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Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin
Citations: 109 L. Ed. 2d 631; 110 S. Ct. 2105; 495 U.S. 604; 1990 U.S. LEXIS 2700; 58 U.S.L.W. 4629Docket: 89-44
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; May 29, 1990; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
During a business trip to California, New Jersey resident Dennis Burnham was served with a divorce petition from his estranged wife. He challenged the jurisdiction of the California Superior Court, arguing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment barred the court from asserting jurisdiction over him due to insufficient "minimum contacts" with California. However, both the Superior Court and the State Court of Appeal upheld the service of process, stating that personal service while physically present in the state is a valid basis for in personam jurisdiction, regardless of the nature of the lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed this judgment, emphasizing that the Due Process Clause does not prevent states from exercising jurisdiction over nonresidents who are personally served in the state. The Court highlighted that traditional principles of jurisdiction dictate that physical presence in the forum state, even temporarily, is sufficient for a court to establish jurisdiction. Justice Scalia, supported by other justices, noted that historical precedents support the notion that service of process grants jurisdiction over nonresidents, regardless of whether their actions relate to the state. Burnham's argument that continuous, systematic contacts are necessary for jurisdiction misinterprets previous Supreme Court rulings. Additionally, the Court clarified that the decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, which addressed jurisdiction over absent defendants, does not negate the validity of jurisdiction over those physically present in the forum. Thus, the ruling reaffirmed that personal service establishes jurisdiction, maintaining the traditional understanding of state authority in such matters. Justice Brennan's proposal to incorporate "contemporary notions of due process" into the constitutional analysis challenges the established International Shoe standard. It advocates for measuring state-court jurisdiction based on subjective fairness, creating a "totality of the circumstances" test that could lead to increased litigation regarding a forum's competence. Justice White maintained that traditional jurisdiction rules, allowing personal service over nonresidents, cannot be deemed unconstitutional without evidence showing that they are generally arbitrary and unreasonable. Until such evidence is presented, claims of unfair application of these rules should not be considered, especially when the nonresident's presence in the forum is intentional. Despite acknowledging the validity of the traditional "transient jurisdiction" rule, Justice Brennan, alongside Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor, argued for a broader evaluation of jurisdictional rules beyond historical precedent, emphasizing the need to assess fairness in the context of due process. They referenced International Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner to assert that all jurisdictional rules must meet contemporary due process standards. The transient jurisdiction rule is generally aligned with due process, as its long-standing acceptance provides notice to defendants that they may be sued in the forum, fulfilling reasonable expectations. Additionally, transient defendants benefit from state services and protections, and the burdens of litigation are mitigated by modern conveniences. Justice Stevens supported affirming the judgment based on historical evidence, a consensus on fairness, and common sense considerations. Justice Scalia announced the Court's judgment, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, with Justice White concurring in parts of the opinion. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor also filed concurring opinions. The case addresses whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restricts California courts from exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident who was served while temporarily in the state for a suit unrelated to his activities there. Petitioner Dennis Burnham married Francie Burnham in 1976 in West Virginia, moving to New Jersey in 1977 where they had two children. In July 1987, they decided to separate, agreeing that Mrs. Burnham would move to California with the children and file for divorce on "irreconcilable differences." However, in October 1987, Mr. Burnham filed for divorce in New Jersey citing "desertion" without serving Mrs. Burnham. In January 1988, Mrs. Burnham filed for divorce in California. Later that month, Mr. Burnham visited California for business and family, during which he was served with a divorce summons upon returning the child to Mrs. Burnham. He subsequently moved to quash the California court's service, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction due to minimal contacts with the state. The California Superior Court denied this motion, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, stating that personal service while present in the state provided sufficient jurisdiction, leading to the granting of certiorari by the Supreme Court. The judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is inherently void, a principle rooted in historical English law and affirmed by Lord Coke. This concept, known as coram non judice, signifies that a proceeding without lawful judicial authority cannot produce a valid judgment. American courts have long recognized this principle, invalidating judgments that contravene it prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case Pennoyer v. Neff established that a court's lack of personal jurisdiction constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause. To assess personal jurisdiction's alignment with due process, the criteria traditionally adhered to by American courts concerning state authority are employed, first articulated in Pennoyer v. Neff. The standard requires that legal proceedings follow established rules for protecting private rights and respect state jurisdiction over persons and property. The landmark case International Shoe Co. v. Washington further clarifies that a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction adheres to due process if it aligns