State v. Campbell

Citations: 770 P.2d 620; 112 Wash. 2d 186Docket: 55977-5

Court: Washington Supreme Court; March 23, 1989; Washington; State Supreme Court

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Charles Rodman Campbell appeals an execution order set by the Snohomish County Superior Court for March 30, 1989, following his conviction for three counts of aggravated first-degree murder. The Supreme Court of Washington affirms the Superior Court's order. Campbell was convicted on November 26, 1982, and sentenced to death after the jury found no mitigating circumstances. His conviction and sentence were upheld on direct review in 1984. Subsequent death warrants were issued, with the first execution date set for March 29, 1985, which was stayed to allow Campbell to seek certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, ultimately denied in April 1985.

Following a second death warrant for July 25, 1985, Campbell filed a personal restraint petition with the Washington Supreme Court, identifying 23 new issues. The court denied the motion and the petition on July 18, 1985. Campbell then filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, which led to a stay of execution. The District Court identified 21 exhausted claims from the original 61 presented but denied the habeas corpus petition on February 12, 1986. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this judgment in October 1987, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied further review in November 1988 and January 1989.

On January 25, 1989, the Ninth Circuit dissolved Campbell's stay of execution. Anticipating this, Campbell requested counsel for a second personal restraint petition in August 1988, but the request was denied in December 1988. A third death warrant was issued on February 15, 1989, with Campbell declared indigent and counsel appointed for direct appeal. On March 3, 1989, Campbell again sought the appointment of counsel to prepare a second personal restraint petition and requested a stay of execution pending this new collateral attack.

On March 8, 1989, the court appointed counsel but denied a motion for a stay, allowing counsel to further brief potential unlitigated issues that might merit a stay. This briefing was set for argument on March 23, 1989. Separately, Campbell filed a notice of appeal regarding a February 15 order. The court established an expedited schedule for this appeal, requiring Campbell's counsel to submit various briefs by set dates, with the oral argument scheduled for March 23, 1989.

Campbell sought to appeal the trial court's order setting his execution for March 30, 1989, claiming a right to appeal under RAP 2.2(a)(13). However, the court determined that the death warrant did not affect a substantial right, as allowing such appeals could indefinitely delay executions and create an impractical cycle of appeals. The court noted prior affirmations of the death sentence and clarified that a final order is appealable only if it affects rights not adjudicated in earlier judgments. Therefore, Campbell's appeal was dismissed, but the notice was treated as a motion for discretionary review. The court subsequently accepted the review in the interest of justice, addressing Campbell's claim that he must complete his prior felony sentences before execution on his 1982 convictions, citing RCW 9.92.080(1).

Campbell is currently serving sentences for prior convictions and argues that a statute prevents execution until all prior sentences are completed. However, the court finds that the statute applies only to individuals sentenced to a term of imprisonment, which does not include those sentenced to death like Campbell. Additionally, Campbell contends that RCW 10.95.180(1) violates his religious beliefs by requiring him to choose his method of execution. The court clarifies that the statute allows for an election of lethal injection but does not compel Campbell to make a choice; if he opts out, the default method will be determined by the statute. Campbell's request for a hearing to further discuss the execution method is deemed unnecessary, as he has not indicated what evidence would be relevant. Furthermore, Campbell asks the court to reconsider a prior ruling that execution by hanging is not cruel and unusual punishment. The court declines this request, noting that other states have upheld similar statutes. Campbell also claims ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the presentation of issues at a previous hearing, but the court finds no harm in this since all issues were addressed on appeal. The death warrant setting an execution date for March 30, 1989, is affirmed. The court waives certain procedural rules regarding motions for reconsideration, issuing an immediate mandate without entertaining further motions.