M. Durbin & Co. of Jasper, Inc. v. Ala. Dept. of Env. Mgmt.
Docket: Civ. 5625
Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; April 29, 1987; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Marshall Durbin Company of Jasper (Marshall Durbin) appealed the dismissal of its action against the Alabama Department of Environmental Management and the Jasper Utilities Board regarding a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit issued to the Board. The case arose after the Jasper Utilities Board decided to expand its sewage treatment facilities and sought federal funds, leading to increased rates for users. On December 5, 1985, the Environmental Management issued a final NPDES permit with stricter discharge standards. Marshall Durbin sought a hearing to challenge this permit, but Environmental Management moved to dismiss on the grounds of lack of standing. The Commission dismissed the action, leading Marshall Durbin to appeal to the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. The circuit court also dismissed the appeal, citing Marshall Durbin's lack of standing and improper venue, and concluded that the issues were part of a previously pending action. Marshall Durbin raised four errors on appeal: the circuit court's ruling on standing, venue, the existence of a prior pending action, and the denial of a motion to amend the complaint. The court noted that under section 22-22A-7(c)(6) of the Code of 1975, only Commission orders modifying, approving, or disapproving agency actions are appealable; since the Commission merely ruled on standing, it did not constitute a final order eligible for statutory appeal.
Judicial review in cases without an adequate remedy by appeal allows for common-law petitions for writs of certiorari. The standard for such reviews is whether the lower court applied the law correctly and whether its ruling is supported by legal evidence. In this case, the circuit court affirmed the Commission's dismissal of Marshall Durbin's challenge to a new NPDES permit due to lack of standing, rendering the issue of improper venue moot. The critical question is whether Marshall Durbin had standing to contest the permit's issuance.
To establish standing, a party must demonstrate a likely injury resulting from the action, causation, and the potential for redress from a favorable ruling. Marshall Durbin argues it has standing based on constitutional due process and statutory challenges. However, it fails to prove that any injury it claims will be remedied by a favorable decision, as the increase in sewage rates it cites results from a new sewage treatment plant's construction, independent of the NPDES permit. Even if the permit were revoked, the rates would not decrease because the treatment facility would still require payment. Thus, Marshall Durbin's claims regarding standing are insufficient.
Marshall Durbin has suffered an injury but cannot demonstrate that the relief sought would remedy this injury, leading to a lack of standing to challenge the new NPDES permit on due process grounds. The record indicates that the increase in sewage rates was due to the Jasper Utilities Board's decision to expand its treatment facility, not the new NPDES standard imposed by the Department of Environmental Management. The Board's decision to expand occurred prior to the permit's issuance and stemmed from its own business judgment, not directly from the permit. Consequently, Marshall Durbin lacks statutory standing under section 22-22A-7(c) because it cannot show that the injury was directly caused by an administrative action. The circuit court's dismissal of Marshall Durbin's appeal for lack of standing is affirmed.
In dissent, Judge Ingram argues that standing and venue are the principal issues, with the latter only relevant if standing is resolved in favor of Marshall Durbin. Ingram points out that Marshall Durbin claims standing to challenge the constitutionality of an administrative order from Environmental Management, which imposed a stringent effluent discharge standard that nearly doubled its sewer service costs. This claim constitutes a legally cognizable injury. Ingram asserts that the issue of standing is not solely before the court due to its pendency in another case, and believes there is merit in Marshall Durbin's argument that it qualifies as a "person aggrieved" under relevant statutes.
The 7Q10 effluent discharge standard imposed on Marshall Durbin by Environmental Management is acknowledged to be more stringent than both the previous standard and the alternative 30Q5 standard proposed by Marshall Durbin. This new standard has resulted in significantly higher sewer service costs for Marshall Durbin, establishing it as a 'person aggrieved' entitled to a hearing before the Commission regarding the appropriate discharge standard. However, the Commission dismissed Marshall Durbin's appeal without a hearing, effectively endorsing the 7Q10 standard's imposition.
There is a disagreement regarding the Commission's dismissal; while some argue it does not constitute an appealable order, it substantively denies Marshall Durbin a chance to contest the 7Q10 standard. The relevant legal framework does not necessitate a formal ruling from the Commission for an appeal to be valid. The statutory definition of 'person aggrieved' is interpreted broadly, allowing for challenges against administrative actions. The increase in rates due to the new standard provides Marshall Durbin the standing required to appeal.
The refusal of the Commission to hear Marshall Durbin's case entitles it to seek recourse in the circuit court, specifically in Jefferson County as per the venue provisions in the applicable statute. Thus, Marshall Durbin's complaint should not be dismissed.
