Court: Supreme Court of the United States; April 23, 1991; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
In the case of California v. Hodari D., the Supreme Court addressed whether Hodari D. was "seized" under the Fourth Amendment at the moment he discarded a small rock containing crack cocaine. The incident began when a group of youths, including Hodari, fled from an unmarked police car in Oakland. Officer Pertoso, wearing a police jacket, pursued Hodari but did not directly intercept him. Hodari was unaware of Pertoso's presence until the officer was nearly upon him, at which point he threw away the rock. The juvenile court initially denied Hodari's motion to suppress the evidence of the cocaine, but the State Court of Appeal reversed this decision, ruling that Hodari had been seized when he saw Pertoso, and that the seizure was unreasonable due to lack of reasonable suspicion.
The Supreme Court overturned the State Court's ruling, determining that Hodari had not been seized at the time he discarded the drugs. The Court clarified that a seizure requires either physical force or submission to an officer's show of authority. In this case, there was no physical force applied, and Hodari did not comply with any perceived authority from Pertoso, as he continued to run until being tackled. Consequently, the cocaine was deemed not to be the result of an unlawful seizure, allowing the court to deny Hodari's motion to exclude the evidence. The decision was delivered by Justice Scalia, with a dissent from Justice Stevens.
Pertoso tackled and handcuffed Hodari, who was found with $130 in cash and a pager, while a discarded rock was identified as crack cocaine. Hodari moved to suppress the cocaine evidence in juvenile court, which was denied without opinion. The California Court of Appeal reversed this decision, ruling that Hodari was 'seized' when he noticed Officer Pertoso approaching, and that this seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, necessitating the suppression of the cocaine as evidence. The California Supreme Court declined to review the case, leading to certiorari being granted.
The central issue is whether Hodari was 'seized' under the Fourth Amendment at the time he discarded the drugs. If he was seized, the cocaine would be considered the fruit of that illegal seizure and thus inadmissible; if not, the drugs were abandoned and could be lawfully recovered by police. Additionally, it is noted that Pertoso’s observation of the cocaine could provide reasonable suspicion justifying the seizure when he tackled Hodari.
The Fourth Amendment protects against 'unreasonable seizures,' which includes personal seizures. Historically, 'seizure' has implied a 'taking possession' involving actual physical control. An arrest, defined as a significant seizure of a person, can occur with the mere application of physical force by an officer, even if the individual escapes afterward. However, if a suspect discards evidence after breaking free, that action is not considered as having occurred during an arrest.
A seizure is defined as a singular act rather than a continuous state. In the current case, there was no physical force applied by Officer Pertoso when Hodari discarded cocaine, as Hodari was not touched. Hodari's defense argues that a seizure occurs when an officer restrains a citizen's liberty through physical force or a show of authority. The court accepts Hodari’s claim that Pertoso’s pursuit constituted a show of authority demanding Hodari to stop. However, the court concludes that a seizure does not occur if the individual does not yield to that authority. The Fourth Amendment's language supports this interpretation, emphasizing that a "seizure" implies physical restraint; mere verbal commands do not constitute a seizure if the individual continues to flee. Furthermore, an arrest requires either physical contact or the suspect's submission to authority. The court finds it undesirable to expand the Fourth Amendment beyond its explicit terms or the traditional understanding of arrests. It underscores the importance of encouraging compliance with police orders during pursuits for public safety, asserting that unlawful orders will not be deterred by allowing exclusionary rule sanctions for non-compliance. The court also addresses the Mendenhall test, which states that a person is considered "seized" under the Fourth Amendment only if a reasonable person would believe they were not free to leave under the circumstances.
In Florida v. Royer, the Court clarifies the definition of "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, emphasizing that a person is not considered seized solely based on the presence of police authority. The standard for determining a "show of authority" is objective, focusing on whether a reasonable person would perceive they were being ordered to stop, rather than the individual's subjective feelings. The case references previous rulings, including Chesternut, where police actions did not communicate that the defendant was not free to leave. Additionally, in Brower v. Inyo County, although there was an extensive police chase, the Court concluded that a seizure did not occur as the chase did not compel the individual to stop. Thus, in this case, Hodari was not seized until physically tackled, meaning the cocaine he abandoned during his flight was not the result of a seizure, affirming the denial of his motion to exclude the evidence. The decision reverses the California Court of Appeal's ruling and remands for further proceedings. Justice Stevens dissents, arguing that the majority's narrow definition of "seizure" diverges from established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and is detrimental to the protection of individual rights, suggesting that the ruling allows for excessive police conduct without accountability.
