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Realty Exchange Corp. v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co.
Citations: 487 P.2d 420; 15 Ariz. App. 199; 1971 Ariz. App. LEXIS 721Docket: 1 CA-CIV 1451
Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; July 29, 1971; Arizona; State Appellate Court
The Court of Appeals of Arizona addressed the appeal from Realty Exchange Corporation regarding whether the interest of a beneficiary in a subdivision trust can be garnished by creditors. The case stemmed from a prior litigation for a broker's commission against Cadillac Land and Development Co. and its stockholders. Realty Exchange initiated a garnishment proceeding against Phoenix Title and Trust Company, which acted as trustee for subdivision trusts where Cadillac Land was the first beneficiary. Following Cadillac Land’s decision to sell its beneficial interest to stockholders Harry Gelt and Jerome Smith on February 5, 1963, Realty Exchange filed a writ of garnishment the next day. The court previously ruled in favor of Realty Exchange against Cadillac Land but denied claims against the individual stockholders. A related appeal affirmed this judgment, which led to a partial summary judgment for Phoenix Title, stating it had no liability under the garnishment. The case also raised issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel concerning the prior decision on the validity of Cadillac Land's assignments to Gelt and Smith, with Realty Exchange asserting these assignments lacked valid consideration and were fraudulent to creditors. The court's decision hinged on the acceptance of the assignments by Phoenix Title and whether they were valid under the terms of the subdivision trusts. Realty Exchange argued that the trial court's judgment did not imply that assignments were effective on their stated dates and did not establish any priority. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court's rejection of Realty Exchange's claim of lack of consideration implied that valid consideration existed, confirming that Gelt and Smith owned the trusts as of the dates indicated. Realty Exchange maintained that the trust instrument required trustee acceptance of assignments, making the assignments from Cadillac Land to Gelt and Smith effective only upon Phoenix Title's acceptance on February 13, 1963, after Realty Exchange's garnishment writ had been served on February 7, 1963. Realty Exchange contended that this argument was not previously raised or decided in earlier litigation involving Cadillac Land, and that Phoenix Title was not a party to the first appeal, thus rendering res judicata and collateral estoppel inapplicable. Phoenix Title defended against this by asserting that garnishment is not suitable for reaching a trust beneficiary's interest, which traditionally required a creditor's bill. However, Arizona law allows creditors to reach a debtor's equitable interests through legal proceedings under A.R.S. 12-1558, subsec. B, which permits the levying of equitable interests. Additionally, Arizona's constitutional amendment has merged law and equity courts, allowing creditors to attach various types of property, including trust interests, through garnishment against the trustee. The court concluded that a creditor could reach a trust beneficiary's interests via garnishment without needing to resort to equity proceedings, affirming the legal framework that supports this approach. Both parties concurred that a writ of garnishment does not affect debts owed by the garnishee if the principal defendant had assigned the right to those funds before the service of the writ. The central issue in dispute is the effective date of an assignment: either February 6, 1963, when the assignment occurred, or February 13, 1963, when it was accepted by Phoenix Title. Phoenix Title argues that this matter is precluded from being raised again by Realty Exchange due to the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel, asserting that Realty Exchange is collaterally estopped based on a previous appellate decision in Realty Exchange Corp. v. Cadillac Land and Development Co. The court agrees with Phoenix Title, clarifying that collateral estoppel applies because the validity of the assignment, including its effective date, was previously litigated and necessary to the earlier judgment. Even though Realty Exchange may present a different legal theory regarding the trust instrument that was not raised in the prior case, the issue itself—when the assignment became effective—was already determined in the prior litigation. Therefore, Realty Exchange is barred from re-litigating this issue, and the trial court's judgment is affirmed. The court notes that Phoenix Title is treated as a stranger to the earlier litigation without making a definitive ruling on its status as a garnishee-defendant.