In Re Saunders

Citations: 472 P.2d 921; 2 Cal. 3d 1033; 88 Cal. Rptr. 633Docket: Crim. 14272

Court: California Supreme Court; August 7, 1970; California; State Supreme Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

James W. Saunders, currently in the custody of the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, seeks a writ of habeas corpus, asserting a violation of his right to effective legal counsel during his trial. He was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, and assault, receiving a death sentence for the murder. The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, but later identified a trial error related to jury selection, prompting a remand for a new penalty trial while the habeas corpus petition was pending.

Saunders contends that his trial counsel failed to investigate and present evidence supporting his diminished capacity, which could have impacted the outcome of his trial. Key undisputed facts include that an attorney was appointed to Saunders in October 1964, and his mother sent a letter to the attorney detailing Saunders' history of head injuries and associated behavioral issues. Despite the relevance of this information, the attorney did not respond to the letter or pursue additional medical records. The trial commenced on February 8, 1965, without the presentation of any evidence in Saunders' defense.

The defense aimed to exclude two extrajudicial admissions made by the petitioner, one of which indicated his awareness of a robbery plan while he drove his codefendants to a liquor store where a murder occurred. Efforts to prevent these statements from being admitted were unsuccessful. The guilt phase concluded on March 5, 1965, with the jury finding the petitioner and his co-defendants guilty. On the same day, Dr. Sidney J. Merin, a clinical psychologist, sent a letter and reports to the petitioner's counsel noting that the petitioner had been examined in 1961, showing signs of potential organic brain damage and abnormal brain activity. Dr. Merin recommended inpatient treatment, which was not pursued due to financial constraints, leading to ineffective outpatient therapy. He observed little improvement by 1964 and cautioned that the petitioner would likely continue to face legal issues without adequate treatment.

Counsel did not seek to reopen the guilt phase based on Dr. Merin's findings. The penalty phase began on March 8, 1965, with the jury hearing no mitigating evidence or witness testimony from the defense; arguments for a life sentence were solely based on the petitioner not being the actual killer. The jury returned a death verdict on March 11, 1965. A motion to reduce the penalty was denied on April 7, 1965, with the court stating it found no justification to disturb the jury's verdict despite acknowledging potential mental deficiencies. The same attorney was appointed for the automatic appeal, and on October 10, 1966, the petitioner expressed frustration that the medical and psychiatric reports were not utilized during his trial.

Counsel acknowledged on October 21, 1966, receiving medical and psychiatric reports relevant to petitioner Saunders' case but determined they would not aid in the trial. The issues now raised by the petitioner were not addressed during the automatic appeal process, which concluded with the court affirming the judgment against him on April 27, 1967. In June 1967, Saunders replaced his trial attorney with J. Perry Langford, who noted in a cover letter that he had not used the doctor's reports or birth certificates in court, saving them for a potential clemency hearing. The birth certificate could indicate that Saunders was 20 during the crime, contrary to his claim of being 25, possibly impacting his case. No clemency application was ever filed. 

Langford subsequently prepared a petition for writ of certiorari on Saunders' behalf, which was denied on December 4, 1967, and the issues now raised were not included in that petition. Saunders filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on April 8, 1968, making amendments with the help of attorney Michael Ballachey, but the current issues were not presented. Following the habeas corpus decision, the court ordered a new penalty trial, appointing the former trial counsel again. On December 8, 1969, Saunders requested to represent himself and disclosed in a declaration that he had discovered the existence of the medical and psychiatric reports, which had not been utilized at trial. He claimed he did not realize their legal significance until December 1967 and had sought new counsel to investigate these records and assess trial counsel's competence. In response to his declaration, the trial counsel admitted the statement was largely true but refrained from commenting further. The court granted Saunders' motion to proceed in propria persona for the new penalty trial.

