Court: Supreme Court of the United States; March 31, 1992; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
In the case of Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court addressed a class action initiated by black school children and their parents against the DeKalb County, Georgia, School System (DCSS), which had a history of de jure segregation. A consent order in 1969 mandated the dismantling of this segregation, with the court overseeing the implementation. By 1986, DCSS officials sought dismissal of the case, asserting that they had achieved unitary status. The District Court recognized DCSS's significant progress in four of the six factors outlined in Green v. New Kent County School Board, particularly noting that the racial imbalance in student assignments stemmed from demographic changes unrelated to DCSS's actions.
However, the court did not dismiss the case due to DCSS's failure to achieve unitary status concerning faculty assignments and resource allocation, which affected the quality of education for black and white students. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision, arguing that full compliance in all Green categories must be achieved simultaneously for unitary status to be recognized and that DCSS could not absolve itself of responsibility based on prior demographic changes.
The Supreme Court held that a district court supervising a desegregation plan possesses the authority to gradually relinquish control over a school district and may refrain from ordering further remedies in areas where compliance has been achieved. The Court acknowledged that while the concept of unitariness provides a framework for evaluating compliance, it does not limit the court's discretion to implement equitable remedies aimed at correcting constitutional violations, ultimately allowing for a practical approach to restore local control over compliant school systems.
Incremental or partial withdrawal of judicial supervision in compliance matters may be justified based on case-specific facts while retaining jurisdiction over areas of noncompliance. Courts can refrain from ordering further remedies in student assignment issues if racial imbalance is not directly linked to constitutional violations. Key factors informing a court's discretion for such withdrawal include the extent of compliance with the decree, the necessity of control for achieving compliance in other areas, and the school district's demonstration of good faith in adhering to the decree and relevant statutory provisions.
A court should closely examine the school system’s compliance history and existing policies aimed at eliminating previous violations. Over time, the significance of racial imbalances may lessen, allowing for better evaluation of remedy effectiveness. The Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that the District Court lacked discretion to allow the DCSS to regain control over student assignments while maintaining oversight in other areas. The District Court properly exercised its discretion by assessing the Green factors and ensuring minority students were not disadvantaged, highlighting that these factors do not have to be rigidly applied.
The Court of Appeals' underlying assumptions—that noncompliance in any area precludes partial withdrawal of judicial control and mandates full compliance before any remedial measures can be relaxed—are inconsistent with precedent. Racial balance should only be pursued if linked to constitutional violations; once such violations are addressed, districts are not obligated to rectify demographic-based imbalances. The decree effectively achieved its desegregation goals in student assignments, and subsequent resegregation was attributed to demographic changes rather than constitutional violations, reinforcing the need for feasible remedies focused on specific violations.
Retention of judicial control over student attendance in the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) is to be evaluated in further proceedings on remand. The District Court lacked this Court's prior analysis when addressing faculty assignments, necessitating specific findings on whether student reassignments could remedy existing compliance issues. While the District Court acknowledged DCSS's progress and dedication, it did not conclude that DCSS acted in bad faith or discriminated post-decree, which does not equate to a finding of DCSS's commitment to fully comply with the desegregation plan. The case originated from a 1969 court order mandating DCSS to dismantle its dual school system, and a 1986 motion for final dismissal revealed that while some aspects achieved unitary status, others did not. The Court of Appeals had ruled that full remedial authority should be retained until unitary status was achieved across all categories simultaneously. However, the current ruling reverses this and permits a district court to withdraw supervision from specific areas where compliance has been achieved, without needing to maintain control over the entire system until all aspects demonstrate unitary status. The historical context highlights DCSS’s previous delays in desegregation efforts, notably adopting a freedom of choice plan in 1966-67 that minimally affected the dual-school system.
In the landmark case Green, the court emphasized the urgency for school districts previously segregated by law to present effective desegregation plans, stating that "the time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out." Following this ruling, a class action was initiated by black school children and their parents against the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) in June 1969. In response, DCSS collaborated with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to create a comprehensive desegregation plan, which included the closure of former black schools and the reassignment of students to neighborhood schools under a consent order approved by the District Court.
