wage, while Class IV inmates cannot exceed the prevailing wage, as stipulated in RCW 72.09.100(1) and (4). The majority opinion selectively quotes this statute and relies on irrelevant case law, which pertains to the standing of labor councils to represent members' rights, implying that individual members must have actionable rights themselves. Under WISHA, employees lack a private right of action against employers, meaning that members of the National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA) and union members similarly cannot assert third-party claims under WISHA. The majority's assertion that declaratory judgment actions bypass ordinary standing rules is unfounded. Furthermore, it is questionable whether chapter 19.28 RCW applies to this case, as its provisions target entities engaged in the electrical business. The Department, by conducting inmate work on its own property for its own purposes, does not engage in the electrical installation industry and therefore is not subject to the licensing requirements of RCW 19.28.120(1). Additionally, the requirement for a journeyman electrician certificate under RCW 19.28.510(1) does not apply, as per RCW 19.28.610, which exempts work on one's own property. If the case is deemed not justiciable, the Court should dismiss the claims without prejudice, awaiting action from the executive and legislative branches.
