Anderson v. Weslo, Inc.

Citations: 906 P.2d 336; 79 Wash. App. 829Docket: 17611-4-II

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; November 28, 1995; Washington; State Appellate Court

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David Anderson, a 16-year-old, was injured while performing a double flip on a trampoline owned by Linda Iszler and manufactured by Weslo. He landed on his head, fracturing a cervical vertebra. Anderson, an experienced trampoline user, had frequently used the Iszler's trampoline and had previously taught himself various flips. Prior to the accident, the Iszlers required parental consent for friends to jump and had posted safety rules derived from the trampoline's user manual, which they believed Anderson had read. Although Linda Iszler had advised against performing double flips, Anderson claimed he was never explicitly forbidden to do so.

Anderson filed a negligence and products liability lawsuit against the Iszlers and Weslo, alleging a failure to warn about potential injuries and claiming the trampoline design was unreasonably dangerous. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Anderson had not established premises liability, that the trampoline's design was not unreasonably dangerous, and that he failed to prove proximate cause regarding the manufacturer's warnings. Anderson subsequently appealed the decision.

An appellate court reviews summary judgment orders de novo, applying the same analysis as the trial court. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court evaluates facts favorably for the nonmoving party and grants summary judgment if only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn.

In a negligence action, the existence of a duty and its breach are critical elements. The determination of whether a duty exists is a legal question, particularly in premises liability cases where the plaintiff's status (invitee, licensee, or trespasser) defines the duty owed by the property owner. In this case, Anderson was a licensee, defined as someone allowed onto the property with the owner's consent.

Washington law, referencing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, establishes that a landowner is liable for harm to licensees caused by dangerous conditions if: (1) the owner knows or should know of the condition, realizes it poses an unreasonable risk, and expects the licensee will not recognize the danger; (2) the owner fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe or to warn the licensee; and (3) the licensee does not know or should not know of the condition or associated risks.

Regarding the trampoline as a potential dangerous condition, the Iszlers could be liable only if all three elements are met. They were aware of the trampoline, satisfying the first element. However, Anderson, being an experienced user who understood the inherent risks and had previous injuries, could reasonably be expected to recognize the danger, negating the first element.

For the second element, the Iszlers took precautions by posting safety rules, requiring written parental permission, and providing manufacturer literature, indicating they exercised reasonable care. Thus, this element is also not satisfied.

Finally, the third element fails as well, given Anderson's age, experience with trampolines, and knowledge of prior injuries related to trampoline use, meaning he was aware of the risks involved. Overall, the Iszlers' potential liability under the established legal framework is not substantiated.

Anderson is not required to be informed of every possible injury but must recognize he is engaging in a risky activity, indicating that the third element of his claim is not met. Consequently, the Iszlers did not breach their duty to Anderson as a licensee, and the trial court correctly granted them summary judgment. Anderson also contends that Weslo, Inc. should be held liable for defective design and inadequate warnings related to the trampoline. Under RCW 7.72.030, a manufacturer is liable if the product is not reasonably safe due to design flaws or insufficient warnings. 

For defective design, the statute allows a plaintiff to prove liability by showing either that the risk of harm and its severity outweigh the burden of designing a safer product or that the product is unsafe beyond what an ordinary consumer would expect. The "risk-utility" standard is not applicable since an alternative design that prevents harm from trampoline use is not feasible. Under the "consumer expectations" test, Anderson fails to demonstrate that the trampoline is more dangerous than what an ordinary consumer would anticipate; jumping on a trampoline inherently carries risks, which are obvious to consumers.

Regarding inadequate warnings, Anderson asserts there is a material issue concerning the sufficiency of warnings provided by Weslo, Inc. The statute states that a product is not safe if warnings could have been provided to mitigate the likelihood and severity of harm but were not. However, Anderson has not established that the warnings given were inadequate based on the criteria set forth in RCW 7.72.030(1)(b).

A plaintiff can establish liability under defective design claims using either the "risk-utility" or "consumer expectations" tests as outlined in RCW 7.72.030(3). However, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that inadequate warnings or instructions were the proximate cause of their injury. Proximate cause includes two components: cause in fact, which is determined by the "but for" test, and legal causation, which assesses whether liability should be imposed based on logic, common sense, and policy. In this case, Weslo provided extensive warnings in the user manual, safety placards, and stickers on the trampoline, specifically cautioning against improper landings and the risks associated with somersaults. If a user disregards known risks, the manufacturer's warnings may not prevent harm, as established in prior cases like Baughn v. Honda Motor Co. Here, since Anderson was aware of the risks yet paid insufficient attention to the warnings, he likely would not have altered his behavior even if the warnings were more detailed, thus failing to establish cause in fact. Additionally, without legal causation, proximate cause is not satisfied. The courts have emphasized that just because a product may cause injury does not necessitate its removal from the market. Unlike cases where legal causation was deemed satisfied, such as Ayers regarding baby oil, the extensive warnings provided in this case imply that the risk of trampoline injuries cannot be entirely eliminated. Anderson’s claim of inadequate warnings is countered by the clear communication of general injury risks and specific dangers related to somersaults.

A manufacturer is not obligated to warn users about dangers that are obvious or known, as established in Hegre v. Simpson Dura-Vent Co. The inherent risk of injury from jumping on a trampoline, such as falling or landing improperly, is considered obvious. Consequently, it follows that users are aware they might land on vulnerable parts of their bodies, potentially resulting in serious injuries. Therefore, the court concludes that Weslo's warnings sufficiently informed users about these risks, leading to the determination that proximate cause has not been established legally. The decision is affirmed, with concurrence from Justices Seinfeld and Bridgewater. Additionally, while cause in fact typically falls to jury consideration, it can shift to a legal question when the facts are undisputed and the inferences are clear. Finally, there are slight variations in the wording of the safety statement on the safety card.