From 1969 to 1986, the respondents sought limited judicial intervention, and in 1976, the court mandated the expansion of a Minority-to-Majority (M-to-M) transfer program and established oversight for the program. The court also made adjustments to school boundaries and teacher assignments to better reflect racial balance. In 1986, petitioners requested a final dismissal of the litigation, asserting that DCSS had achieved unitary status.
The District Court evaluated DCSS's compliance with Green's criteria and also considered the quality of education provided to both white and black students. It concluded that DCSS had made significant progress toward unitary status in areas such as student assignments and facilities but identified remaining issues related to teacher and principal assignments, resource allocation, and educational quality. Consequently, while DCSS was recognized as a unitary system in several respects, the court ordered further actions to rectify the lingering disparities.
Proper resolution of desegregation cases requires a careful assessment of factual circumstances, particularly the degree of racial imbalance within the school district. A critical starting point is the comparison of majority and minority student proportions in individual schools to overall district demographics. The District Court initiated its analysis by evaluating the current racial composition of schools in DeKalb County School System (DCSS) and the reasons for observed imbalances. The findings of racial composition were not contested as clearly erroneous by the respondents on appeal, nor did the Court of Appeals dispute these findings. However, the appellate court disagreed with the District Court's conclusion regarding the necessity for ongoing supervision of racial balance in student assignments.
Significant demographic shifts occurred from 1969 to 1986, with the black student percentage rising from 5.6% to 47%. During this period, DeKalb County's total population grew substantially, while public school enrollment remained relatively stable. The northern and southern areas of the county exhibited different growth patterns: the northern region became predominantly white, while the southern region became predominantly black. This shift was largely due to a migration of black residents from Atlanta to southern DeKalb County and a concurrent exodus of white residents from that area. The District Court's findings highlighted these demographic changes as crucial to understanding the current racial mix in DCSS, noting their profound impact on school racial compositions.
From 1976 to 1986, overall enrollment in elementary schools decreased by 15%, while black enrollment rose by 86%. Similarly, high school enrollment declined by 16%, with black enrollment increasing by 119%. In DeKalb County, during the 1986-1987 school year, 47% of students in the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) were black. Notably, 50% of black students attended schools with over 90% black populations, and 62% went to schools with more than 20% excess black students compared to the systemwide average. Conversely, 27% of white students were in schools that were over 90% white, and 59% attended schools with more than 20% excess white students. Among DCSS's high schools, five had over 90% black populations, while five others were over 80% white. In elementary schools, 18 out of 74 were over 90% black, and 10 were over 90% white. The District Court noted that nonblack minority students made up less than 1% of the population.
Respondents argued that this racial imbalance was a remnant of the dual school system rather than a result of demographic changes. They highlighted significant discrepancies in student racial ratios across schools and contended that DCSS did not fully utilize available desegregation strategies, citing specific shortcomings: lack of subdistricting, insufficient funding for minority education, absence of community advisory organizations, ineffective use of the freedom of choice plan, failure to create a feeder pattern through school clustering, delayed implementation of the magnet school program, and inadequate busing for urban-suburban exchanges.
The District Court acknowledged that a 1969 order for neighborhood school assignment had temporarily desegregated DCSS student assignment but noted respondents' claims of ongoing imbalances in two schools, even in 1969. Despite a small black percentage in the county at that time, Terry Mill Elementary School (76% black) and Stoneview Elementary School (51% black) had majority black enrollments. The Court determined that these imbalances were not remnants of the previous de jure system, as both schools were originally designated as white schools. Expert testimony indicated that demographic changes, particularly the migration of black residents from Atlanta, led to Terry Mill becoming predominantly black by 1967, having been primarily white the previous year.
By 1968, black students made up 50% of Terry Mill's school population, increasing to 76% by 1969 when a new desegregation plan was implemented. The District Court determined that prior unconstitutional actions by petitioners did not contribute to this demographic shift, indicating challenges faced in integrating the entire district. Although the court acknowledged that DCSS was temporarily desegregated under the 1969 plan, it did not conclude that DCSS achieved unitary status solely based on this brief period. Instead, it scrutinized the relationship between DCSS policies and demographic changes in DeKalb County.
