Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; March 30, 2000; Alabama; State Supreme Court
Wayne Holleman Travis was convicted of capital murder for the death of 69-year-old Clarene Haskew, under Alabama Code for murder committed during a first-degree burglary. The jury, by an 11 to 1 vote, recommended the death penalty, which the trial court imposed. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both the conviction and the sentence. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted certiorari review and also affirmed the decision, noting that most of the 28 issues raised by Travis had been adequately addressed by the Court of Criminal Appeals, with only two issues warranting further discussion.
The facts indicate that on December 12, 1991, Travis and his friend Steven Wayne Hall traveled to Uriah, Alabama, and stayed with a mutual friend until December 14. After a brief visit to Travis's parents' home, they left on foot around 7:05 p.m. They visited the home of Jessie Wiggins, seeking to use the telephone, and left shortly afterward. Later that night, Nellie Shad discovered her home had been burglarized. The following morning, Wiggins found that Haskew's home had been broken into, with the telephone wire cut and doors smashed. Haskew’s body was discovered in her kitchen, showing signs of brutal assault, including gunshot wounds and blunt-force injuries. Several items were reported missing from her home, including her car.
Travis and Hall returned to Shiver's home in Haskew's car early on December 15, claiming it belonged to Travis's sister-in-law. When law enforcement arrived at Shiver's residence later that day, both Travis and Hall fled, leading to a pursuit and a gunfight in which they were both wounded.
During the search of Travis, law enforcement discovered the keys to the victim's car, five .38 caliber bullets, and his driver's license. A subsequent search of Haskew's vehicle revealed a stolen .38 caliber Rossi revolver, which forensic tests later identified as the murder weapon, as well as a .410-gauge shotgun, silverware, and an address book. Both Travis and Hall were indicted for capital murder and subsequently convicted and sentenced to death under Alabama law.
Travis argued for a change of venue due to extensive and inflammatory pretrial publicity surrounding the murder, asserting that it created a biased atmosphere in Conecuh County, where the crime occurred. He claimed that local media coverage heightened community emotions, leading residents to believe that he and Hall should be executed without trial. The State countered that by the time of Travis's trial, community feelings had cooled, and that potential jurors need not be completely unaware of the case details to deliver an impartial verdict. The State maintained that Travis failed to demonstrate actual prejudice from the publicity.
The trial court denied the change of venue request, a decision affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals, which noted that over a year had elapsed since the murder and that the most intense media coverage occurred shortly thereafter. The court referenced the standard set in *Ex parte Grayson*, which requires defendants to prove significant community prejudice or saturation with negative publicity for a venue change to be granted. It indicated that mere exposure to media coverage was insufficient and that voir dire examination is the appropriate method to assess potential juror bias. Additionally, Alabama courts recognize that the passage of time can mitigate the effects of extensive pretrial publicity.
The trial court conducted a comprehensive hearing in January 1993 regarding Travis's motion for a change of venue, during which Travis presented evidence including newspaper articles, television and radio broadcast transcripts about the murder and his case, and witness testimonies concerning community reactions. Key publications included local newspapers such as The Evergreen Courant and The Conecuh Countian, as well as metropolitan newspapers from Montgomery and Mobile. Most articles were published shortly after the murder in December 1991 and January 1992, detailing graphic accounts of the crime, community shock, and sensational claims about satanic involvement.
The hearing revealed that witnesses reported extensive discussions in Conecuh County about Haskew's murder and surrounding rumors of satanic practices, with some expressing extreme sentiments against the defendants. However, many witnesses, including local officials and law enforcement, noted that interest in the murder had diminished significantly by the time of the hearing, with little discussion occurring in the preceding months. Only two articles from 1993 were introduced, highlighting ongoing legal proceedings. Overall, the evidence presented illustrated the intense initial media coverage and community reaction to the crime, contrasted with a subsequent decline in public discourse.
Several teachers testified that discussions about Haskew's murder were rare both in school and in the community. The trial court denied Travis's motion for a change of venue but allowed individual voir dire for jury selection due to significant pretrial publicity regarding the case. Over two and a half days, approximately 1500 pages of testimony were collected from nearly 100 potential jurors, revealing many had been exposed to extensive pretrial coverage, which influenced their opinions on Travis's guilt. The court granted challenges for cause to jurors who had substantial pretrial knowledge.
Of the 12 jurors selected, 7 had minimal recollection of the case from newspapers, 4 had no prior knowledge, and 1's knowledge was unknown. Those with some knowledge claimed they could remain impartial and base their verdict solely on trial evidence. To warrant a change of venue, Travis needed to prove pervasive pretrial publicity that would prevent a fair trial or demonstrate actual prejudice, which he failed to do. Although considerable pretrial publicity occurred, it was brief and did not render a fair trial impossible. The trial court's denial of the venue change was upheld as appropriate.