with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Subsequent rulings permit deviations from 19th-century jurisdictional rules, conditional on the defendant's contacts with the state. The current inquiry involves whether due process mandates a connection between litigation and the defendant's contacts with the state when the defendant is physically present in the state at the time of service. Courts in the United States have a well-established principle that allows them to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents physically present within the state. This principle, rooted in early American and English common law, posits that a state can summon any individual found within its borders and maintain jurisdiction regardless of the individual's brief stay. Historical cases, such as Potter v. Allin and Barrell v. Benjamin, exemplify this notion, suggesting that once properly served, a person is subject to the court's jurisdiction. Justice Story traced this principle back to Roman law and emphasized its basis in English tradition, asserting that personal actions are transitory and can be pursued wherever a defendant is located. Contemporary critiques of Story's interpretation indicate that the historical English practice may have been more nuanced than he acknowledged. However, by 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, American courts had largely adopted Story's perspective. This is illustrated in a Georgia Supreme Court case, which affirmed that a citizen of Alabama could be sued in Georgia simply for passing through. Numerous 19th and early 20th-century cases reaffirmed that personal service on a physically present defendant was sufficient for jurisdiction, regardless of the connection between the defendant's presence and the cause of action. Examples include decisions from states like West Virginia, California, Louisiana, and Alabama, among others, all supporting the principle that jurisdiction can be established through physical presence alone. Reed v. Hollister and Hagen v. Viney illustrate that while not every state has a case directly addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction through in-state service, the consensus is that the matter is well settled and rarely litigated. Historical opinions from various state courts have acknowledged this rule, often in dictum. Most states have statutes or common law that exempt individuals from service of process if they were coerced into the forum or were present due to unrelated judicial proceedings, reinforcing the idea that service of process establishes jurisdiction. Notably, there has been a lack of cases, from the period in question until 1978, suggesting that in-state personal service was inadequate for conferring personal jurisdiction. Consensus among legal commentators supports this understanding. The established practice of personal jurisdiction through in-state service continues across states and at the federal level, despite some recent opinions questioning its constitutionality based on due process grounds. No state or federal statute or judicial decision has eliminated in-state service as a basis for jurisdiction, with many recent cases affirming this principle. Relevant cases include Hutto v. Plagens, Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, and several others across various jurisdictions. The petitioner argues, based on the International Shoe standard, that a nonresident defendant can only be judged for matters related to their contacts with the forum, a misunderstanding of existing case law. Historically, courts held that in-personam jurisdiction could not be exercised over a nonresident without personal service in the forum. Although the principle from Pennoyer v. Neff is well-known, it was established as dictum, operating under public law principles predating the Fourteenth Amendment. Subsequently, the strict limits on state jurisdiction over nonresidents have relaxed due to advancements in transportation and communication, leading states to require nonresident corporations to appoint in-state agents for service and to establish substituted service for nonresident motorists. Laws previously upheld under the Due Process Clause were based on the fictional concepts of "consent" and "presence" as outlined in landmark cases, such as Hess v. Pawloski and Philadelphia, Reading R. Co. v. McKibbin. The ruling in International Shoe rejected these fictions, establishing that due process does not require strict adherence to the territorial limits on jurisdiction from Pennoyer. Instead, jurisdiction over a nonconsenting, non-present defendant depends on the "quality and nature" of their activities related to the forum, aligning with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." The document asserts that no subsequent case supports the notion that a defendant's presence in the forum is unnecessary for establishing jurisdiction or that it is insufficient for validation. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining distinctions between traditional and novel jurisdictional procedures, reiterating that due process must be grounded in principles that have evolved over time, not merely historical precedents. The reference to Hurtado v. California highlights that the essence of due process includes practices that are recognized as law, which should not be stagnant. Furthermore, it argues that jurisdiction based solely on physical presence meets due process requirements, as it reflects long-standing legal traditions. Petitioner's argument, which the document ultimately rejects, draws on Shaffer v. Heitner, where the court ruled that a Delaware court could not assert jurisdiction over absent defendants based solely on the sequestration of their stock, as their connection to Delaware was insufficiently related to the lawsuit. The petitioner incorrectly asserts that Shaffer establishes a lack of state jurisdiction over an individual unless the litigation arises from their activities within the state. Shaffer, along with International Shoe, addresses jurisdiction over absent defendants and asserts that when property ownership constitutes the "minimum contact" for jurisdiction, it must relate to the litigation. The petitioner's interpretation of Shaffer misrepresents the context of the statement regarding the evaluation of state-court jurisdiction based on International Shoe's standards. Shaffer argues that treating jurisdiction over property as separate from jurisdiction over its owner lacks modern justification and can lead to