Court: Supreme Court of the United States; January 13, 1993; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Walter L. Nixon, the Chief Judge of a Federal District Court, was convicted of federal crimes and subsequently impeached by the House of Representatives, which led to a Senate trial under Senate Rule XI. Nixon claimed that this rule, which restricts the full Senate's participation in evidentiary hearings, violated the Constitution's Impeachment Trial Clause, arguing that the Senate should conduct a judicial-style trial subject to judicial review. The District Court deemed his claim nonjusticiable, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court held that Nixon's assertion regarding Senate Rule XI's violation of the Impeachment Trial Clause was indeed nonjusticiable. The Court explained that nonjusticiability arises from a clear constitutional allocation of impeachment authority to the Senate and a lack of judicially manageable standards for resolving such disputes. The language of the Impeachment Trial Clause indicates that the Senate holds the exclusive power to try impeachments. The Court rejected Nixon's interpretation that "try" necessitates a full Senate trial subject to judicial review, noting that the term lacks the precision required for judicial standards.
Moreover, the established procedural requirements within the Clause, such as the oath of Senate members, the necessity of a two-thirds vote for conviction, and the Chief Justice's role in presidential impeachment trials, suggest that the Framers did not intend to impose further limitations on Senate proceedings. The historical context and commentary from the Constitutional Convention further support the notion that impeachment authority resides solely within the legislative branch, free from judicial interference.
The Court also highlighted that involving the judiciary in impeachment could lead to political instability and complicate the process of judicial relief, reinforcing the conclusion that impeachment is a political question not suitable for judicial resolution.
A ruling of nonjusticiability aligns with the Court's decision in Powell v. McCormack, as there is no constitutional provision undermined by granting the Senate the authority to interpret the term "try" in Article I, Section 3, Clause 6. Courts may review legislative actions that breach defined textual limits, but the term "try" does not impose such restrictions on the Senate's authority.
The case involves petitioner Walter L. Nixon, Jr., a former Chief Judge who was impeached after being convicted of making false statements to a federal grand jury. The House of Representatives charged Nixon with high crimes, leading to a Senate trial governed by Rule XI, which allows a committee of Senators to gather evidence and report findings to the full Senate. This process included four days of hearings, witness testimonies, and arguments presented to the Senate. Ultimately, the Senate convicted Nixon with the necessary two-thirds majority, resulting in his removal from office.
Nixon subsequently filed a lawsuit claiming that Senate Rule XI violated the constitutional provision granting the Senate the exclusive power to try impeachments, arguing that it restricted the full Senate's involvement in evidentiary hearings. The Court concluded the claim was nonjusticiable, affirming the Senate's broad authority in impeachment proceedings.
Nixon sought a declaratory judgment to void his impeachment conviction and restore his judicial salary and privileges. The District Court deemed his claim nonjusticiable, a decision upheld by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. A nonjusticiable controversy occurs when a significant issue is constitutionally committed to a political branch or lacks judicially manageable standards for resolution, as established in Baker v. Carr. Courts must first interpret relevant constitutional text to determine if an issue is textually committed.
The analysis focuses on Article I, Section 3, Clause 6, which grants the Senate the exclusive authority to try impeachments, detailing procedural requirements such as the necessity of an oath, a two-thirds vote for conviction, and the Chief Justice's presiding role during a presidential trial. Nixon argued that the term "try" implies a judicial-style trial, thereby preventing the Senate from delegating witness testimony to a select committee.
However, the interpretation of "try" is broader than Nixon suggested, encompassing various meanings, including examination and investigation. The Constitution generally allows Congress to establish detailed procedures, which indicates that the Framers did not intend "try" to impose strict limitations on the Senate's impeachment process. The position that courts can review whether the Senate adequately "tried" Nixon is ultimately rejected based on the broader understanding of the term and the constitutional framework.
The use of the word "try" in the Impeachment Trial Clause lacks precision for judicial review of the Senate's actions, supported by three specific constitutional requirements: Senators must be sworn in, a two-thirds vote is necessary for conviction, and the Chief Justice presides over presidential trials. These clear limitations imply that the Framers did not intend to impose further restrictions through the term "try." The term "sole" in "the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments" is significant, indicating that the Senate has exclusive authority to decide on acquittal or conviction. Its definition as "solitary" and "independently" suggests that any judicial review would undermine the Senate's independence. Nixon's assertion that "sole" is a mere cosmetic addition is flawed; the Committee of Style, which revised the language, was authorized to reflect the Framers' intent accurately. The acceptance of this revision by the Constitutional Convention further supports its substantive value. Additionally, the argument regarding the President's pardon authority does not negate the Senate's exclusive role in impeachment matters, as a pardon is an executive act and not a judicial overturning of a conviction.
