Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; June 29, 2000; Mississippi; State Supreme Court
Willie Jerome Manning, also known as "Fly," was convicted of two counts of capital murder on July 24, 1996, for the killings of Emmoline Jimmerson and Alberta Jordan during a robbery. Following his conviction, the Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed the case for potential errors and remanded it to the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court to evaluate the State's peremptory strikes against two black female jurors, under the precedent set by Batson v. Kentucky.
At the subsequent hearing, District Attorney Forrest Allgood provided three race-neutral justifications for striking Juror 57, Jacqueline Wright-Brewer, citing her perceived hostility during voir dire, concerns about her ability to serve due to childcare responsibilities, and her indication on a questionnaire that she could not impose the death penalty. For Juror 59, Renata M. Johnson, Allgood noted her prior representation by Manning's attorney, her connections to Manning's family, and her involvement in protests against previous death penalties imposed on Manning.
Defense attorney Clive Stafford Smith contended that these reasons were pretextual, arguing that the record did not support Allgood's claims and highlighting inconsistencies regarding other jurors with similar circumstances who were not struck. Despite these arguments, Judge Montgomery upheld the State's strikes, concluding they were valid and race-neutral, and emphasized that the challenges did not prejudice Manning since the strikes were against potential alternates who did not ultimately serve. The court affirmed the circuit court's ruling, maintaining that the death penalty was lawfully imposed and Manning's convictions were upheld.
Manning appeals a circuit court's Batson order, not contesting findings regarding Juror Johnson but claiming the State's reasons for striking Juror Wright-Brewer were pretextual. He disputes the circuit court's harmless error analysis in its Batson findings. The court has established that a trial court's determination of whether a peremptory challenge is race-neutral is given significant deference and will only be overturned if clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of evidence (Thorson v. State, 721 So.2d 590).
Five indicators of pretext in evaluating race-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes include: 1) disparate treatment of jurors, 2) failure to voir dire on the cited characteristic, 3) irrelevance of the cited characteristic to the case, 4) lack of supporting record evidence, and 5) reliance on group-based traits (Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289). Manning contends the State's three reasons for striking Wright-Brewer were pretextual. He argues there's no record evidence supporting claims of her demeanor during voir dire. Although lack of record support can indicate pretext, the prosecutor's reason need not be recorded (Thorson, 721 So.2d).
Manning cites Conerly v. State, where a new trial was ordered due to an untrue reason for a juror strike. In contrast, the prosecutor’s claims in Manning's case lack corroboration yet remain unchallenged. Credibility of the prosecutor plays a key role in determining race-neutrality, and the trial court accepted the prosecutor's explanation regarding demeanor as valid (Fleming v. State, 732 So.2d).
Manning also disputes the State's reason for striking Wright-Brewer based on her response to a juror questionnaire regarding the death penalty, noting she later clarified her position during individual voir dire. The State acknowledges her rehabilitation for a challenge for cause does not prevent a peremptory strike based on her initial questionnaire response, as the requirements for a peremptory strike differ from those for a challenge for cause (Davis v. State, 660 So.2d).
Manning contends that the exclusion of Juror Wright-Brewer based on her questionnaire response and concerns about childcare constituted disparate treatment. He highlights that the State did not strike two white jurors, Hutchins and McGee, who expressed similar childcare concerns and were less favorable to the State. McGee specifically required an eyewitness to support a death penalty vote and voiced apprehension regarding the case’s disturbing details.
Disparate treatment can indicate discriminatory intent, but it is not solely determinative, as established in various case law. If the State provides additional race-neutral justifications for striking a juror and applies similar reasoning to jurors of other races, claims of disparate treatment may be dismissed. In this instance, the State provided three race-neutral reasons for striking Wright-Brewer and similarly struck two white jurors for reluctance regarding the death penalty, leading the circuit court to uphold the State's actions.