Key propositions acknowledged in the case include: Officer Pertoso lacked lawful grounds to stop or arrest the respondent at the start of the chase, which constituted a 'show of authority' once the respondent was aware of the officer's proximity. The respondent's act of discarding cocaine was a direct reaction to this show of authority. The Court clarified that no common-law arrest occurred until the officer physically tackled the respondent, indicating that the abandonment of the cocaine was not a result of a lawful arrest.
Had the officer touched the respondent before he discarded the cocaine, an arrest would have been established—even without subduing him—rendering the evidence a product of an unlawful arrest. The distinction between assault and battery is highlighted to illustrate that a touching transforms an assault into a battery, suggesting that this common-law distinction should not influence the constitutional interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court failed to recognize the difference between an actual arrest and an attempted arrest, asserting that the facts presented describe an unlawful attempt to seize a presumptively innocent individual, which is not consistent with common law. The text questions whether common law should delineate the boundaries of constitutional protections against unreasonable seizures, and whether unlawful attempts to arrest constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, warranting the application of the exclusionary rule.
Furthermore, the Court adopts a narrow definition of 'seizure,' contrasting with a broader interpretation established in Katz v. United States, where electronic surveillance was deemed a search and seizure despite the absence of physical trespass or seizure of objects. The precedent emphasizes a flexible interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, which is meant to protect against various forms of unreasonable seizures and not just those that strictly align with a literal reading of the text.
Justice Stewart, in Katz, critiques the narrow interpretation established in Olmstead, where the Court previously ruled that non-intrusive surveillance did not fall under the Fourth Amendment. He emphasizes that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals, not just physical areas, against unreasonable searches and seizures, expanding its application to include the electronic recording of private conversations. The Court asserts that the government's act of eavesdropping on the petitioner’s phone call constituted a search and seizure, regardless of the absence of physical intrusion.
Stewart further notes that the notion of 'seizure' encompasses the recording of audio, which was debated in earlier cases. Justice Black’s dissenting view from the 1967 Katz decision argued against extending the Fourth Amendment to eavesdropping, maintaining that the language of the Amendment did not traditionally apply to such actions. The Katz decision's broader interpretation of 'seizure' laid the groundwork for the Court's ruling in Terry v. Ohio, which established that reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause, could justify brief stops and searches by law enforcement, reflecting the necessity for adaptability in police-citizen encounters.
The Court determined that the term 'seizure' under the Fourth Amendment includes official restrictions on individual freedom that do not amount to a traditional arrest. This ruling in Terry expanded the scope of police encounters classified as 'seizures' and lowered the proof standard required for justifying a 'stop.' The Court clarified that the Fourth Amendment is relevant whenever a police officer restricts an individual's freedom to leave, thus constituting a 'seizure,' regardless of whether it leads to an arrest or not. The Court rejected the notion that police actions such as 'stop' and 'frisk' fall outside the Fourth Amendment's purview. It emphasized that the reasonableness of police actions must be assessed, rather than narrowly adhering to definitions of 'search' and 'seizure' based on common law. The decisions in Katz and Terry illustrate a departure from the limitation of 'seizure' to traditional arrests, as Katz extended Fourth Amendment protections to encompass non-material invasions, and Terry allowed investigative stops without probable cause. The Court criticized the reliance on common law definitions for 'seizure,' asserting that this perspective fails to recognize the broader interpretations established in prior rulings. The Court reaffirmed that any restraint of personal liberty by police signifies a 'seizure,' rejecting the idea that an individual must submit to authority for a seizure to occur, thus aligning with the principles laid out in Terry regarding investigatory stops.