Authority to determine impeachment procedures lies solely with the Senate, and this power is not subject to judicial review. The Framers intentionally excluded cases of impeachment from the President's pardon authority, indicating that executive clemency is not applicable in such situations. While the petitioner emphasizes the word "sole" to argue that only the Senate, and not other entities such as courts or committees, can try impeachments, this interpretation lacks a natural reading and could imply unwarranted limitations on the Senate's procedural authority. Historical context reveals no evidence from the Constitutional Convention suggesting the possibility of judicial review concerning impeachment powers, despite the existence of judicial review in relation to other legislative actions. The Framers debated placing impeachment power with the Federal Judiciary but ultimately assigned it to the Senate, which they viewed as a more suitable body due to its representation of the people and concerns over the Supreme Court's capacity to handle such significant responsibilities. Additionally, the Framers anticipated separate impeachment and criminal proceedings for offenses, as outlined in the Constitution.
The Framers intentionally established a separation between forums to prevent bias and ensure independent judgments in impeachment proceedings. They questioned the propriety of allowing individuals who had already impacted a person's rights in one trial to also determine their fate in another, highlighting concerns that errors could compound across trials. Judicial review of Senate impeachment trials would similarly introduce bias and contradict the Framers' vision of checks and balances, where impeachment serves as the Legislature's sole check on the Judiciary. Hamilton emphasized that the Constitution provides for judicial accountability solely through impeachment, which ensures judicial independence. Nixon's call for judicial review is counterproductive, as it would undermine the constitutional checks placed on the Judiciary and effectively place the reviewing authority in the hands of the body it should regulate.
The Framers included safeguards to prevent Senate overreach: the division of impeachment powers between the House and Senate, and the requirement of a two-thirds supermajority for conviction. These mechanisms aim to protect against the dangers of factionalism. Furthermore, the potential lack of finality in judicial review raises justiciability concerns, as prolonged legal proceedings could lead to political instability, particularly if a President were impeached. The uncertainty surrounding the nature of judicial relief also complicates matters, as it could result in prolonged chaos and undermine the legitimacy of any successor during the impeachment process.
The document examines the justiciability of a federal judge's reinstatement and Congress's authority to create additional judgeships. The petitioner argues that a nonjusticiability ruling conflicts with the Supreme Court's opinion in Powell v. McCormack, which addressed whether courts could review the House's determination that Powell was "unqualified" due to allegations of misconduct. The Court held that while the House has the authority to judge members' qualifications, this authority is limited to the specific qualifications outlined in Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, which are age, citizenship, and residency. The House's broad claim of unreviewable authority was rejected because the Constitution defines these qualifications.
In the current case, there is no similar constitutional provision that limits the Senate's interpretation of the term "try" in the Impeachment Trial Clause. The court affirms that it has the power to review legislative or executive actions for compliance with textual limits, but concludes that the term "try" does not impose such limits on the Senate’s authority. Justice Stevens concurs, emphasizing that the impeachment power is constitutionally assigned to the Legislative Branch, reflecting the Framers' intent, and highlights the Senate's awareness of its responsibilities in this regard. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judicial restraint and the potential issues stemming from a contrary perspective justify agreement with the Chief Justice's views. Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurs in the judgment regarding the petitioner’s claim that the Senate's method of conviction violates the Constitution's requirement that the Senate "try" impeachments. The Court believes it cannot consider this claim, but Justice White disagrees and asserts that the Senate did fulfill its constitutional duty to conduct a trial. Practically, the distinction between the Court’s view and his own may have little impact, as the Senate has broad discretion in determining impeachment trial procedures. There is minimal risk of the Senate misusing this discretion to disregard its constitutional obligation. Justice White emphasizes the importance of not allowing the Senate to dismiss its critical role in the impeachment process, especially in light of the Solicitor General's suggestion that a basic procedure could suffice.
The majority's framing of the issue aligns with the political question doctrine established in Baker v. Carr, asserting that the constitutional text commits the issue to a political branch and lacks judicially manageable standards. However, Justice White contends that the relevant inquiry is whether the Constitution grants a political branch the final authority to interpret such powers, rather than simply identifying a textual commitment. He notes that while some constitutional provisions suggest a lack of judicial review, many instances require courts to infer political questions from the Constitution’s text and structure. The courts often look for evidence that the judiciary was not intended to exercise review, contributing to the determination of what constitutes a political question.