Regarding jury selection, the final venire included 36 members (20 black and 16 white). The State used 11 of 12 peremptory strikes against black jurors, while Travis excluded 12 white jurors. Ultimately, the jury comprised 9 black jurors and 3 white jurors. After selection, Travis raised a Batson challenge citing racial discrimination, which the trial court acknowledged, finding a prima facie case based on the State's strike pattern. The district attorney justified the exclusions, noting that 10 of the struck black jurors had objections to the death penalty.
The district attorney indicated that several veniremembers had backgrounds or sentiments that influenced their exclusion from the jury. Notably, one had a prior marijuana possession charge and resentment towards the arresting officer, two were confused by voir dire questions, and one was a social worker aiming for a career in criminal justice. The district attorney justified striking the 11th black juror due to her husband’s prior theft prosecution. The trial court deemed these reasons race-neutral and denied Travis's Batson motion.
The Court of Criminal Appeals emphasized that trial courts are best positioned to assess the adequacy of the prosecution's reasons for juror strikes, with a high standard for appellate review which only allows reversal if the trial court's findings are "clearly erroneous." It noted that Travis's jury was 75% black, while the venire was approximately 56% black, contrasting with Conecuh County's overall black population of about 38%. These statistics countered claims of disparate impact and suggested a lack of discriminatory intent by the prosecutor.
Of the 11 blacks struck, 10 opposed the death penalty, a recognized race-neutral reason for exclusion. The state also struck a white juror for similar ambivalence towards the death penalty, reinforcing the race-neutrality of the decision. Another black juror was excluded due to her acquaintance with the district attorney and her husband's criminal history, which is also deemed a legitimate race-neutral reason.
Travis contended that he demonstrated a prima facie case of racial discrimination based on the district attorney's pattern of strikes, questioning the extent of questioning directed at black versus white jurors, and arguing that the greater percentage of blacks on the jury did not negate potential discrimination. The State countered that the reasons for striking the jurors were indeed race-neutral, citing valid concerns about views on the death penalty and connections to criminal activity.
The State emphasizes that the number of black jurors struck versus those remaining is crucial in assessing a Batson challenge. The Court of Criminal Appeals correctly analyzed the relevant law and facts concerning Travis's Batson challenge, agreeing that the trial court's rejection of his motion was not clearly erroneous. In his certiorari petition, Travis contends that the district attorney's questioning of the black veniremembers he struck was inadequate and inconsistent compared to that of white veniremembers, suggesting a discriminatory motive. However, the Court found no evidence of desultory questioning in the voir dire process. Although not every veniremember received identical questioning, the inquiries made to jurors of different races were comparable.
Travis argues that the district attorney's reason for striking ten black veniremembers—primarily their opposition to the death penalty—was pretextual. The district attorney challenged two of these veniremembers for cause based on their expressed opposition, which the trial court declined to accept. Other veniremembers displayed varying degrees of ambivalence towards the death penalty yet indicated a willingness to follow the law. The Court noted a misstatement regarding one veniremember, C.B., but found her reservations about the death penalty did not undermine the race-neutral justification for the strikes. Additionally, a white veniremember also expressed similar ambivalence about the death penalty, reinforcing the conclusion that the district attorney's actions were not racially motivated.
The excerpt addresses the use of peremptory strikes by the district attorney during jury selection in a criminal case. The district attorney provided independent reasons for striking several black veniremembers, including concerns about past abuse and their backgrounds related to the death penalty. Specific reasons included V.M.'s education in social work and criminal justice, K.P.'s family history of murder, and C.H.'s prior arrests and expressed grievances against law enforcement. K.T. was struck solely due to the district attorney's previous prosecution of her husband, a reason deemed race-neutral by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Travis, the defendant, contended that the district attorney's questioning of black jurors about criminal prosecutions was not applied to white veniremembers, noting that two white jurors with similar backgrounds were not struck. Despite some disparity in questioning, the Court found no evidence of discriminatory intent in the district attorney's strikes. The analysis of the backgrounds of the struck jurors revealed relevant concerns justifying the strikes, while the unstruck white jurors had less concerning histories. Ultimately, the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court’s denial of Travis’s Batson motion, concluding that the district attorney's actions were not racially motivated.
The court reviewed all issues in Travis's petition and related briefs, as well as oral arguments, and examined the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion. No errors were found in the guilt or penalty phases of Travis's trial to justify a reversal of his conviction or sentence, leading to the affirmation of the decision by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Chief Justice Hooper and Justices Maddox, Houston, Cook, and See concurred, while Justice Johnstone concurred specially, expressing disagreement with the Court of Criminal Appeals' exclusion of testimony from Investigator Benson. This testimony related to the codefendant's drawing of satanic symbols, which could indicate the codefendant's presence at the crime scene. Justice Johnstone argued that such evidence could be critical to establishing reasonable doubt about the defendant's presence and intent, highlighting the defendant's right to present evidence that another might have committed the crime. He referenced the cases Chambers v. Mississippi and Green v. Georgia to support the argument that excluding this testimony could violate due process rights. Justice Brown recused herself from the decision.
