Cavalier v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc.

Citations: 637 So. 2d 724; 93 La.App. 1 Cir. 1214; 1994 La. App. LEXIS 1729; 1994 WL 195508Docket: 93 CA 1214

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; May 20, 1994; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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On September 21, 1989, Dennis Cavalier was injured while performing hydrostatic testing at a job site for Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corporation, under a subcontract from WHC Contractors to Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc. Cavalier, employed by WHC, was instructed to assist Cain's employee Ray Parrish during the testing. The injury occurred when Cavalier removed a valve plug from a depressurized pipe. He and his wife, Norma, subsequently filed a lawsuit against Cain's, Parrish, and Transco for damages stemming from the injury and for loss of consortium. 

CIGNA, WHC's workers' compensation insurer, intervened to recover $67,126.77 in benefits it had paid, settling for $30,000.00 and reducing its claim to $37,126.77. The jury found WHC 80% at fault and Cain's 20%, awarding Cavalier $500,000.00 in damages but finding no loss of consortium for Norma. Consequently, Cavalier was awarded $100,000.00 from Cain's based on its 20% liability. 

All parties appealed, with the Cavaliers contesting the damage award reduction and the loss of consortium finding. CIGNA echoed their concerns and challenged the reduction of its compensation claim, while Cain's argued against its 20% fault designation and claimed that Cavalier should be considered a borrowed or statutory employee. The appeal also addresses the bases for liability, specifically vicarious liability under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2320 and 2315, emphasizing the need to prove negligence on the part of Cain's employee.

The jury determined that Ray Parrish bore 0% fault in the incident, leading to the conclusion that Cain's could not be held vicariously liable for negligence. To establish Cain's independent liability under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, a four-pronged duty-risk analysis was applied. 

1. The first prong assessed whether Cain's failure to train or warn Cavalier was a cause-in-fact of his injuries, with the "but for" standard indicating that Cavalier wouldn't have been injured without this failure. Testimony indicated Cavalier was inexperienced in hydrostatic testing and had not received any training or warnings, suggesting that proper training could have prevented the accident.

2. The second prong evaluated whether Cain's owed a duty to Cavalier. Although not an employee, Cavalier was permitted to assist in the testing, and testimony highlighted that neither Cain's nor Parrish provided necessary training or safety instructions. The relationship between Cavalier and Cain's, coupled with the risks involved, supported the existence of a duty.

3. The third prong examined whether Cain's breached its duty. The findings indicated that allowing an inexperienced individual to participate in a technical process without adequate training constituted a breach.

4. Finally, the fourth prong considered whether Cavalier's injuries were within the scope of the duty breached. The evidence established a clear connection between his injuries and Cain's failure to train and warn him about the hazards of hydrostatic testing, as his injury occurred when he acted on a task without the necessary precautions.

Overall, the jury's conclusion that Cain's owed a duty to train and warn Cavalier was upheld, and the evidence supported that Cain's breached this duty, leading to Cavalier's injuries.

The duty to train and warn workers includes addressing the risk of injury to untrained individuals during hydrostatic testing. The jury found Cain's negligent for failing to train or warn Cavalier, a determination upheld by the court. Additionally, Cain's contended that Cavalier was a borrowed or statutory employee, limiting his remedies to workers' compensation. The court referenced the factors from Billeaud v. Poledore to assess borrowed employee status, emphasizing that no single factor is decisive. The analysis included:

1. Control: Cavalier followed WHC supervisor's orders, indicating WHC retained control.
2. Selection: WHC supervisor assigned Cavalier to assist.
3. Payment: WHC was identified as the payer of Cavalier's wages.
4. Termination rights: No evidence was provided on this aspect.
5. Tools and workspace: Cain's supplied equipment, but the work occurred at WHC's job site.
6. Duration: Cavalier's assignment appeared to last only one day.
7. Work performed: The work was under WHC's general contract with Transco.
8. Agreements: There was no evidence of a formal agreement between the employers.
9. Employee acquiescence: Cavalier's compliance was directed by WHC's supervisor.
10. Original employer control: WHC maintained its relationship with Cavalier.

Despite some factors potentially supporting Cain's claim, the cumulative evidence did not convincingly establish Cavalier as a borrowed employee. Thus, the court concluded that Cavalier was not under borrowed employee status with Cain's.

Norma Cavalier's loss of consortium claim was rejected by the jury, which found no evidence of such loss following her husband's accident, despite her testimony regarding changes in their relationship and lifestyle. The jury's decision is upheld on appeal, as it is based on credibility assessments that warrant deference to the jury's findings. 

Cavalier was awarded $500,000 in damages, with Cain's assigned 20% fault and WHC 80%. The trial judge ruled that Cain's should pay $100,000, but the Cavaliers and CIGNA argue for full compensation. Citing relevant case law, the court explains that while employer fault must be quantified, it should not affect the final judgment. Following the ratio approach from Guidry v. Frank Guidry Oil Company, the court reallocated fault solely to Cain's, resulting in a total liability of $500,000. 

CIGNA also claims an error in the reduction of its workers' compensation award to 20% of the total, referencing Louisiana statute La. R.S. 23:1101(B), which allows recovery against third parties for compensation paid.

Recovery percentages for compensation claims are to align with the recovery amounts of the employee or their dependents against a third party. If an employee's recovery is reduced due to comparative negligence, the compensation paid by CIGNA, or any party obligated to pay compensation, will similarly be reduced. CIGNA's award should not have been diminished, and the judgment is amended to grant CIGNA 100% of its compensation claim, taking precedence over the plaintiff's claim.

The trial court erred by not permitting CIGNA a credit for future compensation obligations. According to La. R.S. 23:1103(A)(1), when damages exceed the compensation carrier's reimbursement, the excess is awarded to the plaintiff while the compensation carrier receives credit for future obligations up to the amount received by the plaintiff. Consequently, the judgment is amended to allow CIGNA this credit.

The conclusion affirms parts of the judgment regarding Cain's fault and Norma Cavalier's loss of consortium, while amending the judgment to award Cain damages of $500,000 and CIGNA 100% of its compensation claim, along with a credit for future obligations. Costs of the appeal are assessed against Cain. The judgment is amended and, as amended, affirmed.