The court noted that DCSS actively worked to address the racial balance in schools, including the establishment of a biracial committee overseeing boundary changes, with only three out of approximately 170 changes having any segregative impact. An M-to-M (Magnet-to-Magnet) transfer program initiated in 1972 proved successful, with increasing participation, ultimately benefiting 19% of DCSS students through integrated learning experiences. In the 1980s, DCSS launched magnet school programs to attract a diverse student body from different county regions.
Additionally, DCSS implemented various racially integrated experience programs, including a writing center, summer school initiatives, and a dialectical speech program. The District Court's evaluation focused on whether maximum practical desegregation had been achieved and if further efforts were necessary to meet constitutional requirements. Conflicting expert testimonies were presented, with the court favoring petitioners' experts for their superior knowledge of DCSS and relevant experience.
The District Court found that the actions of the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) facilitated maximum practical desegregation from 1969 to 1986, attributing demographic changes primarily to suburbanization, which drew black residents to DeKalb County, alongside declines in birth rates among white families and blockbusting in neighborhoods. The court concluded that these shifts were not caused by DCSS and that no evidence suggested prior unconstitutional conduct contributed to segregation. It asserted that further actions by DCSS would only marginally affect population trends, as the same level of racial segregation would have occurred regardless.
The court ruled that, absent massive busing—which was deemed unviable—the magnet school program and the M-to-M program were the most effective current strategies to address the impacts of residential segregation on student attendance. Additionally, regarding faculty and staff assignments, the court determined that DCSS fulfilled its obligation to hire and retain minority teachers and administrators, with a higher percentage of black educators than the state average. However, it identified a racial imbalance in teacher assignments, noting that several schools deviated significantly from the systemwide average of minority teachers. Black administrators were found to be over-represented in schools with high black student populations and under-represented in schools with low black student populations.
The court criticized DCSS for relying on a voluntary replacement process to achieve racial balance instead of implementing mandatory reassignment, which they argued was necessary for effective integration. DCSS justified its approach by citing competition among districts and the difficulty of retaining teachers who must work far from their homes. The voluntary transfer program, which allowed teachers to move closer to their residences after three years, further complicated efforts to attain racial balance in staffing.
The District Court acknowledged the challenges faced by the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) but mandated compliance with the Singleton ruling. It ordered the DCSS to create a plan for compliance, which would likely require the reassignment of teachers and principals. While the court found that meeting Singleton's requirements for faculty could be achieved with minimal teacher movement, it rejected claims of racial disparities in educational resources. The court cited expert opinions and evidence showing that black students in DCSS outperformed their peers on standardized tests, concluding that DCSS had not been negligent in supporting black students. However, it noted that DCSS had not attained unitary status due to unequal teacher qualifications and funding disparities between majority white and majority black schools, thus requiring the DCSS to equalize spending and address these issues.
The court evaluated the final Green factors—physical facilities, transportation, and extracurricular activities—and determined that DCSS had achieved unitary status concerning physical facilities. As a result, no further relief was ordered in student assignment, transportation, physical facilities, or extracurricular activities. The court mandated the establishment of a system to balance teacher and principal assignments and equalize per pupil expenditures. It also dissolved the biracial committee, finding it unnecessary given the representation of black members in the school board and administration. Both parties subsequently appealed, with the Eleventh Circuit Court affirming that DCSS had not achieved unitary status but reversing the finding regarding student assignment duties.
The Court of Appeals determined that the District Court incorrectly analyzed the six Green factors as distinct categories. Instead, the Court mandated that a school system could only achieve unitary status after simultaneously satisfying all six factors for an extended period. The Court found that the DCSS had never achieved unitary status and could not evade its constitutional obligations by citing demographic changes before obtaining such status. The Court held that the responsibility for racial imbalance rested with the petitioners, who must undertake potentially complex and unconventional measures—like school pairing, gerrymandering of zones, grade reorganization, and busing—to rectify this imbalance. The case raised two key questions: whether a district court could cease supervision over compliant areas of a school system while other areas remained noncompliant, and whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the District Court's plan for incremental withdrawal of supervision. The Court emphasized that a formerly segregated school district must take comprehensive action to eliminate all remnants of the unconstitutional system to address the harm inflicted by segregation, as established in the rulings of Brown I and Brown II. In particular, it reiterated the detrimental effects of segregation on children, which can hinder their educational development and perpetuate feelings of inferiority. The Court highlighted that the objective of desegregation is to establish a unitary system free from racial discrimination.
