City of Seattle v. Agrellas

Citations: 906 P.2d 995; 80 Wash. App. 130Docket: 32508-6-I

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; December 18, 1995; Washington; State Appellate Court

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The Court of Appeals of Washington addressed an appeal by Mike Agrellas, Robert Canamar, and Raul Miranda regarding a superior court's order that stayed proceedings and issued a writ of certiorari to review pretrial rulings from municipal court related to charges of obstructing a police officer and criminal trespass. The City of Seattle cross-appealed after the superior court later dissolved the writ and lifted the stay, stating that any further appeals should follow standard procedures under the Rules for Appeal of Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (RALJs). 

The appellate court concluded that the City's petition for the writ was filed too late, resulting in a lack of jurisdiction for the superior court to issue the writ or to delay the Appellants' speedy trial rights. As the records indicated that the Appellants' speedy trial periods had expired, the court dismissed the cases. 

The background involves a demonstration at the Pacific Hotel aimed at raising awareness of homelessness, leading to the arrest of 26 individuals, including the Appellants. A pretrial hearing determined that the Appellants could present a necessity defense, among other rulings. The City subsequently filed a writ application without notifying the Appellants, who later sought to intervene and dismiss the writ, arguing it was untimely and improperly executed. The superior court allowed the intervention, eventually dissolving the writ without addressing its merits, mainly due to procedural complications and the absence of all defendants at the hearings.

A writ procedure is deemed appropriate for reviewing pre-trial rulings from lower courts. In this case, although the writ was not frivolously sought, the court decided to dissolve it, lift the stay on proceedings, and reserve questions regarding Judge Aoki's pretrial rulings for the standard appeal process, allowing for further proceedings and trial in the lower court. The Appellants argued that the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss the writ infringed on their right to a speedy trial, while the City sought review of the dismissal without addressing the merits. Both motions were granted, and the cases were dismissed due to the expiration of the speedy trial period.

The Appellants contended that the City's writ application was untimely, asserting it should have been filed within 14 days of the relevant decision based on RALJ 2.5(a), CRLJ 73, and CrRLJ 9.1. The court concurred, stating that while RCW 7.16.040 does not impose a specific time limit for writ applications, such applications must be made within a reasonable time, generally interpreted to align with the appeal time frames for municipal court decisions. The court emphasized that applications for writs of certiorari regarding interlocutory decisions from limited jurisdiction courts must also adhere to the 14-day requirement. 

The City argued for a 30-day appeal period under the Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAPs), but the court rejected this, asserting that it is illogical to apply a longer period from unrelated rules when a consistent 14-day period governs appeals from district to superior court. The court clarified that the precedent cases cited by the City were not applicable due to the lack of conflicting limitations periods in this case.

The City's application for a writ of certiorari was filed 28 days after the relevant pretrial rulings, exceeding the 14-day filing requirement, rendering the application untimely. Consequently, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ or to stay the Appellants' speedy trial periods, which have since expired. The Appellants contended that the trial court erred in issuing the writ without joining or notifying them, which is a violation of due process principles that require notice before the deprivation of substantial rights, particularly in criminal cases. Although RCW 7.16.050 permits ex parte writs, due process mandates that the defendants be informed prior to any proceedings affecting their rights. The City also failed to adhere to RAP 5.4(b), which necessitates timely notice to opposing parties, further undermining its position. The court dismissed the cases due to the untimeliness of the City's application and the expiration of the Appellants' speedy trial periods. The court rejected the City's argument that the Appellants' later intervention rectified the initial lack of notice, asserting that had all defendants been present from the outset, the writ may not have been issued, thus preserving the Appellants' rights.