State v. Tarango

Citations: 914 P.2d 1300; 185 Ariz. 208; 214 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 38; 1996 Ariz. LEXIS 45Docket: CR-95-0118-PR

Court: Arizona Supreme Court; April 16, 1996; Arizona; State Supreme Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

In State of Arizona v. Sharon Lee Tarango, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the court of appeals' decision regarding the defendant's parole eligibility following her conviction for drug offenses, which included two prior felonies. The court of appeals had ruled that Tarango was eligible for parole after serving two-thirds of her 15.75-year concurrent sentences under former A.R.S. 13-604(D), despite the conflicting provisions in former A.R.S. 13-3408(D) that would typically mandate a flat sentence with no parole for similar offenses.

The trial court's sentencing order did not specify parole eligibility, leading to the appeal where the state contended that A.R.S. 13-3408(D) required Tarango to serve her entire sentence without the possibility of parole, while Tarango argued for eligibility under A.R.S. 13-604(D). The court of appeals concluded that when enhanced sentencing penalties under A.R.S. 13-604 are applied, the corresponding release provisions also apply, thus allowing parole eligibility.

The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals, emphasizing that the language of A.R.S. 13-604(K) is clear and establishes an exclusive sentencing scheme for repeat offenders, overriding the conflicting provisions of A.R.S. 13-3408(D). The case illustrates the importance of statutory interpretation and the application of enhanced sentencing laws in determining parole eligibility.

The state contends that former A.R.S. 13-3408(D) implicitly repealed the exclusive penalty provisions in former A.R.S. 13-604(K). However, legal interpretation favors avoiding implied repeals, instead harmonizing conflicting statutes. Courts typically seek to interpret statutes in a manner that gives effect to all involved. Former A.R.S. 13-604 anticipated potential conflicts and asserted that its penalties would govern. The interpretation of former A.R.S. 13-3408(D) is limited to first-time, non-dangerous offenders, as the legislature did not repeal the exclusive provisions for repeat or dangerous offenders.

The rule of lenity plays a role here, indicating that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the defendant. The flat time provision of former A.R.S. 13-3408 may apply to all sentences or only to unenhanced sentences due to former A.R.S. 13-604(K). The state argues that former A.R.S. 13-603(A) supports flat time enhanced sentences, but this interpretation does not allow for substituting the flat time provision in place of the two-thirds release eligibility in former A.R.S. 13-604(K). Instead, it clarifies that where a specific sentencing range is provided by a statute, that range governs.

For first-time offenders, sentencing ranges are guided by former A.R.S. 13-701 and 13-702, whereas repeat or dangerous offenders are governed by former A.R.S. 13-604. The analysis from State v. Behl, which favored a flat time provision over enhanced penalties under former A.R.S. 13-604(G), is rejected as it fails to harmonize the statutes appropriately.

The Behl court cited former A.R.S. 13-604(K) without applying its exclusive penalty provisions, affirming a flat time enhanced sentence. The court expressed concern over the disparity in release eligibility between dangerous and non-dangerous sexual offenders committing identical offenses, particularly when a dangerous offender could theoretically be released after 4.67 years, compared to a non-dangerous offender serving the full 5.25 years. Such anomalies arise only with mitigated sentences; with presumptive or aggravated terms, dangerous offenders cannot be released sooner than non-dangerous offenders with flat time sentences. The dissent referenced State v. Lambson, highlighting the potential for such disparities, but noted that the trial court might have imposed longer sentences had it understood the parole eligibility implications. The sentencing ranges illustrate significant discrepancies: first-time class 2 felony offenders face 5.25 to 14 years, while those with multiple prior felonies face 14 to 28 years. The current case allows parole eligibility after 10.5 years, which could exceed the sentence of a presumptive flat time first-time offender by 3.5 years, emphasizing that while parole is not guaranteed, the defendant's potential incarceration could be significantly longer than that of a first-time offender.