Racial discrimination must be eliminated in various components of the school system, including faculty, transportation, and facilities, to comply with the mandates of the Brown decision. The Green factors assess the racial identifiability of schools and guide District Courts in crafting remedies for desegregation. The concept of "unitariness" aids in defining the scope of District Court authority, emphasizing that a formerly dual school system requires comprehensive evaluation during both remedial orders and later desegregation phases. However, the term "unitary" lacks precise definition and should not limit judicial discretion beyond traditional equitable principles. Courts must maintain flexibility in applying equitable remedies to effectively address violations of constitutional rights. This approach aligns with precedent, as illustrated in Swann, where the objective is to balance individual and collective interests to rectify constitutional offenses. In Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spangler, the court ruled that a District Court overstepped its authority by mandating annual adjustments to school attendance zones due to demographic changes unrelated to segregation, highlighting that compliance with the unitary system remains a guiding principle in desegregation efforts.
The District Court's plan for achieving racial neutrality in Pasadena's public school attendance was initially successful, eliminating prior racial discrimination. However, the court lacked authority to mandate continuous annual adjustments to attendance zones to maintain this racial balance indefinitely. The court's obligation was fulfilled once a racially neutral attendance pattern was established. Arguments from the original plaintiffs asserting that the court's requirement for a perpetual "no majority of any minority" standard was valid—pending attainment of "unitary" status in other areas—were deemed moot and lacking in substance. The ruling underscores that federal courts have discretion to gradually withdraw supervision once a school district demonstrates compliance with constitutional standards. This discretion is rooted in the initial constitutional violations that justified court intervention. The ultimate aim of such remedies is to restore local control of school systems, recognizing the importance of local autonomy in education. A gradual transition phase from federal oversight is deemed appropriate as districts achieve compliance. Overall, the long-term goal remains the return of local authority in school governance, consistent with constitutional mandates.
School districts and associated state entities can be held accountable to citizens, the political process, and courts without judicial oversight. A key requirement for reducing judicial control is the school district's demonstration of commitment to equal protection under the Constitution. Despite progress, the risk of discrimination persists, necessitating state oversight to prevent such influences in school policies. Federal courts possess the authority to gradually relinquish control over school districts that are partially compliant with desegregation plans, allowing for a case-by-case return to local governance in areas where compliance has been established, particularly if racial imbalances are not linked to constitutional violations.
The court's decision to incrementally withdraw supervision must align with its equitable powers, taking into account several factors: compliance with the decree, necessity of judicial control for ongoing compliance, and the school district's genuine commitment to the decree and relevant legal standards. Courts should focus on the school system's compliance history to assess its good-faith efforts to rectify past violations. Over time, the remnants of past discrimination may lessen, providing clearer insights into the effectiveness of various remedies. This framework informs district court responsibilities during the final stages of desegregation, emphasizing the need to evaluate the school board's adherence to the desegregation decree and the elimination of past discrimination.
The Court of Appeals erred by ruling that the District Court lacked discretion to grant the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCSS) partial control over certain operational areas, such as student assignment, transportation, physical facilities, and extracurricular activities, while maintaining supervision over faculty assignments and educational quality where compliance was still lacking. The District Court appropriately exercised its discretion to evaluate elements of a unitary system and assess whether minority students were disadvantaged, which may necessitate new remedies for full compliance with the desegregation decree. Both parties acknowledged the quality of education as a valid consideration in compliance evaluations, and the trial court's focus on resource allocation in this context was unchallenged.
