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Harris v. State
Citations: 537 So. 2d 1325; 1989 WL 1318Docket: 57653
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; January 3, 1989; Mississippi; State Supreme Court
Willie James Harris appealed a life imprisonment sentence for rape, imposed by the Circuit Court of DeSoto County, Mississippi. The case stemmed from a July 11, 1984, incident where 16-year-old Julie Scott and her 12-year-old sister Marcie were violently assaulted in their home. An assailant, described as a young black male, forcibly entered their home with a silver pistol, overpowered the girls, and subjected them to rape and severe physical abuse for approximately 30 minutes to an hour. Julie was repeatedly struck with the pistol and stabbed multiple times with a barbecue fork, while Marcie was beaten with a shotgun and choked until unconscious. After the attack, Marcie sought help from a neighbor, who discovered the gruesome scene and called for emergency assistance. Marcie managed to provide a description of the attacker to the police before being hospitalized. The incident highlighted the extreme violence and trauma inflicted upon the victims, ultimately leading to Harris's conviction. Sheriff Riley, while patrolling, was approached by two men who reported seeing a young black man resembling the assailant of the Scott girls. They directed him to Bobbie Jean Harris's home, where appellant Willie James Harris was present. During a brief questioning about the rapes, Harris denied knowing anything about the crimes or possessing items described by a witness. Subsequently, a green shirt and bloody tan cut-off pants, matching the assailant's description, were found in the house and handed to the police. Harris was arrested and read his Miranda rights. On July 11, 1984, he signed a waiver of rights and confessed in the presence of law enforcement officers. The following day, he signed another waiver and provided a second confession. An indictment for the forcible rape of Marcie Scott was issued on August 15, 1984. Harris was tried starting October 30, 1984, and found guilty on November 1, 1984, receiving a life sentence without parole. The appellant's pre-trial motion for a change of venue was denied, despite presenting evidence of extensive media coverage that could hinder a fair trial. Testimonies from county supervisors indicated a belief in the possibility of a fair trial in DeSoto County, while various newspaper articles and broadcast certificates detailed the coverage of the case. Fifteen newspaper articles relevant to the case were published in July 1984, with four additional articles published in August, the last on August 22, just two months before the trial commenced on October 30. The trial judge, after considering evidence, including witness testimonies and exhibits, decided not to immediately rule on the motion for change of venue, opting to revisit it after observing the jury pool during voir dire. On the trial date, 82 potential jurors were present, 52 of whom had prior knowledge of the case. The appellant challenged 11 jurors for cause, resulting in 9 being excused. The appellant and the State exercised 12 and 7 peremptory challenges, respectively, culminating in the selection of 11 jurors without further requests for additional challenges. After the jury selection, the trial judge again considered the venue change motion, ultimately overruling it based on his observations of the jurors' responses during voir dire. The judge distinguished this case from previous rulings in Fisher v. State and Johnson v. State, where the media saturation was significantly higher. The court upheld the trial judge's discretion in denying the venue change, referencing prior case law that supports the notion that a presumption of jury prejudice can be rebutted by demonstrating an impartial jury was actually selected. The conviction will remain valid if the government can demonstrate its legitimacy despite any adverse pretrial publicity. The trial judge is deemed to have exercised sound discretion in denying the motion to change venue. The appellant argues that the lower court erred in rejecting his motion to suppress his confessions and related physical evidence, claiming they resulted from an illegal arrest and search. During a suppression hearing, seven police officers testified that the appellant was arrested after his mother or aunt voluntarily brought evidence to law enforcement. The officers stated they read him his Miranda rights, which he waived, and that his confessions were made freely. The appellant contested these claims, alleging he was arrested prior to the evidence being found and that he faced threats and promises of leniency. The court's ruling on confession admissibility is upheld unless it contradicts overwhelming evidence. Given the testimonies, the lower court's decision is supported, and this error is rejected. The appellant also contends he was denied a fair trial due to prejudicial conduct by the prosecution. The District Attorney made inflammatory remarks describing the appellant as a "savage animal" and a "perverted degenerate" in both opening and closing statements, which were objected to and some were upheld by the court. The prosecution's comments were characterized as personal attacks that overstepped acceptable legal arguments, raising concerns about the fairness of the trial. The discussion emphasizes the importance of maintaining decorum and propriety in courtroom arguments, particularly by prosecutors. It notes that objections to the statements made by Assistant District Attorney Buntin and District Attorney Williams were promptly made and upheld by the court, which instructed the jury to disregard those remarks. Citing Reed v. State, the text asserts that trial courts must prevent abuses in argumentation and intervene when such abuses are extreme. It highlights that prosecutors should avoid personal attacks on defendants and inflammatory language, referencing prior cases that condemned derogatory terms used in closing arguments. The court reiterates that the objective of closing arguments should be to illuminate the facts and law, not to provoke the jury emotionally. It states that jurors are presumed to follow the judge's instructions to disregard improper remarks, and even if those remarks had not been disregarded, they would have been harmless given the overwhelming evidence presented. The excerpt concludes by affirming the ruling and dismissing the assigned error.