In United States v. Mendenhall, the Supreme Court established that a person is 'seized' under the Fourth Amendment when their freedom of movement is restrained through physical force or a show of authority. Key to this determination is whether a reasonable person in the same situation would feel free to disregard the police questioning and leave. Seizures can occur through various means, such as the presence of multiple officers, an officer displaying a weapon, physical touching, or coercive language. The recent court ruling deviates from the Mendenhall 'reasonable person' standard, suggesting that meeting this standard does not automatically indicate a seizure has occurred. This contrasts with previous cases, such as INS v. Delgado, which emphasized that a seizure only happens when an officer restrains a citizen's liberty through force or authority. The protection against unreasonable seizures also extends to brief detentions, and an initially consensual encounter can become a seizure if a reasonable person would feel unable to leave. In Florida v. Royer, the Court affirmed the Mendenhall standard, stating that a citizen cannot be detained without reasonable, objective grounds, and that mere refusal to engage does not suffice to justify a detention. The focus should be on the objective circumstances of the encounter rather than the subjective feelings of the individual being questioned.
A seizure occurs when a police officer's show of force signifies that a citizen is not free to leave, impacting their liberty significantly. This principle is supported by the Mendenhall definition, which the Court recognized as a necessary and sufficient condition for identifying a Fourth Amendment seizure. In United States v. Jacobsen, a meaningful interference with a person's property rights also constitutes a seizure. The Court upheld the reasonable person standard in Michigan v. Chesternut, rejecting calls to abandon it. It emphasized that the objective standard of evaluating a reasonable person's perception of police conduct allows law enforcement to assess potential Fourth Amendment implications beforehand.
Professor LaFave endorsed the Court's decision in Chesternut, arguing that the "free to leave" standard should not depend on a suspect's decision to flee. The Court's ruling in this case marks a shift from earlier Fourth Amendment interpretations, challenging the notion that there is a clear distinction between seizures by physical contact and those by a display of authority. By narrowing the definition of "seizure," the Court has reduced Fourth Amendment protections for citizens, contrary to earlier rulings like Terry, which warned against compartmentalizing police interactions into rigid categories. In the current case, the officer's aggressive approach effectively communicated to the respondent that he was not free to leave, contrasting with Mendenhall, where the respondent had no reason to believe they were not free to go. The critical question remains whether the Fourth Amendment's protections were triggered at the moment the respondent first perceived the officer's approach or at the moment he was physically restrained.
The timing of a seizure is determined by a citizen's reaction rather than an officer's actions during a show of force, such as commands to 'freeze,' warning shots, or the use of sirens and flashing lights. A seizure occurs not when a citizen believes they are no longer free to leave, but only after the officer exerts control over them. This perspective aims to balance effective law enforcement with personal liberty, advocating for a standard that allows police to anticipate whether their actions will engage the Fourth Amendment.
The document references cases like Tennessee v. Garner and Brower v. Inyo County to illustrate that the nature of a suspect's response does not absolve officers of responsibility for their actions. The constitutionality of an officer's show of force should be assessed based on the conditions present at the time of the action, similar to how searches are evaluated. An unconstitutional search cannot be justified by subsequent findings, and the same principle applies to seizures. Thus, if an officer seizes a citizen, the legality of that action should be judged at the moment it occurs, regardless of any subsequent escape by the citizen. A consistent rule should apply to all types of seizures, including those involving a show of force.
In this new subcategory of cases, there exists a time frame where a citizen's liberty is restrained without their complete submission to law enforcement's show of force. For instance, a motorist may not stop immediately when signaled by a patrol car, even with the intention to comply. If an officer initiates a stop deemed unconstitutional, such as one forbidden by Delaware v. Prouse, and observes an expired license plate before the motorist comes to a halt, the legality of the seizure is questionable. Similarly, in an airport scenario, a drug enforcement agent approaching passengers with a drawn weapon and announcing a search raises concerns about the intimidation factor involved in such investigative stops.
The majority's ruling fails to account for the coercive nature of these actions, potentially allowing law enforcement misconduct to persist unchecked. The exclusionary rule aims to deter improper behavior by officers rather than focusing on a citizen's reaction to coercive tactics. In the case at hand, if Officer Pertoso had successfully apprehended a suspect before they disposed of contraband, the evidence would likely be excluded as the result of an unlawful seizure. However, the Court's reasoning suggests that attempts at unconstitutional seizures fall outside the protections of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the officer's unreasonable behavior.
