Court: Nevada Supreme Court; November 30, 1995; Nevada; State Supreme Court
Weldo D. Woolsey pleaded guilty on April 27, 1994, to felony failure to appear after being admitted to bail and received a three-year suspended sentence with parole conditions. Woolsey's failure to appear is linked to a 1986 arrest for third offense felony DUI in Eureka County. After posting bail, he failed to appear for a preliminary hearing on May 23, 1986, resulting in a bench warrant. An amended complaint downgraded his felony DUI charge to a misdemeanor due to the invalidity of prior Utah DUI convictions under the precedent set by *Koenig v. State*. Woolsey was re-arrested in June 1986 and again failed to appear for a hearing on July 16, 1986, leading to a second bench warrant. No further complaints for felony failure to appear were filed until 1993, when Woolsey was arrested in New Mexico and extradited to Nevada. On March 17, 1993, a criminal complaint was filed against him for felony failure to appear, related to the July 16, 1986 hearing, nearly seven years after the alleged offense. Following this, Woolsey was found guilty of two misdemeanors related to his original arrest and charged with felony failure to appear under NRS 199.335.
On July 20, 1993, Woolsey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before his trial for felony failure to appear, claiming the statute of limitations barred the charge and that the State could not demonstrate a necessary element of the underlying crime—that he was released on bail for a felony. The district court denied his request, which led Woolsey to file a writ of prohibition that was also denied. On April 27, 1994, Woolsey pleaded guilty to the felony failure to appear charge related to his July 16, 1986 preliminary hearing, acknowledging he was aware of his obligation to appear but claiming ignorance of the felony status of the DUI charge. He believed his bail covered court costs and fines for his non-appearance. Woolsey received a suspended three-year sentence with probation conditions, including abstaining from alcohol and possible counseling, while preserving his right to appeal legal issues.
The district court found that failure to appear is a "continuing offense," thus not subject to the statute of limitations, which generally applies a three-year limit to felonies. Woolsey's felony charge was prosecuted under NRS 199.335, which details penalties for individuals who fail to appear after being admitted to bail. Notably, the State filed the complaint nearly seven years after Woolsey failed to appear. For the statute of limitations to be circumvented, failure to appear must be treated as a continuing offense. The court referenced Campbell v. District Court, which established that escape is a continuing offense, and extended this reasoning to the context of bail jumping. The court concluded that an accused person remains in lawful custody while on bail, and failing to appear constitutes a violation of bail conditions, paralleling the continuing nature of escape offenses.
Failure to appear is classified as a continuing offense as long as the individual has not returned to lawful custody. The court supports this interpretation based on NRS 199.335, which aims to penalize those who violate bail conditions by failing to appear. Allowing Woolsey to evade prosecution due to the expiration of the statute of limitations contradicts the intent of the statute. The court determined that Woolsey's failure to appear did not constitute felony failure to appear, aligning with precedents that establish failure to appear as a separate offense from the underlying charge. The statute NRS 199.335 was designed to treat failure to appear as an independent offense, irrespective of the outcome of the original charges. Statutory interpretation principles disfavor unreasonable results, leading to the conclusion that the severity of a failure to appear charge should generally correspond to the original offense. The court also noted that NRS 199.335 does not require proof that the original charge would have succeeded in prosecution. Woolsey was only charged with failing to appear for a preliminary hearing, and since the DUI charge had been reduced to a misdemeanor before that hearing, his failure to appear was deemed a misdemeanor and not a felony. Consequently, the district court's conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this finding.