The District Court's flexible application of the Green factors demonstrated equitable discretion, allowing it to shift control away from areas where judicial oversight was no longer essential, thus directing resources to areas still affected by discrimination. The Court of Appeals' reasoning was flawed, suggesting that partial withdrawal of judicial control was impermissible due to noncompliance in some areas and advocating for extreme measures to ensure racial balance in student assignments until complete compliance was achieved. However, the ruling misconstrued the precedent set in Swann, which recognized that racial balance measures should not lead to impractical solutions, especially when demographic changes—not prior violations—contributed to imbalances. The District Court had implemented a comprehensive desegregation plan in 1969 that included measures for racial balance, achieving its goal initially before demographic shifts occurred, and for 17 years, the respondents did not significantly contest the student assignment system while focusing on other desegregation efforts.
Racial imbalance in student attendance zones does not automatically indicate that a school district is noncompliant with desegregation decrees or legal obligations. Achieving racial balance is only necessary when past constitutional violations have caused the imbalance. Once such violations are remedied, the school district is not required to address demographic imbalances resulting from non-legal factors. School authorities and courts are not obligated to continually adjust the racial makeup of student bodies after achieving desegregation and eliminating official discrimination. Federal courts retain the authority to address future issues; however, without evidence of deliberate state actions affecting demographics, further intervention is not warranted.
The District Court found that changes in DeKalb County's population stemmed from independent, demographic factors rather than school district policies. This is reflected in broader societal trends, with significant population mobility documented. The relationship between residential and school segregation is evident, as studies indicate preferences among white and black residents for mixed-race neighborhoods. If resegregation arises from private choices rather than state actions, it lacks constitutional implications, and federal courts cannot feasibly manage ongoing demographic shifts. While some remnants of past segregation persist, addressing these changes through judicial means presents significant challenges.
Past injustices against the black race, particularly those sanctioned by the State, remain a persistent aspect of history. However, while historical context is important, it should not overly influence current legal responsibilities. In cases of school segregation, any lingering effects must have a clear causal link to the original de jure violations being addressed. The connection between historical violations and present demographic changes can weaken over time, especially if a school district demonstrates good faith efforts.
In DeKalb County, the District Court correctly concluded that demographic shifts were unrelated to past violations, indicating that the district was not obligated to achieve racial balance across its schools. The court appropriately evaluated the causes of racial imbalances before considering significant expenditures for achieving balance after years of implementing a comprehensive plan in a changing demographic landscape.
The court emphasized the need for discretion in equitable remedies, prioritizing the allocation of resources toward improving educational quality over pursuing impractical racial balancing measures. The Court of Appeals' requirement for a school district to meet all six Green factors before declaring a unitary system was deemed overly formalistic. Rather, legal remedies should focus on feasible solutions that ensure compliance with court decrees while addressing the specific violation's effects.
The necessity and practicality of retaining judicial control over student assignments were also considered, recognizing that racial balancing can serve as a valid remedy for addressing fundamental inequities resulting from constitutional violations. The interrelation of the Green factors highlights that issues such as student and faculty segregation are often interconnected, necessitating comprehensive judicial remedies.
Students possess the standing to contest racial faculty allocation, as it infringes on their equality of educational opportunity, independent of pupil segregation. A continuing violation in one area may necessitate remedies in another, as established in *Bradley v. Richmond School Bd.* There is no merit in claims that the correlation between racially-based faculty allocation and the adequacy of desegregation plans is purely speculative, as noted in *Vaughns v. Board of Education of Prince George's County*. The interdependence of desegregation plan components means changes in one can affect others, yet there was no evidence that racial balancing could remedy existing deficiencies.
Although the school district failed to comply with faculty assignments, the record does not support that student reassignments are a viable solution. The District Court suggested that minor teacher reassignments could address the faculty issue, but it lacked the necessary analysis to make definitive conclusions on this matter. Further proceedings are warranted to evaluate the school district’s good faith compliance with the desegregation plan, which is crucial for ensuring that parents, students, and the public have confidence against further discrimination.