In December 1969, the petitioner engaged attorney Don Edgar Burris, who filed the current petition in January 1970. The court addressed preliminary matters, rejecting the People's claim that the petition was untimely despite nearly five years passing since the conviction. The delay was attributed to the petitioner's limited education and lack of legal knowledge, which prevented him from understanding the significance of trial counsel's possession of medical records and the doctrine of diminished capacity until late 1967. The petitioner sought new counsel to review relevant medical and psychiatric records, which he obtained in early 1970. The court noted that the issue of trial counsel's constitutional adequacy regarding penalty was moot due to a new penalty trial being ordered, allowing for future examination of the petitioner’s mental capacity during that proceeding. The inquiry focused solely on whether the petitioner was entitled to a new trial concerning guilt.

The document outlines the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, referencing key cases such as Gideon v. Wainwright and Powell v. State of Alabama. "Effective" counsel does not equate to error-free counsel but must be reasonably effective. The determination of whether due process standards are met is subjective, requiring a judgment based on all circumstances to ensure fundamental fairness, supported by evolving general standards for judicial guidance.

Counsel has a fundamental duty to conduct thorough factual and legal investigations to develop defense strategies, enabling informed decision-making on behalf of clients during both the pleading and trial stages. A failure to undertake such investigations can result in the loss of crucial defenses, denying the defendant effective representation. In Brubaker v. Dickson, counsel neglected to explore the defendant's medical history related to prior head injuries and alcohol consumption, leading to a conviction based on an incomplete defense. Subsequent medical evaluations revealed brain damage linked to these issues, suggesting the defendant's behavior was influenced by his condition. The United States Court of Appeals found that the defendant sufficiently alleged a violation of his right to effective counsel, noting that the trial was rendered fundamentally unfair due to counsel's lack of preparation and failure to present available defenses. This situation is not characterized as mere counsel error but as a complete failure to advocate for the accused. The current habeas corpus petition alleges similar shortcomings, arguing that the trial counsel's inaction regarding the defendant's significant head injuries and related mental health issues led to the withdrawal of essential defenses during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial.

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to discuss his history of head injuries and psychiatric issues, claiming there were three pre-motion conversations where counsel indicated he did not investigate the potential use of medical evidence. Petitioner states he was never evaluated by a psychiatrist or psychologist and only learned of his mother’s letter to counsel after counsel was relieved in December 1969. In response, the return to the order to show cause defends the legitimacy of petitioner’s detention, asserting that trial counsel did investigate the medical evidence but deemed it strategically unhelpful for the defense. Trial counsel's declaration details his extensive engagement with petitioner, including eight visits to the county jail and four additional discussions during court appearances, through which he became well-acquainted with the prosecution's evidence and petitioner’s mental and physical history. Counsel confirms he requested petitioner’s medical records and discussed psychiatric issues with him and his mother. He references legal precedents indicating that evidence of mental condition is admissible to negate specific intent in certain pleas, but concluded that such evidence did not apply to petitioner’s case, believing petitioner was neither legally insane nor suffering from a relevant mental condition at the time of trial.

The declarant chose against requesting a court-appointed psychiatrist based on several strategic considerations. Firstly, the declarant believed that Mr. Saunders had a strong chance for acquittal if his admissions could be excluded from evidence, as his involvement in the robbery murder was limited to being a lookout and driver, with no direct evidence against him aside from those admissions. The declarant was unaware of Mr. Madorid's intention to testify and did not see psychiatric testimony as relevant or beneficial given the circumstances.

Secondly, the defense primarily aimed to prevent the jury from hearing Saunders' admissions, particularly his acknowledgment of knowing about the robbery. Calling a psychiatrist could lead to those admissions being introduced as evidence, which the declarant believed would outweigh any potential benefits of psychiatric testimony. The declarant also did not think Saunders had any mental or physical conditions relevant to the charges.

Additionally, the declarant noted that, at the time of trial, a report from a court-appointed psychiatrist would not be confidential and could be used by the prosecution. A motion by co-defendant Joshua Hill regarding this issue was denied in the declarant's presence.

