Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon; November 29, 1995; Oregon; State Appellate Court
Stepmother sought to intervene in a custody and visitation proceeding for a 13-year-old child she helped raise during her marriage to the child's father. The court allowed her to seek visitation rights under ORS 109.119(5), contingent upon proving that visitation is in the child's best interests. However, it denied her intervention regarding custody under ORS 109.119(1). The court's ruling is under appeal, and the appellate court has reversed and remanded the decision.
Key facts include that the child's biological parents divorced when she was two, with joint custody awarded to both. Following the divorce, the father married the stepmother, and for several years, the child lived primarily with them. The stepmother played a significant parenting role, making crucial decisions for the child and providing emotional and practical support, while the child maintained a positive relationship with her biological mother. After the divorce of the father and stepmother, the child continued to live with her father, but the stepmother alleged that the father began restricting her access to the child despite an initial verbal agreement allowing free visitation.
During the intervention hearing, testimonies were presented from the mother, father, and stepmother, focusing solely on whether the stepmother should be granted intervenor status to pursue custody or visitation rights.
The proceeding aimed to evaluate the stepmother's motion to intervene in custody or visitation rights, which the father did not oppose, but the mother contested. The mother's opposition was based on the argument that the stepmother had the opportunity to establish such rights during her divorce from the father but chose not to, and that it was not in the child's best interests to introduce the stepmother into the custody discussion given the successful joint custody arrangement between the parents. Testimony presented deviated from the primary issue of the emotional child-parent relationship between the stepmother and the child, focusing instead on opinions about whether the stepmother should have custody or visitation rights. Both parents expressed concerns that any disruption in the child's relationship with either of them would be detrimental. Additionally, evidence of disagreements between the mother and stepmother regarding parental responsibilities was irrelevant to the hearing's limited scope but seemed to influence the trial court's decision. The relevant statute, ORS 109.119, outlines that individuals who have established emotional ties with a child can petition for custody or visitation rights, provided it is in the child's best interests. It specifies that stepparents in dissolution proceedings can also petition for these rights and that motions may be dismissed if they do not establish a prima facie case for a child-parent relationship or if the intervention is not in the child's best interests. The statute defines a "child-parent relationship" as one characterized by significant interaction, care, and fulfillment of the child's psychological and physical needs within the six months prior to filing. It also allows for petitions for visitation rights from individuals maintaining a continuous personal relationship with the child for at least one year.
The court must grant visitation to a person if clear and convincing evidence shows that it is in the child's best interests and appropriate. The trial judge allowed the stepmother to seek visitation but denied her the chance to intervene for custody, concluding she failed to prove she was the child's psychological parent, as the child still considers her biological mother as "mom." The court found that the stepmother did not meet the definition of a "child-parent relationship" under ORS 109.119(4) because she had not exclusively fulfilled the child's psychological needs. Additionally, the court ruled that seeking a change in the custodial arrangement of two biological parents was not in the child’s best interests.
However, this ruling was erroneous on both counts. First, ORS 109.119(4) does not restrict the fulfillment of a child's psychological needs to only two individuals. Evidence showed that the stepmother had significantly contributed to the child's psychological and physical needs, potentially more than either biological parent. The existence of fit biological parents who share custody does not negate the stepmother's established psychological child-parent relationship with the child.
Second, there is no requirement for a stepparent to prove they have "substituted" for a biological parent to gain intervenor status. The stepmother did not need to demonstrate that the child views her as the primary mother figure, as a psychological parent does not have to replace a biological parent to establish the necessary relationship.
Lastly, the court's assertion that the stepmother needed to prove her intervention would be in the child's best interests was misinterpreted. ORS 109.119(3) allows for intervention unless it fails to allege facts supporting the best interests of the child. The trial court incorrectly placed the burden on the stepmother to prove the benefits of her involvement, and its concerns about potentially restricting the child's autonomy were not valid grounds for denying her standing to intervene in the custody proceedings.
The court erred in prematurely concluding that a custody or visitation order would not serve the best interests of a child who has previously enjoyed autonomy in her visitation and living arrangements. It failed to consider whether stepmother's participation in the custody hearing, given her close relationship with the child, would be beneficial. Instead, the court speculated on potential negative outcomes of a future order without addressing the current proceedings. ORS 109.119 outlines procedural rights for individuals claiming emotional ties to a child but does not alter substantive custodial rights. Even if stepmother might face challenges in custody preference, this should not preclude her from participating in the proceedings, especially considering the father's alleged psychological issues and lack of objection to her intervention. The statute requires only that stepmother allege facts supporting her intervention as being in the child's best interests, which she did successfully. The trial court's focus on potential detrimental effects of a custody order was misplaced, as the current issue was solely whether she could intervene, not the outcome of custody rights. The evidence demonstrated a valid child-parent relationship, thus the trial court's denial of stepmother's intervention under ORS 109.119(1) was incorrect. The decision is reversed and remanded.
