Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board
Docket: 90-1059
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; December 10, 1991; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
New York's "Son of Sam" law mandates that any entity contracting with a person accused or convicted of a crime for a work about that crime must pay any funds owed under the contract to the Crime Victims Board, which holds the funds in escrow for potential victims. This law defines "person convicted of a crime" to include those who have admitted to a crime without prosecution. After a publisher contracted with Henry Hill, an admitted organized crime figure, the Board ruled the publisher violated the law and ordered payment to the Board. The publisher filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing the law violated the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court held that the Son of Sam law is inconsistent with the First Amendment. It reasoned that the law imposes a financial burden on speech related to crime, differentiating it from other forms of speech, and thus is presumptively unconstitutional. The Court clarified that whether the speaker is Hill or the publisher, the law creates a disincentive to engage in speech about crime. It rejected the Board's claims that the law's focus on "entities" rather than media was constitutionally sound, asserting that any entity contracting with a convicted person effectively acts as a medium of communication. The State must demonstrate that such differential treatment serves a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.
While the State has a compelling interest in compensating crime victims, the Court found no justification for limiting such compensation to the proceeds from storytelling, as opposed to other assets of wrongdoers. The differentiation lacks a valid justification, undermining the law's constitutionality.
New York's "Son of Sam" law mandates that any income generated from works by accused or convicted criminals related to their crimes be deposited into an escrow account, which is then allocated to victims and creditors. The law emerged in response to the notoriety of serial killer David Berkowitz, highlighting concerns that criminals could profit from their crimes while victims remained uncompensated. The statute aims to ensure that funds obtained by criminals for recounting their crimes are redirected to compensate victims for their suffering. However, the law is criticized for being overly broad, as it encompasses any work that references the author's criminal actions, regardless of the nature of the content. This broad definition allows the state to escrow income from authors who merely admit to crimes, even if they were never formally charged. The implications of this law raise questions about its alignment with the First Amendment, as it may infringe upon free speech rights while failing to effectively prevent criminals from profiting at the expense of victims.
The Board must deposit payments into an escrow account for victims, which can only be accessed if the victim files a civil action within five years of the account's establishment and secures a monetary judgment. After five years, any unclaimed funds will be returned to the convicted individual or their representatives. The five-year limitation for filing a civil action begins upon the account's creation, overriding any earlier statutes of limitations.
Subsection (8) prioritizes claims against the escrow account, allowing the Board to release funds for legal representation and, with notice to victims, to cover necessary expenses for the accused or convicted, such as payments to literary agents, capped at one-fifth of the total collected. Claims are prioritized in the following order: payments under subsection (8), state subrogation claims for victim payments, civil judgments by victims, and claims from other creditors, including tax authorities.
The definition of "person convicted of a crime" is broad, encompassing individuals who admit to criminal acts in publications, even if they haven't faced prosecution. However, the New York Court of Appeals has clarified that the statute does not apply to victimless crimes.
The Son of Sam law complements existing laws that allow for victim compensation and asset forfeiture related to crimes. Since its enactment in 1977, the law has been infrequently invoked, primarily concerning high-profile criminals, while notably not applying to David Berkowitz, the original "Son of Sam."
Berkowitz voluntarily paid a share of the royalties from the 1981 book "Son of Sam" to his victims or their estates. The case originated in 1986 when the Board learned of a contract involving petitioner Simon & Schuster and organized crime figure Henry Hill. Hill, reflecting on his past while in the Federal Witness Protection Program, expressed that his childhood ambition was to be a gangster, which he achieved over a 25-year criminal career. His crimes included the Boston College basketball point-shaving scandal and the $6 million Lufthansa heist, among others like extortion, narcotics distribution, and robberies. After his 1980 arrest, Hill testified against former associates in exchange for immunity and subsequently lived under an assumed identity.