The good faith of the district in complying with court orders over time is essential for determining whether jurisdiction can be relinquished, as discussed in *Dowell*. The District Court must assess whether the Board has complied with the desegregation decree and whether past discrimination has been sufficiently addressed. A history of good faith suggests that any current racial imbalance is not a result of new violations and supports the Board's commitment to racial equality, reducing the chance that compliance is merely a temporary measure. When a district fails to demonstrate good faith in remedying ongoing violations, continued court supervision is warranted, as seen in *Columbus Bd. of Education v. Penick*, which underlines the need for systemic remedies in light of historical practices of segregation.
The District Court acknowledged the successes of the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) during judicial supervision, noting its commitment to providing quality education and its progress toward achieving unitary status. However, the Court found that while DCSS had not acted in bad faith or engaged in discrimination since the desegregation plan's implementation, this did not equate to an affirmative commitment to fully comply with the plan. Consequently, further proceedings were deemed necessary. The judgment was reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine outstanding issues for consideration based on prior briefs and arguments, with each party bearing its own costs. Justice Thomas did not participate in this case, while Justice Scalia concurred, highlighting that the District Court found the imbalances in student assignments were due to private demographic shifts rather than government action. The Court of Appeals' order for extensive busing and integration was deemed inconsistent with previous rulings. Justice Scalia noted that this decision would empower DeKalb County citizens to manage their public schools regarding student assignments, but emphasized the need to address ongoing federal oversight in other districts, which remains unresolved since the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education. He referenced the obligation established in Green v. School Board, emphasizing the duty of school systems previously enforcing de jure segregation to actively pursue desegregation and racial balance.
The legal principle under review clarifies that the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution only addresses racial imbalances that are intentionally caused by the State, rather than requiring racial balancing as a constitutional mandate. The Court emphasizes that any desegregation efforts are not because current racial imbalances violate the Constitution, but rather as a remedy for the lingering effects of historical de jure segregation that was unconstitutional prior to 1969.
Challenges arise in identifying and remedying the effects of past discrimination in school systems, as these are often complex and intertwined with various other factors, unlike straightforward financial remedies such as tax refunds. The Court has previously noted that desegregation orders must not extend to conditions that do not stem from constitutional violations.
Furthermore, the excerpt highlights that racial and ethnic imbalances in public schools are largely a consequence of residential patterns, which are influenced by economic factors, private discrimination, and personal choices regarding neighborhood composition. This issue of residential segregation is portrayed as a widespread phenomenon across the United States, regardless of regional laws or policies, indicating that it is not confined to the southern states.
Racially imbalanced schools result from a combination of public and private actions, making it difficult to ascertain the degree of segregation that would exist without specific factors. The burden of proof in "vestige of past discrimination" cases typically favors defendants, as plaintiffs must demonstrate that the racial imbalance is linked to historical de jure segregation, leading to frequent losses for plaintiffs. Requiring school authorities to prove the absence of discrimination would shift the advantage to plaintiffs. While some suggest allowing parents to choose schools freely would resolve issues without necessitating equality among schools, the courts have established that such a "freedom of choice" plan is insufficient in contexts of intentional segregation. Judicial decisions, starting with Green and reinforced in Swann, have recognized an affirmative duty for school authorities to actively desegregate, emphasizing that racially neutral policies may not adequately address the lingering effects of past discriminatory practices. Thus, courts have imposed a requirement for school authorities to demonstrate that their plans effectively counteract historical segregation.
Once state-enforced school segregation is established in a jurisdiction as of 1954, an irrebuttable presumption arises that any current racial imbalance stems from that violation, especially if the imbalance has persisted. This presumption is legally significant in the context of elementary and secondary education, where it is reasonable to infer that schools with substantial racial disparities are remnants of a de jure system of segregation. However, 25 years later, the original intent of federal oversight was to be temporary, aimed at remedying past discrimination while recognizing local control over schools as a deeply rooted tradition.
The rationale supporting this presumption has diminished over time as the de jure system and its enforcing school boards recede into history. Various private factors, including migration patterns and demographic changes, have increasingly influenced school compositions, reducing the significance of past government-enforced discrimination. It has become untenable to assume that constitutional violations from decades ago still meaningfully affect current school operations. While racial discrimination in public schools must continue to be prohibited and remedied, there is a growing argument for reconsidering the validity of the presumption established in the Green case.
