Den Beste v. Pollution Control Hearings Board

Citations: 914 P.2d 144; 81 Wash. App. 330Docket: 13967-1-III

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; April 18, 1996; Washington; State Appellate Court

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The Yakima Indian Nation appealed 43 decisions made by the Washington Department of Ecology, which allowed various applicants to withdraw groundwater in the Black Rock, Moxee, and Rattlesnake Ridge areas. The Pollution Control Hearings Board (PCHB) initially denied motions from several applicants to dismiss the appeals as untimely. However, after the Yakima County Superior Court reversed the PCHB's decision, the Yakima Indian Nation filed an appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court's decision and remanded the case to the PCHB for further proceedings.

The relevant facts established during the PCHB hearing indicate that from 1980 to 1993, 43 applicants submitted groundwater applications to the Department, which informed the Yakima Indian Nation of these applications. The Department delayed granting or denying these applications while investigating groundwater conditions and conducting public meetings, where the Yakima Indian Nation participated. Specific instances of their involvement included attendance at public meetings, preparation of a literature review related to groundwater impacts, and ongoing discussions with Department staff. The Department approved the groundwater applications between May and July 1993, mailing the orders to the applicants immediately but delaying the notification to the Yakima Indian Nation, which received the orders in two batches on June 17 and July 7.

On July 19, the Yakima Indian Nation filed appeals regarding orders received on June 17 and July 7. These appeals were consolidated, and applicants moved to dismiss them as untimely. The Pollution Control Hearings Board (PCHB) ruled that the 30-day appeal period under RCW 43.21B.230 began when the Yakima Indian Nation received the orders. However, the superior court determined that the appeal period starts on the date the orders were issued, not when received, and that it was not tolled until mailing since the Yakima Indian Nation wasn't legally entitled to notice. The case was remanded to the PCHB to dismiss appeals filed beyond the 30-day limit from the issuance date. 

Two key issues arose: when the 30-day appeal period starts under RCW 43.21B.230 and whether both Saturday and Sunday are excluded if the last day for filing falls on a Saturday. RCW 43.21B.230 allows appeals within 30 days from the date of notice of a decision, while related administrative rules specify the appeal must be filed within 30 days of receiving the order. The applicants argue the appeal period should start on the order's issuance date for clarity, while the Yakima Indian Nation contends it should begin upon receipt. The ambiguity in the statute is evident, as it raises questions regarding the definitions of "date of notice" and whether an appellant can lose the right to appeal if the Department fails to mail the order timely.

Statutory construction aims to realize legislative intent, as established in City of Yakima v. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters. When statutory language allows for multiple interpretations, legislative history and other aids may be consulted; however, in this case, there is no legislative history available. Two reasonable interpretations of RCW 43.21B.230 arise: one posits that notice is effective when mailed, starting the appeal period at that time; the other suggests that notice is effective upon receipt, beginning the appeal period then. The appropriate interpretation concludes that the appeal must be filed within 30 days of mailing the notice. This aligns with the general Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provision, which states that service is complete upon mailing, evidenced by the postmark.

The Yakima Indian Nation argues for the date of receipt as a fairer start for the appeal period to protect parties from potential mailing delays. However, this presents issues in legal certainty and interpretation. Although receipt dates are agreed upon in this instance, they can be unpredictable, risking appeals based on when parties become aware of an order. The mailing date establishes a clear timeframe, preventing complications that could arise from varying receipt dates. Moreover, if the appeal period began on the notice date, it could allow the Department to unduly shorten or eliminate appeal rights through delays in sending notifications—an issue considered more serious than extending the appeal period due to administrative errors.

The interpretation of RCW 43.21B.230 is not necessarily at odds with WAC 371-08-080, despite differing perspectives from the PCHB. The phrase "notice of" can be understood as "notification of" rather than a formal document, aligning the statute with the communication-focused framework of the rule. The term "communicated" can have various meanings, and one interpretation does not hinge on the recipient's acknowledgment of the communication, which is often unknown.

The Department and applicants argue that the Yakima Indian Nation was not entitled to notice or copies of relevant orders, contrary to the PCHB's conclusion. RCW 43.21B.230 states that only those who have received notice of an order may appeal, but this does not grant standing to parties merely notified who are not aggrieved. An aggrieved party involved in an administrative proceeding retains the right to appeal despite a lack of notice. The Yakima Indian Nation demonstrated significant concern regarding groundwater applications, evidenced by participation in meetings and submitting written comments, warranting timely notice of decisions. The Department's claim of no obligation to notify the Yakima Indian Nation is questioned, as its participation indicates it was an interested party. The PCHB's definition of a party includes anyone allowed to participate in agency proceedings, supporting the Yakima Indian Nation's entitlement to notice. Additionally, regarding the appeal period, the interpretation of RCW 1.12.040 and WAC 371-08-235 is inconsistent; the statute does not exclude Saturday from the appeal period. The Yakima Indian Nation cites Stikes Woods Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Lacey, which highlights similar conflicts between statute and court rule, reinforcing that Saturdays should be included in the computation of appeal deadlines.

Stikes determined that Civil Rule (CR) 6(a) supersedes RCW 1.12.040, as the Supreme Court has the authority to define its procedural jurisdiction under RCW 2.04.190 without infringing on legislative power. The Court interpreted both the statute and the rule to fulfill the legislative intent of ensuring fairness for claimants. Although WAC 371-08-235 is procedural, it is not a court rule, limiting the Court's ability to extend Stikes' holding. The Court recognized that excluding Saturdays from time calculations would enhance fairness for appellants, as the PCHB is closed on Saturdays; however, such exclusion must be enacted by the Legislature. Consequently, the Court ruled that final Saturdays must be included in the time calculation under RCW 1.12.040, rendering WAC 371-08-235 ineffective. The superior court's decision was reversed, and the case was remanded to the PCHB for further proceedings. Additional notes detail specifics about appeal applications and previous legislative provisions, highlighting that the Department had argued that the appeal period began upon mailing the orders to applicants rather than the Yakima Indian Nation, leading to claims of untimeliness for many appeals.