In August 1981, Hill entered into a contract with author Nicholas Pileggi to produce a book about his life, culminating in a publishing agreement with Simon & Schuster. Hill's collaboration with Pileggi involved extensive daily discussions, resulting in the 1986 publication of "Wiseguy," which candidly details Hill's experiences in organized crime. The book includes Hill's accounts of his prison experiences, where Mafia members allegedly received preferential treatment, including luxurious accommodations, smuggled food, and illicit activities facilitated by corrupt prison staff.
Hacks smuggled alcohol into a location regularly, making life bearable for those involved. The book "Wiseguy," which details these events, received positive reviews, with notable acknowledgment from The Washington Post and Jimmy Breslin, and achieved commercial success, selling over a million copies within 19 months. It was later adapted into the award-winning film "Goodfellas." However, the Crime Victims Board took issue with the book, prompting Simon & Schuster to provide details of their contract with author Henry Hill, who had a criminal background. The Board concluded that Simon & Schuster violated New York's Son of Sam law by failing to disclose the contract and ordered them to turn over payments to be held for victims of Hill's crimes. In response, Simon & Schuster filed a lawsuit claiming the law violated the First Amendment. The District Court upheld the law, and a divided Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The case was significant as similar statutes exist across the U.S. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately reversed the lower court's ruling, indicating that statutes imposing financial burdens based on speech content are presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment. The Court highlighted the incompatibility of government scrutiny of publication content with the freedom of the press.
The excerpt critiques the Son of Sam law within the framework of First Amendment protections against content-based discrimination in speech. It emphasizes that the government’s ability to impose financial burdens based on the content of speech can suppress certain viewpoints, a principle established in previous cases like Leathers. The Son of Sam law is identified as problematic because it targets income from expressive activities specifically related to certain content, thereby creating a financial disincentive for those speakers, whether they are authors or publishers.
The Board's attempt to distinguish the Son of Sam law from the discriminatory tax in Arkansas Writers' Project fails, as both impose burdens on speech and function similarly as disincentives. The argument that discriminatory financial treatment is only suspect when there is evidence of legislative intent to suppress ideas is also refuted; the courts have maintained that even legitimate governmental concerns can unduly restrict First Amendment rights.
Lastly, the Board’s claim that the law applies generally to any entity contracting with a convicted person does not hold up, as any such entity would inherently act as a medium of communication. The government's authority to impose content-based financial penalties does not change based on the speaker's identity, reinforcing that the Son of Sam law creates a specific financial disincentive for certain types of speech.
The State must demonstrate that any differential treatment in its regulations is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that goal. The Board acknowledges it has no interest in suppressing crime descriptions due to reader sensibilities, as offensive speech cannot be suppressed simply because society disapproves of it. The First Amendment protects even ideas that may be disagreeable to society. The State does have a compelling interest in ensuring that crime victims are compensated, which is reflected in its tort law and statutory provisions for prejudgment remedies and restitution. Additionally, the State aims to prevent criminals from profiting from their crimes, a principle supported by longstanding equitable doctrines. Although there is debate over whether book royalties qualify as profits from crime, it can be assumed for this case that the income under the Son of Sam law is derived from criminal acts. The State's interest in denying criminals these profits to compensate victims is compelling, but the Board's narrower definition that focuses on "storytelling" lacks justification, as it fails to explain why this should be treated differently from other assets of criminals. Thus, the Board's argument for a compelling interest in this specific context is weak and has been previously rejected.
The Arkansas Writers' Project and Minneapolis Star cases illustrate that while the State has a legitimate interest in tax revenue, this does not justify selective taxation of the press, particularly when unrelated to a press/non-press distinction. Similarly, in Carey v. Brown, the State's interest in privacy did not warrant a ban solely on nonlabor picketing, as the distinction was irrelevant to the interest at hand. This reasoning applies to the Son of Sam law, which inadequately connects the restriction of proceeds from crime to the State's objective of compensating victims. The law's application is overly broad, capturing any work that references an author’s crime, regardless of its relevance. The statute's definition of a "person convicted of a crime" allows for the escrow of income from any author who admits to a crime, potentially including a wide range of literary works, such as The Autobiography of Malcolm X and Civil Disobedience. The broad scope of the law risks encompassing many works, undermining the intended objective of victim compensation while infringing on authors’ rights.