Plaintiffs claiming Equal Protection violations must demonstrate intent and causation rather than simply showing racial disparity, as established in case law such as Bazemore and Washington v. Davis. Public education should be managed by locally elected authorities in collaboration with parents, emphasizing the importance of allowing students to attend schools close to their homes, as highlighted in cases like Dowell and Swann. Justice Souter concurs, noting that while a district court retains jurisdiction over a school system with remnants of a dual system, it is not required to maintain constant oversight on aspects where compliance has been achieved.
Judicial control over student assignments may be necessary to address lingering effects of prior segregation, including imbalances in faculty assignments. Notably, demographic changes that affect school composition may not independently cause racial disparities if linked to prior segregation practices. Courts must assess these relationships before deciding to reduce supervision of student assignments. Additionally, potential future imbalances after supervision is lifted may arise from ongoing remnants of the dual system, such as disparities in faculty composition or resource allocation, which could maintain racial identification in schools.
There exists a notable correlation in certain schools characterized by an overrepresentation of black principals and administrators, lower per pupil expenditures, and higher percentages of black students. The predominantly black schools in the southern part of the district are uniquely reliant on portable classrooms. If a school is identified as "black," white parents may relocate their children to "white" schools once the district court ceases supervision of student assignments. This scenario suggests that remnants of discrimination could foster resegregation. Therefore, before terminating oversight of student assignments, the district court should ascertain that no immediate risk exists of unresolved factors leading to demographic shifts that could disrupt the racial balance.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, highlights that nearly 38 years post-Brown v. Board of Education, students in DeKalb County, Georgia, have never experienced a fully desegregated school system. The district court mistakenly deemed the school district to have achieved "unitary status," overlooking the persistent duality of the system. The Court of Appeals subsequently mandated corrective actions for the racial imbalance, which Blackmun believes were erroneous. He concurs with the decision to vacate the judgment and remand the case, emphasizing that the district court should maintain jurisdiction until all traces of state-imposed segregation are eradicated.
He notes that whether the district court must intervene in student assignments hinges on whether any imbalance derives from unlawful state policies and if remedial action is essential. Additionally, the school board's good faith is relevant in these considerations. Blackmun aims to clarify the implications of the district court retaining jurisdiction while relinquishing control over parts of the school system and to specify the factors the court should evaluate regarding the racial imbalance and the board's actions.
The Court emphasizes that in cases of de jure school segregation, the entire racially segregated school system must be remedied, rather than just isolated discriminatory policies. It asserts that jurisdiction should remain with the district court until complete removal of state-imposed segregation is confirmed, even if some aspects of discrimination cease. Skepticism is advised regarding school boards' assurances of non-discrimination, particularly when violations persist in key areas such as funding and teacher assignments. The Court reiterates that a school board has an ongoing affirmative duty to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination and that this duty is enforceable without needing new evidence of constitutional violations. The burden lies with the school district to prove its actions are effectively dismantling the legacy of segregation. Retaining jurisdiction does not necessarily require continuous supervision; the district court's role is to ensure that the school district addresses past discriminatory practices and prevents future discrimination.
The court has an obligation to review school-board actions to ensure they promote the transition to a unitary, nonracial, nondiscriminatory school system, as established in cases such as Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs and others. However, this obligation does not automatically require new affirmative actions solely due to racial imbalances in student assignments. A district court must determine whether changes in student assignments are necessary or practicable for compliance with other aspects of the school system and must order such actions if the school district's conduct is a contributing cause of racially identifiable schools. The burden is on the school board to demonstrate that its actions did not create or contribute to this racial identifiability.
In the case of DeKalb County Schools (DCSS), the district claims it is not required to address segregation caused by demographic changes for which it holds no responsibility. However, it must prove its policies did not contribute to these changes, either by influencing demographics or directly causing racial imbalances. Establishing a connection between past segregative actions and current segregation requires careful examination, as demographic patterns perceived as private preferences may be influenced by the school district's actions. The location of schools can impact residential development and neighborhood composition, as families may choose where to live based on a school's racial composition, which can perpetuate residential segregation. Schools can be identified as "black" or "white" through various means, including enrollment patterns.
