Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; May 25, 1994; Florida; State Appellate Court
In the case of United Services Automobile Association v. Robert E. Selz, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's judgment favoring Selz, the insured. The trial court had ruled that the insurer's claims were barred by collateral estoppel due to a prior case, United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Elitzky. The appellate court disapproved of the trial court's consideration of defensive collateral estoppel, noting it was improperly raised beyond the insurer's complaint. The court emphasized that defensive collateral estoppel requires identity of issues, not parties, and cited the U.S. Supreme Court's rationale in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories regarding judicial economy and the avoidance of repetitive litigation. Moreover, it reiterated that due process must be upheld, meaning a party cannot be estopped unless they had the opportunity to litigate the issue previously. The appellate court concluded that the trial court had erred in finding that the issues in the current case were resolved by the Elitzky case. The case has been reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
In Elitzky, the Pennsylvania court examined a USAA exclusionary clause stating that "Medical Payments to others do not apply to bodily injury or property damage which is expected or intended by the insured." USAA claimed it had no duty to defend or indemnify the insured due to allegations of malicious defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court ruled that the exclusion applied only to injuries and damages of the same type that the insured intended to cause. Since the underlying complaint included potential injuries covered by the policy, USAA was obligated to defend the insured until it could establish that the claims fell outside the policy's coverage.
The court also noted that the question of USAA's duty to indemnify was premature, as the insured might prevail in the underlying case. In the current appeal, the appellant contended it was not required to defend or indemnify the appellee under a similar exclusionary clause, focusing on counts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and libel/slander. The appellant further argued that other policy provisions excluded coverage for injuries linked to the insured's business, a point not addressed in Elitzky. The court clarified that only the duty to defend was litigated in Elitzky, meaning collateral estoppel did not apply to the business-related exclusion issue, allowing the appellant to raise it now.
In Florida, an insurer's duty to defend is determined by the allegations in the complaint, requiring defense if any claim is within the liability coverage until that claim is removed. This aligns with Pennsylvania's interpretation in Elitzky, where the court clarified that injuries may fall within the policy's scope based on how "intended" is defined in the exclusion. While most courts, including Florida, hold that the exclusion applies if the insured specifically intended to cause harm, Pennsylvania interprets it more narrowly, only excluding coverage for harm of the same general type intended.
Insurance coverage was excluded under an intentional injury clause because an expected or intended bodily injury must occur for the exclusion to apply, regardless of whether an unintended serious injury resulted from an incident. In Colonial Life, Accident Insurance Co. v. Cooper, the insured's death was deemed intentional, even if not intended, based on the insured's actions to inflict self-harm for financial gain. Florida courts require specific intent to harm for exclusion to apply, contrasting with Pennsylvania's legal standards. The trial court improperly applied collateral estoppel to bar the appellant's declaratory action regarding duty to defend, as Florida's standards are more lenient, allowing broader application of the exclusion clause. Furthermore, the issue of indemnity was not decided in the prior Elitzky case and thus cannot preclude ongoing litigation regarding indemnification responsibilities. Florida law states that indemnity obligations are determined by the facts from the underlying trial and any applicable exclusionary clauses. The trial court's judgment on this matter was premature, and the award of attorneys' fees and costs to the appellee was reversed. The court also noted the procedural necessity for the appellant to secure a final, appealable order before proceeding with the appeal.
Dobrick's case aims to emphasize the importance of its precedent for litigants and trial courts in the district. The appellant received a final judgment instead of a final order of dismissal, which may be clarified by the case's specific circumstances. The Elitzky court determined that an intended harm exclusionary clause in an insurance contract is legally ambiguous and must be interpreted against the insurer. This clause only excludes injuries of the same type that the insured intended to cause, where intent is defined as either desiring the consequences or knowing that such consequences were substantially certain to result. The court also clarified the meaning of "expected," indicating that it applies when the insured acted while being substantially certain that similar harm would occur. This interpretation aligns Pennsylvania law with Florida law. The document references Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Thomas to support the view that "intentional" and "expected" are synonymous in the context of insurance exclusions. Additionally, the court reiterated in Landis v. Allstate Insurance Co. that Florida law requires a specific intent to harm. Lastly, it notes that collateral estoppel does not apply when there has been a change in the law, referencing Wilson v. St. Louis, San Francisco R.R.