A list of notable individuals, including Sir Walter Raleigh, Jesse Jackson, and Bertrand Russell, illustrates the types of autobiographies that would fall under the New York Son of Sam law, which prevents criminals from profiting from their crimes while victims remain uncompensated. The law is criticized for being overly broad, as it could hinder the publication of various works unnecessarily. The Court references previous rulings (Ward v. Rock Against Racism and Renton v. Playtime Theatres) that established standards for content neutrality and narrow tailoring of regulations. Despite the law's intent to serve a valid state interest—compensating crime victims—it fails to meet the "narrowly tailored" requirement, resulting in a violation of the First Amendment. The Court determined that the statute unfairly targets specific speech and income types, concluding that it is inconsistent with constitutional protections. The judgment of the lower court was reversed, with Justice Blackmun noting concurrence but suggesting the statute is both underinclusive and overinclusive. Justice Thomas did not participate in the case's consideration.
Most states have enacted similar legislation, warranting guidance from the Court on this sensitive issue. Justice Kennedy, concurring, emphasizes that the New York statute imposes stringent restrictions on authors and publishers based solely on content, which is protected by the First Amendment. This fundamental protection is sufficient grounds to declare the statute unconstitutional, making it unnecessary to assess whether the state can demonstrate a compelling interest or that the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The law in question targets speech that is not obscene, defamatory, or likely to incite imminent harm, and thus does not warrant a deeper inquiry into the state's justifications for upholding the statute.
Kennedy argues against applying the compelling interest and narrow tailoring analysis to content-based restrictions, asserting that such an approach may imply that states can censor speech based on perceived justifications. He critiques the trend in recent jurisprudence that has introduced the compelling interest test into First Amendment considerations even when the primary issue is whether the regulation is content-based. He notes that while the idea that speech can be restricted if it passes strict scrutiny may seem familiar, it has inadvertently entered the Court's reasoning without thorough deliberation. The historical context reveals that previous cases cited to support this notion were grounded in equal protection principles rather than First Amendment considerations, indicating a misapplication of the test regarding content-based speech regulation.
A principle of equal protection has evolved into a discussion on the government's authority to regulate speech content in public forums, extending to a broader interpretation concerning First Amendment rights. The compelling interest test cited by colleagues does not apply here, as demonstrated by references to Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland and Minneapolis Star Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, which do not involve state regulation of speech based on content. Other cases utilizing the compelling interest test, such as Buckley v. Valeo and Cousins v. Wigoda, also focus on different issues than content censorship. The inapplicability of the compelling interest test to content-based speech restrictions is underscored by the established principle that the First Amendment prohibits government from limiting expression due to its message or content. This principle is consistently supported by precedents like Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley and Arkansas Writers' Project. While some categories of content-based regulation, like obscenity and defamation, are permitted, they are historically recognized exceptions, and the government faces a high burden in demonstrating justification, particularly in cases of imminent danger.
The excerpt addresses the complexities of First Amendment protections concerning various forms of expression. While traditional categories of unprotected speech are preferred over an ad hoc balancing approach, the potential for content regulation is acknowledged, which could undermine established precedents and invite violations of the First Amendment. The text emphasizes that abandoning the compelling interest test for content-based restrictions would not eliminate challenging constitutional questions, including the classification of restricted expression, potential impairments of other rights, and the nature of the regulation (whether it targets expression or the associated activity). The excerpt argues for a consistent application of established jurisprudence to classify the New York statute as unconstitutional content-based censorship, reaffirming the necessity of protecting speech and press rights. The author concludes by supporting the Court's judgment to invalidate the statute.