Additionally, Judge Montgomery ruled that because Jurors Wright-Brewer and Johnson were only potential alternates who did not serve on the jury, Manning suffered no actual prejudice from their exclusion. Manning argues this application of a harmless error standard contradicts U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which holds that racial discrimination in jury selection undermines the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the jurors' predispositions. He asserts that the harmless error standard is inappropriate in Batson analysis, and future Batson hearings should avoid this standard to ensure fair jury selection processes.
Lastly, the document raises the question of whether the death penalty in Manning’s case is disproportionate compared to other upheld death sentences.
Section 99-19-105(3) of the Mississippi Code mandates a review of death penalty sentences to assess if they were influenced by passion, prejudice, or arbitrary factors, whether the evidence supports statutory aggravating circumstances, and if the sentence is excessive or disproportionate compared to similar cases. Manning's argument regarding the improper application of aggravating factors was previously rejected on direct appeal. The Court evaluated whether the death penalty was imposed arbitrarily or disproportionately, concluding that it was proportionate given Manning's conviction for the brutal murder of two elderly women during a robbery. The Court referenced similar cases to substantiate its findings.
Though Judge Montgomery misapplied harmless error analysis concerning the State's peremptory strikes against alternate jurors, the circuit court's determination that the State provided sufficient race-neutral reasons for its strikes was upheld. Consequently, the Court affirmed Manning’s guilty verdict and death sentence. The execution date will be set within sixty days following this ruling.
Justice Banks dissented, arguing that the State's peremptory challenge against Juror Wright-Brewer was unjustified compared to other jurors, suggesting that the reasons given were pretextual and violated her rights.
The State struck juror Wright-Brewer citing her concerns about caring for her small child, yet two white jurors, Hutchins and McGee, with similar concerns about younger children, were not challenged. This inconsistency raises questions about the validity of the State's reasoning. Additionally, the State claimed Wright-Brewer was struck due to her views on the death penalty; however, three white jurors who expressed reluctance about imposing the death penalty were not struck. This pattern of disparate treatment suggests that Wright-Brewer's race may have been the real reason for her exclusion.
At a remand Batson hearing, the State introduced a new reason for striking Wright-Brewer, citing her perceived hostility during voir dire based on her folded arms and demeanor, which was not noted during the original challenge. The trial court did not make a specific finding on this new reason.
The necessity for trial courts to provide an on-the-record factual determination regarding the reasons for peremptory challenges has been established in prior cases. The failure to do so has been ruled as reversible error. Given the lack of sufficient rebuttal by the State to the prima facie case of racial discrimination in Wright-Brewer's striking, a reversal of the judgment and a remand for a new trial is warranted.
The document lists cases related to death sentences affirmed by the court. It includes "McGilberry v. State," where the decision was reported as 741 So.2d 894 in 1999, and "Puckett v. State," reported as 737 So.2d 322 in 1999, which was remanded for a Batson hearing.
Manning v. State, 735 So.2d 323 (Miss. 1999) was remanded for a Batson hearing, indicating issues related to jury selection and potential discrimination. The excerpt lists numerous cases from Mississippi's legal history, spanning various years, highlighting decisions that led to remands for new sentencing hearings or other significant legal outcomes. These include notable cases such as Turner v. State, Smith v. State, and multiple instances of Wilcher v. State. The document references both state-level decisions and federal reviews, such as those involving the U.S. Supreme Court, which vacated and remanded state court rulings, particularly concerning sentencing issues. Overall, the compilation reflects ongoing legal challenges and precedents in Mississippi's judicial system, particularly regarding sentencing and jury selection practices.
Numerous death penalty cases in Mississippi have been reversed regarding both the guilt phase and the sentence phase, including notable cases such as Edwards v. State and Smith v. State from 1999, along with several others dating back to 1982. Additionally, certain cases have been reversed concerning punishment and remanded for resentencing to life imprisonment, such as Reddix v. State and Wheeler v. State. A specific note highlights that Juror Johnson's father was represented by Richard Burdine, not Juror Johnson herself, and that a case initially affirmed was remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court for a new sentencing hearing.