This ruling could encourage unlawful displays of force, leading innocent citizens to surrender their privacy rights. The irony lies in the Court's reliance on outdated common law principles, which historically provided greater protections against unlawful arrests than the current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court now defines a seizure as beginning only upon a citizen’s submission, thus narrowing the instances that qualify as seizures and effectively placing the security of citizens against unreasonable searches at the discretion of law enforcement. An illegal search and seizure is typically characterized by its suddenness and lack of judicial oversight, leaving citizens with the choice to either acquiesce to police actions or resist, risking arrest or violence.
In the dissenting opinion of *Brinegar v. United States*, the author argues that the expansion of unreviewable law enforcement powers by the executive branch entails a sacrifice of individual freedoms. Highlighting the Fourth Amendment's purpose, the dissent suggests that courts should demand greater societal benefits before accepting such sacrifices. The opinion references Alexander Bickel's observation that governmental actions can have both immediate effects and unintended consequences on fundamental values.
The dissent notes California's concession that Officer Pertoso lacked the "reasonable suspicion" necessary to justify the stop of Hodari, as established in *Terry v. Ohio*. It questions the reasoning behind considering it unreasonable for young men to flee at the sight of police, implying that such behavior could be seen as instinctive. The dissent emphasizes that the discussion is based solely on the State's concession and does not delve into broader legal principles derived from common law regarding "seizure."
Additionally, the dissent addresses the interpretation of the term "seizure," asserting that while *Terry v. Ohio* expanded the justifications for seizure beyond probable cause, it did not redefine what constitutes a seizure of a person. The opinion clarifies that *Katz v. United States* established that items not subject to common law seizure could be seized under the Fourth Amendment, but this does not alter the definition of an arrest. The dissent also critiques the majority's dismissal of residents' fears regarding police encounters, arguing that such an assumption fails to recognize the realities faced by many, particularly minority communities.
Men who are innocent may flee from crime scenes due to fear of being wrongfully accused or unwillingness to testify. The legal principle that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth" is not universally accepted. An arrest is not considered valid if an officer merely announces it without physical contact; actual apprehension requires a lawful touching by the officer, even if the suspect escapes immediately afterward. An individual attempting an unlawful arrest can commit assault or battery, depending on the circumstances. An officer may be liable for false imprisonment or assault even without physical contact if he attempts an arrest without lawful authority. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy from unreasonable governmental intrusion, with its application depending on the context of the situation. The principle that not all searches and seizures are unconstitutional applies here, and past cases, such as Hester v. United States, do not directly address the potential for constitutional violations in the context of personal seizures. In Brown v. Texas, the Court permitted brief detentions for questioning based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. The reliance on earlier cases predating significant Fourth Amendment interpretations highlights the evolving legal landscape regarding search and seizure rights.
The Court's decision in Terry emphasizes the necessity of respecting individual rights to personal security and freedom during police encounters that do not constitute a full arrest. This principle has been consistently upheld in various cases, including INS v. Delgado and United States v. Place, highlighting the concept that any meaningful interference with a person's freedom of movement qualifies as a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. The notion of a seizure extends beyond physical restraint to include any actions by law enforcement that intrude upon an individual's movement, as articulated in Michigan v. Chesternut, where police conduct perceived as blocking or controlling movement can trigger Fourth Amendment protections. To assess the constitutionality of a seizure, a balance must be struck between the nature of the intrusion and the governmental interests that justify it, as established in Tennessee v. Garner. The text also notes that even common law acknowledges that unlawful actions by officers, such as shooting at an individual during an unauthorized arrest, can lead to serious criminal charges. The Fourth Amendment's core purpose is to protect against such intrusions.
The excerpt emphasizes the importance of protecting individuals from arbitrary interference by law enforcement, highlighting the role of the Fourth Amendment in safeguarding privacy and personal security. It references several landmark cases, including INS v. Delgado and Terry v. Ohio, to illustrate the principle that excluding evidence obtained through unlawful searches and seizures serves to deter police misconduct. The text cites Justice Brandeis, underscoring that the Constitution was designed to ensure individuals could be free from unjust government intrusion, which is considered a fundamental right. Additionally, it reflects concerns raised by Justice Jackson regarding the difficulty of safeguarding against unlawful searches, pointing out that many innocent individuals may suffer illegal searches without any legal recourse or acknowledgment from the courts. Overall, the excerpt advocates for strict adherence to Fourth Amendment protections to prevent future violations.