The state contended that the legislature intended for courts to merge the provisions of former A.R.S. 13-3408(B) and former A.R.S. 13-604(D) to enforce enhanced flat time sentences. The only supporting evidence for this claim was an unspecified handout distributed to the House Appropriations Committee, which indicated that the proposed A.R.S. 13-3408 included enhanced flat time sentences. However, there is no confirmation that this handout reflected the intent of the majority of legislators. The legislature retained the language of former A.R.S. 13-604(D) and former A.R.S. 13-604(K), indicating a lack of clear legislative intent to deviate from established statutory penalties. The court emphasized the importance of not rendering statutory language superfluous or void, indicating that accepting the state's argument would invalidate the exclusive penalty provision in former A.R.S. 13-604(K).

The court agreed with the court of appeals that the defendant would be eligible for parole after serving two-thirds of her sentence, and directed the Department of Corrections to calculate parole eligibility dates accordingly. Post-conviction relief is available for any discrepancies in parole eligibility arising from this ruling.

In dissent, Justice Martone argued that A.R.S. 13-604(K) does not support the majority's conclusion that its release eligibility conditions override those in A.R.S. 13-3408(D). He highlighted that the statutory framework differentiates between terms of imprisonment and release eligibility, pointing out that A.R.S. 13-701(C) governs terms of imprisonment for first offenses, while A.R.S. 13-604 pertains to enhanced terms for dangerous and repetitive offenders, contingent upon specific charges by the prosecutor. Martone stated that A.R.S. 13-604(K) provides conditions under which enhanced penalties apply, rather than asserting control over penalties from other statutes. He concluded that A.R.S. 13-604(K) does not address parole eligibility, which is governed by provisions in Titles 31 and 41, specifically noting that parole eligibility generally occurs after serving one-half of a sentence unless restricted to a two-thirds requirement by law.

Individuals must serve at least half of their sentence unless a specific statute dictates otherwise. According to A.R.S. 13-604(D), parole eligibility arises after two-thirds of the sentence is served, but this statute is intended to extend the standard one-half time to two-thirds, not to reduce the required time for offenses with a predetermined flat time upon conviction. A.R.S. 13-3408(D), which pertains specifically to drug offenses, mandates that the entire sentence must be served regardless of whether it is a first or subsequent offense. For someone convicted of selling drugs with prior felony convictions, the appropriate statutes are A.R.S. 13-701(C) and A.R.S. 13-604, which apply in tandem to determine imprisonment terms and parole eligibility. A.R.S. 13-3408(D) does not limit its application to first offenders, thus requiring full sentence completion for all convicted. The author argues that it is illogical for the legislature to impose full service for first-time drug offenders while allowing reduced time for repeat offenders. The author references a specific case, State v. Lambson, to illustrate the potential for anomalous outcomes within the sentencing framework, where a dangerous sex offender could be eligible for earlier parole than a non-dangerous offender due to a misinterpretation of the statutes. The complexity of Arizona's sentencing laws can lead to significant discrepancies, yet the author aligns with the court of appeals in State v. Behl, asserting that the legislature did not intend for these contradictory results to occur.

A duty exists to harmonize statutes to ensure both remain effective. The author dissents respectfully. Legislation effective January 1, 1994, amended A.R.S. 13-604(D) and 13-3408(D) to require prisoners to serve at least 85.71% of their sentence before parole eligibility, as per 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch. 255. Additionally, A.R.S. 41-1604.07(A) mandates that inmates must serve six days to earn one day of release credit. A.R.S. 28-1751 specifies sentencing for operating an aircraft while intoxicated. The 1994 amendments addressed inconsistencies identified in the Behl court by establishing that individuals committing a class 2 felony in a dangerous manner must also serve at least 85.71% of their sentence. Since January 1, 1994, the presumptive term for a first-time class 2 felony is five years, with a sentencing range of 4-10 years for most first-time offenders, per 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch. 255. The statutes referenced are those in effect at the time the case arose.