In Coleman v. Miller, the Supreme Court declined to establish a definitive lifespan for a proposed constitutional amendment, emphasizing that the amendment process is primarily a congressional responsibility and that no judicial criteria exist for such determinations. The majority opinion identifies a significant textual commitment in the Constitution's use of "sole" in the context of impeachment, noting its limited occurrence in only two clauses—one for the Senate and one for the House. This implies that the Framers intended to grant each chamber exclusive authority over its respective role in the impeachment process, thereby separating prosecutorial from adjudicative functions. While the majority correctly interprets "sole" as indicating the Senate's need for independence in impeachment trials, it mistakenly attributes potential interference concerns to the judiciary rather than the House. Furthermore, the Court's reluctance to engage with legislative review based solely on the term "sole" raises questions, especially when compared to its historical willingness to interpret "All legislative powers" in Article I, which has been addressed by the judiciary in significant cases like INS v. Chadha, reinforcing the judiciary's role in clarifying legislative powers. The majority also references historical context and early interpretations of the Impeachment Clauses, citing arguments made during the Constitutional Convention and articulated by Hamilton in The Federalist Papers.
The Framers of the Constitution believed that the trial of public officials should be conducted by representatives of the people, as they viewed the judiciary as ill-equipped to handle political matters. They contended that impeachment powers should reside within the Legislative Branch to ensure checks on the judiciary, which was seen as largely unaccountable. The majority opinion asserts that the Senate holds the authority to conduct impeachment trials, but it fails to address the historical context regarding judicial review of impeachment. The debates reveal that many Framers expressed ambivalence regarding impeachment, recognizing the challenges it posed to the system of checks and balances, particularly the potential for one branch to exert undue power over others.
The Framers proposed various mechanisms for impeachment, with figures like Madison initially advocating for judicial involvement, though he later suggested a more complex scheme involving all branches. Jefferson also sought an interbranch approach. Hamilton, while defending the Senate's exclusive power in his writings, advocated for a court of state judges during the convention, later pushing for a joint trial system involving multiple branches. Historical evidence indicates that the Framers were wary of granting any branch excessive discretion in impeachment matters. The majority’s conclusion that Congress has significant power in impeachment while being immune from judicial review contradicts the fundamental principles of checks and balances intended by the Framers. The Court's stance on nonjusticiability ultimately undermines the careful design established by the Framers.
Impeachments tried by the Senate are intended to check the judiciary's power while ensuring that the Senate follows basic procedural standards during trials. The majority asserts that the term "try" lacks a clear judicial standard, noting that it could refer to an inquiry akin to a judicial proceeding or simply to experimentation. The Court finds no evidence that the Framers intended "try" to limit the Senate's impeachment process, as indicated by the specific procedural requirements in the Impeachment Trial Clause, such as senators taking an oath and the necessity of a two-thirds vote to convict.
The majority distinguishes this issue from Powell v. McCormack, where the Court asserted its role in interpreting constitutional qualifications despite Congress’s authority to judge its members. The majority argues that while the qualifications in Art. I, § 2 are clearly defined for judicial interpretation, the term "try" does not provide a similar textual constraint on the Senate’s authority. The majority presents two arguments against judicial review based on the ambiguity of "try," but counters that the term was likely used in its legal sense, indicating a formal process rather than an attempt or investigation. This interpretation is supported by the context of the Impeachment Trial Clause and the broader constitutional framework.
A variant of the majority opinion examines whether the legal interpretation of "try" in the Impeachment Trial Clause creates a standard that can be managed judicially. The majority posits that the term lacks a clear textual limit. However, the Government acknowledged during oral arguments that "try" is not as ambiguous as suggested. For instance, if the Senate were to automatically convict upon receiving articles of impeachment, it would fail to adequately "try" the impeachment. The term "try" is argued to present interpretive challenges similar to other constitutional standards that courts have successfully interpreted, such as "commerce" and "due process." The majority's claim that "try" cannot be judicially construed is seen as ironic since procedural justice concepts typically fall within judicial definitional capabilities.