In response to these considerations, the petitioner challenged the tactical decision not to pursue a diminished capacity defense. He argued that counsel could not have made an informed decision on this defense given that relevant medical records were received only on the trial's last day. The petitioner also provided declarations asserting that counsel did not thoroughly inquire into his medical and psychiatric history and did not request that he obtain his medical records. The petitioner felt that counsel dismissed his concerns about psychiatric disorders before trial and only revisited the issue in 1966 during the appeal process. Lastly, the traverse questioned the validity of counsel's reasons for not having the petitioner examined by a court-appointed psychiatrist.

In paragraph 9 of trial counsel's declaration, it is claimed that a psychiatric examination was avoided as a strategic decision to prevent any admissions made by the petitioner from being used against him at trial. The defense strategy aimed to exclude such admissions entirely. This strategy remained effective until codefendant Madorid unexpectedly testified, implicating the petitioner. The petitioner contests this strategy by presenting three declarations: his own, stating that counsel had informed him Madorid would testify; a declaration from Madorid’s counsel asserting that he notified the other defendants’ counsel of Madorid's intent to testify; and a statement from codefendant Hill's counsel indicating prior knowledge of Madorid’s testimony.

In habeas corpus proceedings, the return to the writ alleges facts to support the legality of the detention and is similar to a civil complaint. The traverse and petition, treated as a traverse, function like an answer in civil proceedings, allowing the petitioner to deny or contest material facts or assert facts demonstrating unlawful detention. The issues are formally joined, and any new claims made by the petitioner that counter the return's assertions are considered denied and must be proved by the petitioner.

Furthermore, the petitioner can challenge the sufficiency of the return, akin to a demurrer, and if the return admits allegations that justify relief, that relief may be granted without further hearings on the factual disputes. It is established that counsel decided to exclude the issue of the petitioner's diminished capacity from trial, fully aware of the relevant doctrine and its potential implications, and that this decision was made for compelling tactical reasons. However, this decision was made without conducting sufficient factual investigation into the petitioner's mental condition, despite prior knowledge of the petitioner's head injuries and organic brain damage and limited discussions with the petitioner and his mother.

Counsel failed to have the petitioner examined by a psychiatrist, despite the petitioner's mother offering to cover the costs of a private defense psychiatrist. This decision not to pursue a diminished capacity defense was made without consulting any medical opinion, even though relevant medical reports existed. The record indicates that counsel's lack of investigation into the petitioner's mental capacity constituted a denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. While counsel believed their decision was tactical, the absence of factual inquiry undermined any rational basis for that choice. Further investigation could have revealed evidence either supporting or negating the defense based on the petitioner's mental condition. The court emphasized that the defense of diminished capacity was crucial, especially given the weakness of the defense actually presented. Since the mental condition defense was consistent with the overall defense strategy, the petitioner did not receive the effective counsel guaranteed by the Constitution. Consequently, the court vacated the judgment of conviction and granted the writ, recalling a previous remittitur affecting co-defendant Saunders. The dissenting opinion, however, would deny the writ.

The summary of undisputed factual material includes aspects from the first penalty trial, emphasizing the importance of comprehensive factual and legal inquiries for a constitutionally adequate defense. It distinguishes between cases where counsel fails to investigate adequately and those where counsel makes tactical decisions based on information obtained. In instances where counsel's ineptitude leads to a lack of informed decision-making, no justification for such tactics exists. The document states that the current issues regarding penalties are moot. It notes that trial counsel claimed to have all necessary information regarding the petitioner's medical history before deciding it was not beneficial for the trial. Ben Madorid's testimony is highlighted as a judicial confession that sufficiently implicated codefendants Hill and Saunders, which could support their convictions if properly presented. Additionally, Mrs. Saunders provided a declaration detailing her communications with trial counsel, including unsuccessful attempts to obtain medical records and counsel's insistence that her presence at the trial would be detrimental. She also noted a lack of billing from any medical examinations she offered to pay for.