Mobile classrooms, student transfer policies, transportation arrangements, and faculty assignments based on race lead to schools being categorized by their racial makeup. Even if a school district initially desegregates student assignments, ongoing constitutional violations may result in resegregation as neighborhoods react to these racially identifiable schools. The court must investigate how the school district's actions may have exacerbated or alleviated segregation, independent of residential factors. School board decisions regarding new school placements, closures, and programs such as magnet classrooms and majority-to-minority transfer policies can significantly impact racial composition in schools.
The failure of a school district to implement effective desegregation policies constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the court acknowledged that "white flight" and neighborhood changes influenced segregation, it did not assess whether the district's actions, like racially identifiable faculty assignments, contributed to these trends. The court also overlooked how school placements and attendance zones might have driven residential movement.
Furthermore, the District Court did not adequately analyze whether past actions by the school district contributed to segregation beyond residential patterns. It failed to require the district to demonstrate that its student assignment policies served legitimate purposes while perpetuating a dual system. The court's focus on present actions instead of historical context neglected the necessity to evaluate how past de jure segregation and subsequent actions by school officials affected current racial imbalances in schools.
The District Court emphasized that the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) had initiated desegregation of student assignments in response to a court order in 1969. However, the first action taken by DCSS involved creating attendance zones that resulted in two schools being over 50% black, despite a district-wide black student population of less than 6%. Within a year, another school became majority black, followed by four more within the next two years. The District Court concluded that DCSS had achieved temporary desegregation regarding student assignment, attributing ongoing segregation solely to pre-existing residential segregation. This reasoning was challenged, as it was determined that relying on prior residential segregation does not absolve DCSS from its obligation to address the lasting effects of past school segregation. The court stated that merely implementing race-neutral policies was insufficient; DCSS was required to actively counteract segregation.
Furthermore, significant demographic changes cited by DCSS occurred after 1975, raising questions about the adequacy of its actions prior to that year. From 1969 to 1975, DCSS failed to desegregate, with an increase in students attending racially identifiable schools, resulting in 73% of black elementary and 56% of black high school students attending majority black schools by 1975, while the district's black student population was much lower. Out of 13 new elementary schools opened during this period, six had only four black students total in 1975, and one new high school had no black students. The only measure implemented by DCSS during this time was the M-to-M transfer program in 1972, which was poorly utilized due to administrative limitations, with only a tiny fraction of students participating by the 1975-1976 school year. A 1976 review by the District Court found that DCSS's limitations on the transfer program perpetuated the dual system and that the changes in attendance zones continued to sustain segregation in the county.
In 1976, the District Court determined that the District of Columbia School System (DCSS) failed to comply with a 1969 order aimed at eliminating remnants of its previous de jure segregation. The court found that DCSS had exacerbated racial imbalances in its schools. Consequently, the court should have required DCSS to demonstrate that, excluding demographic changes from 1976 to 1985, its actions would have been sufficient to promptly transition to a non-racially identifiable school system. Evidence suggests that meeting this burden would be challenging for DCSS, which has only implemented limited remedial measures since 1976. Participation in the M-to-M program increased slightly to about 6% of students, while magnet programs serve less than 1%. The court noted that DCSS could have implemented integration-promoting actions more effectively, including expanding magnet programs, adjusting school attendance zones, and ensuring equitable funding.
Despite the difficulties posed by demographic shifts, the court emphasized that the pursuit of an integrated school system remains a constitutional obligation that cannot be dismissed due to challenges. The Court of Appeals did not address the respondents' challenge to the District Court’s causation conclusions, prompting a remand for a review of whether DCSS has sufficiently proven that current racially identifiable schools are not a result of past segregation practices. The excerpt references various legal precedents affirming the presumption that actions by a former de jure segregated school district contribute to the existence of racially identifiable schools, placing the burden on the school board to counter this presumption.