The petitioner must prove that the Constitution prohibits the Senate from using a fact-finding committee merely by invoking the term "try." Historical context indicates that the Framers understood impeachment proceedings to resemble judicial processes, involving formal hearings with representation and evidence presentation. The petitioner contends that the absence of committees in state impeachment trials prior to the Constitutional Convention precludes their use. However, this reasoning is criticized as overly simplistic, with historical and textual evidence suggesting otherwise. Specifically, Article III, Section 2, Clause 3, which exempts impeachment trials from jury requirements, indicates that the Framers intended to avoid imposing strict procedural rules. Hamilton and Justice Story both emphasized the need for flexibility in impeachment processes, arguing that rigid common law procedures do not suit such trials.
Judicial practices, characterized by rigid guidelines and technical principles, are ill-suited for trials involving political offenses such as impeachment. A more flexible and comprehensive tribunal is essential for fair trials, as historical practices in both England and America demonstrate that impeachment proceedings are generally less technical and more straightforward. Notably, fact-finding has been delegated to committees in legislative bodies, a practice acknowledged by the Framers, including Jefferson, who recommended similar methods for the Senate. Historical precedents show that state legislatures and federal courts have utilized committees and special masters for investigation and fact-finding purposes. The Constitution grants each House the power to determine its procedural rules, indicating that the Impeachment Trial Clause does not prohibit the use of fact-finding committees. Consequently, the Senate’s use of such committees aligns with constitutional requirements for impeachment trials. Thus, the petitioner’s challenge to his conviction lacks merit, as the Court refrains from adjudicating the specifics of the impeachment trial, emphasizing respect for legislative authority.
Concerns regarding the impeachment process should not undermine the Constitution, which grants the Senate significant discretion in how to conduct impeachments. Justice Souter, while concurring with the Court's judgment that the case is a nonjusticiable political question, emphasizes that each case requires a nuanced analysis rather than a broad categorization. The political question doctrine is rooted in the separation of powers, aimed at preventing judicial interference in matters assigned to other branches of government. This doctrine is relevant when issues are constitutionally committed to a political department, lack judicial standards for resolution, or require a policy determination outside judicial purview. The Impeachment Trial Clause specifically assigns the Senate the sole authority to try impeachments, subject to certain procedural requirements, allowing it to define related procedures as necessary. Additionally, considerations such as the need for adherence to prior political decisions and the risk of conflicting judgments from various branches further support the conclusion that this matter is nonjusticiable.
Judicial review of impeachment trials could significantly disrupt government operations. However, extreme circumstances, such as the Senate acting in a grossly improper manner—like deciding a conviction by chance or based solely on a subjective judgment—might warrant a more thorough judicial examination. Such actions could exceed the Senate's constitutional authority, justifying judicial intervention despite typical reservations against interference. The political question doctrine, meant to maintain order, will not be employed to foster disorder.
Rule XI outlines the procedural authority of the Senate's Presiding Officer, allowing the appointment of a committee to gather evidence during impeachment trials. This committee exercises powers akin to those of the full Senate, with the requirement to report findings in writing. The Senate retains the right to summon witnesses and conduct hearings openly, preserving its authority over the trial process.
Nixon argues that justiciability should not depend on whether the judiciary's interests are affected by legislative actions. He cites cases like Mistretta v. United States and Morrison v. Olson, which do not support his position as they did not address justiciability and lacked a context where judicial review would eliminate the Framers' checks on the judiciary. The Impeachment Trial Clause, which assigns the Chief Justice to preside over presidential impeachment trials, counters Nixon's argument, and dismissing this as a mere hypothetical abuse is inadequate.
The excerpt emphasizes that the term "try" in the context of impeachment possesses a clear meaning, suggesting it is manageable for judicial interpretation. It critiques the majority's argument that judicial review of impeachments could disrupt the political system, asserting that such review would not be more harmful than existing litigation. The reference to *Powell v. McCormack* supports this stance, as the potential for constitutional crises does not justify abstaining from judicial oversight in impeachment cases.
The text also addresses a prudential view proposed by Justice Souter, which claims that judicial involvement in impeachment could interfere with the Senate’s functions. The author contends that no sufficient rationale is provided to differentiate the respect due to the Senate’s actions from the judicial review of legislative acts. It argues that the courts must maintain their constitutional role by reviewing the validity of impeachment procedures, and that avoiding such review will not prevent the potential for necessary judgments based on the merits of individual cases. Ultimately, the excerpt critiques the notion of deference as superficial, advocating for a thorough constitutional analysis over an impressionistic approach.
