Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; December 15, 1997; Washington; State Appellate Court
Phillip Stout sought to modify his child support obligations due to a decrease in income following a serious injury. Initially ordered to pay $400 monthly after his divorce from Deborah Seaton in 1989, the amount was later increased to $547 in 1994 when Seaton began receiving public aid. Stout's income fluctuated significantly; after earning only $5,308 in 1992 and $5,868 in 1993, his income rose to $15,980 in 1994 but subsequently fell to $9,221 in 1995 due to ongoing health issues. He reported minimal personal income for early 1996.
Stout filed a petition for modification based on these financial challenges, asserting his support obligation should be recalculated to $219. Seaton contested this, claiming Stout was manipulating his corporation's income. The trial court agreed to modify Stout's support but determined his annual income to be $15,000 based on corporate financial documents, leading to a new monthly obligation of $317.43. Stout argued this amount would reduce his income below the DSHS's established minimum of $800, and he contended the court's calculations lacked evidentiary support.
The trial court acknowledged that the support calculation could lower Stout’s income below the minimum but denied his request for deviation, prioritizing the children's needs. The appellate court ultimately reversed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the support order was unjustified given the evidence of Stout’s income.
Stout filed a motion to reconsider following a surgery that left him totally disabled as of June 1996, with a conditional expectation of returning to work by mid-November 1996. The court denied Stout's motion, finding no facts to support imputing income to either party and determining that the needs of the children did not warrant deviation from the standard child support calculation. Stout demonstrated a need for attorney fees, but the court found Seaton lacked the ability to pay. The court acknowledged that the standard calculation resulted in Stout’s income falling below the $800 minimum need standard set by DSHS effective September 1, 1995, but concluded that the children’s needs precluded any deviation from the established support amount of $317.43.
The court's reasoning regarding the 'needs of the children' was vague, lacking specific evidence of special needs that would justify this decision. Stout contended that the statute mandates a limit on child support obligations and argued that the court abused its discretion by not adjusting the support order to maintain his income above the minimum threshold. While the court has discretion to deviate from the need standard under RCW 26.19.075, it must provide written findings and conclusions for any deviation. The record did not clarify the specific needs of the children, nor did it reference any ongoing requirements for psychiatric services mentioned in Seaton’s 1995 declaration, which was not included in the record.
The court's lack of sufficient justification to reduce Stout’s income below the minimum standard raised concerns of potential abuse of discretion. The appellate court decided to remand the case for reconsideration of the support order, instructing the trial court to provide written findings if it continued to reduce Stout’s monthly income below the need standard. Additionally, in modification proceedings, the trial court is required to present written findings supported by substantial evidence, which Stout argued was lacking in the court's calculations of his income, despite his provision of extensive financial data, including personal tax returns and corporate financials.
The trial court's estimate of Stout's annual income at $15,000 is deemed unreasonable and an abuse of discretion, as it lacked a factual basis and disregarded substantial evidence indicating Stout's actual income, which rarely exceeded $10,000 annually since 1992. Stout provided credible medical evidence suggesting he could not work due to his deteriorating health, supported by two doctors' recommendations and impending surgery. The court is instructed to recalculate the support amount in accordance with the evidence, and if it orders Stout to pay standard support obligations, it must document its rationale for deviating from prohibitions against reducing an obligor's income below the minimum threshold.
Regarding attorney fees, Stout argued the trial court erred by denying his request for fees, noting Seaton's ability to pay and her intransigence that increased his legal costs. The court has discretion in awarding attorney fees in modification proceedings, balancing the financial resources of both parties. While Seaton reported an average annual income of $22,000 in 1994 and 1995, her attorney claimed her financial situation was dire, yet the court's finding of her inability to pay Stout's fees contradicts its own income assessment and lacks support in the record. Seaton's lack of cooperation, including untimely responses and failure to produce requested documents, necessitated additional legal efforts from Stout's counsel, justifying an award of attorney fees. Consequently, the denial of Stout's request for fees is reversed, and the case is remanded for reconsideration. Stout also seeks fees for the appeal, which will be assessed based on the merit of the issues raised and the parties' financial situations, with Stout having met the required procedural obligations.
Stout has successfully established the necessity for fee payments related to the appeal, resulting in an award for fees and costs incurred during the appeal process. Stout is required to submit an affidavit outlining the expenses and services provided by his counsel. The trial court's prior decision is overturned and sent back for reevaluation in line with the appellate court's findings.
Relevant statutes include RCW 26.19.065(2), which mandates a minimum support order of $25 per child when combined monthly net income is below $600, and stipulates that a parent's obligation cannot reduce their net income below the established need standard. The record indicates that Seaton's attorney was unable to prepare an updated financial declaration due to Seaton's unavailability, relying instead on a declaration from 1995, which was not included in the appellate records. Stout submitted Seaton's 1994 and 1995 tax forms as part of the trial record.
Additional case references highlight the court's obligation to consider financial resources in awarding attorney fees, affirming that the appellate court can order fees and costs for maintaining an appeal. The document cites several precedential cases emphasizing the need for accurate income verification in support calculations and circumstances where intransigence by a party justifies an award of attorney fees.
