Boone v. Grier

Citations: 688 P.2d 1070; 142 Ariz. 178; 1984 Ariz. App. LEXIS 457Docket: 1 CA-CIV 7237

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; June 28, 1984; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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Jerry and Cleone Boone appealed a judgment from the Yuma County Superior Court which directed a verdict against them, dismissing their wrongful execution complaint against Frank and Shirley Grier and Sheriff John R. Phipps. The appeal raised several issues: whether a judgment lien is required for a levy on real property; if a judgment lien can be established without showing the docket number in the filed copy; the validity of levying real property without first searching for personal property; and whether the court erred by not reforming joint tenancy deeds.

The court concluded that the execution was proper and upheld the trial court's denial of the Boone's request to reform the deeds. The Griers had previously obtained a $23,000 judgment against Jerry Boone in 1979 and had attempted to execute on personal property, which was later claimed to be owned by a partnership. In 1982, they executed on Jerry Boone's half interest in five parcels of real property held in joint tenancy with Cleone Boone. The Boones then initiated this action against the sheriff and the Griers for wrongful execution and to reform the deeds.

Initially, a court trial favored the defendants, leading the Boones to request a jury trial, which was granted. However, the jury trial concluded with directed verdicts for the defendants, who were found to have acted in good faith. The trial court also determined the Boones’ claims were groundless and assessed $2,500 in attorney's fees against them. The Boones appealed, contending the trial court erred in ruling that no prior judgment lien was necessary for the execution, but the court found that under A.R.S. 12-1553, a general writ of execution suffices even without a judgment lien, provided it includes the amount of the judgment and directs the officer to satisfy it from personal then real property if necessary.

A judgment can be satisfied from the real property of the debtor from the day the judgment becomes a lien or thereafter. If an execution is issued from a different county than where the judgment was rendered, it relates to the date the judgment is recorded in that county's superior court. Judgment liens, governed by A.R.S. 33-961, serve as a distinct creditor's remedy. The Boones argue that A.R.S. 12-1553 does not establish different procedures for executing against real property depending on the existence of a judgment lien, citing common law favoring personal property execution first. However, the court in Kaplan v. Reilly clarified that A.R.S. 12-1553 does allow for two procedures, indicating that if a judgment lien exists, it supersedes the requirement to execute against personal property first. The Boones did not provide evidence supporting the necessity of a judgment lien prior to executing against real property. A judgment creditor executing without a lien risks losing rights to bona fide purchasers but does not expose the debtor to wrongful execution claims. The court concluded that a judgment lien is not a prerequisite under A.R.S. 12-1553(1) and did not need to address the Boones' claims regarding the recording of the judgment. The Boones contended that the levy on their property was void due to the sheriff's failure to execute on personal property first. Although the sheriff did not execute on personal property before seizing real property, Jerry Boone indicated he had no personalty to satisfy the judgment. Previous cases, such as Oliver v. Dougherty and Blasingame v. Wallace, established that a debtor must identify personal property for execution; the court upheld that the sheriff's actions were proper despite the lack of personal property execution.

The court emphasized that the appellant's request for equitable relief is contingent upon fulfilling the obligation to pay the judgment amount, including interest and costs. Citing prior cases, the court noted that a sheriff's sale cannot be overturned solely because the judgment debtor's personal property was not levied upon first. The right to levy on real property arises when the officer is unaware of the debtor's personal property, and the debtor must reveal any such property to prioritize its use for satisfying the judgment. Failure to disclose personal property, or directing the sheriff to levy against real estate, waives the debtor's right to claim that their personal property should be levied first.

In a specific case involving the Boones, the sheriff's attempts to satisfy a judgment through personal property were unsuccessful, and the Boones did not disclose any personal property during the levy process. Mr. Boone testified he owned no personal property subject to execution and refused to pay the judgment. The trial court's refusal to set aside the execution was upheld, dismissing the Boones' claims for wrongful execution.

Regarding the Boones' request to reform joint tenancy deeds to reflect their intention for the property to be community rather than separate property, the court noted the presumption that property held by spouses is community property. However, the burden of proof lies with those asserting the property is separate. The joint tenancy deeds clearly indicated the intent for joint tenancy with right of survivorship, explicitly stating that they were not intended as community property. Consequently, the Griers met their burden of proof regarding the nature of the property ownership.

A rebuttable presumption exists that record title accurately reflects ownership interests in real property, as established in Hackin v. Gaynes. The Boones sought reformation of their joint tenancy deeds, claiming a lack of understanding regarding the differences between joint tenancy and community property at the time of execution. They argued for reformation based on a mistake of law. Courts may grant reformation in equity if it is shown that: 1) the instrument does not reflect the parties' intentions; 2) one party was mistaken about the deed's content, with the other party being aware and silent; or 3) one party was misled by the other's fraudulent actions. The court highlighted that if a party has all facts and only misinterprets the legal outcomes, equity typically does not intervene, especially to protect third-party rights. The Boones did not provide evidence beyond their claimed unilateral mistake of law, insufficient for reformation. Their arguments regarding intent were rooted solely in their misunderstanding of legal consequences. Consequently, there were no factual issues warranting jury consideration, and since the jury was advisory, the trial judge correctly decided the equitable relief. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, denied the Boones' request for reformation, and ordered attorney's fees for the appellees. Appellees must submit an affidavit for fee determination.