unfairness for defendants. Therefore, it concludes that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must adhere to the standards of International Shoe. Importantly, the ruling clarifies that quasi in rem jurisdiction, based on property ownership without personal service in-state, must meet the litigation-relatedness criterion of International Shoe. The decision emphasizes that while Shaffer places all suits against absent nonresidents on equal constitutional ground, it does not equate the treatment of physically present defendants with absent ones. Historically, these two categories have been treated differently, and Shaffer does not alter this distinction. The "minimum contacts" requirement remains applicable only when the defendant is not present in the forum. The current ruling does not contradict Shaffer but adopts a different perspective on due process, refraining from assessing the fairness of in-state service rules, which remains under the purview of legislative amendment. Shaffer conducted an independent inquiry, arguing that both outdated practices and new procedures can violate "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." While such assertions may be tenable for practices maintained by a small minority of states, in cases where a jurisdictional principle is well-established and widely accepted, it is difficult to determine what constitutes "no longer justified." The document reaffirms previous rulings, emphasizing that the Due Process Clause necessitates an analysis of whether new procedures offend established standards of fairness. It challenges Justice Brennan's concurrence, which advocates for a standard of "contemporary notions of due process." The text contends that this standard diverges from the established test of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," as articulated in International Shoe. The proposed standard by Justice Brennan is criticized for being subjective and lacking grounding in existing jurisdictional precedents. The document argues that benefits derived by Mr. Burnham from California during his brief stay are insufficient to justify the extensive jurisdictional claims made by the state, suggesting that such a contractual exchange would likely fail under the Uniform Commercial Code's unconscionability provision. The analysis underscores the inadequacy of the subjective approach to jurisdiction proposed in the concurrence. Jurisdiction over Mr. Burnham in California is debated, focusing on the implications of him being allowed to sue as a plaintiff while not compelled to defend as a defendant. The ease of travel and modern procedural conveniences suggest that appearing in California courts should not be a hardship. However, this reasoning risks justifying jurisdiction over anyone, regardless of their actual presence in California, based solely on temporary benefits enjoyed during their stay. The text critiques the notion that Mr. Burnham's three-day visit distinguishes him from others who have also benefited from California's resources without facing jurisdiction due to not being served process. It argues that while Justice Brennan highlights a "reasonable expectation" of being subject to suit for those voluntarily present in a state, this expectation stems from a longstanding tradition of asserting jurisdiction through in-state service, not from a true sense of fairness. The critique emphasizes that this tradition alone does not suffice for fairness; rather, it relies on the premise that fairness and tradition are interconnected. Ultimately, while Justice Brennan suggests that voluntary presence typically meets due process requirements for personal jurisdiction, the analysis exposes underlying tensions between tradition and the need for a more robust justification of fairness. Justice Brennan's use of the term "rule" suggests a reliable legal principle; however, it actually reflects his subjective notion of "fairness" without establishing a definitive legal standard. The phrase "as a rule" implies that fairness elements typically exist, yet various hypothetical scenarios could undermine this assumption, such as a defendant in Mr. Burnham's situation having minimal contact with California or lacking the resources to engage with the state's legal system. Additionally, different circumstances, like personal emergencies, could further complicate the fairness evaluation. Brennan's reliance on a "totality of the circumstances" approach introduces uncertainty and litigation regarding jurisdiction, contrary to traditional jurisdictional norms designed to avoid such ambiguity. While traditional jurisdictional criteria are questioned, changes in jurisdictional standards should emerge from state-level decisions rather than judicial decree. States maintain the in-state service rule, indicating a preference for existing standards rather than adopting more flexible, potentially chaotic criteria for jurisdiction. The Court ruled that it cannot compel States to change their practices based solely on individual Justices' perceptions of fairness, asserting that the Due Process Clause does not prevent California courts from exercising jurisdiction based on in-state service of process. The judgment was affirmed. Justice White, concurring, noted that the rule allowing jurisdiction over nonresidents through personal service in the forum State is widely accepted and could not be deemed violative of due process without a substantial showing of its arbitrary nature. He emphasized that claims of unfair application of this rule need not be considered, particularly when the nonresident's presence in the forum State is intentional, to avoid excessive litigation. Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment, agreed with the general permissibility of jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause but argued against the notion that longstanding jurisdictional rules are automatically constitutional due to their historical pedigree. He advocated for an independent assessment of the fairness of such rules, referencing prior decisions that emphasized a more nuanced analysis of jurisdiction. Jurisdictional analysis must align with modern due process standards as established in *International Shoe* and further elaborated in *Shaffer*. In *Shaffer*, the court emphasized that all jurisdiction rules, including traditional ones, need to reflect contemporary notions of fair play and substantial justice, moving away from reliance solely on physical presence or property location for establishing jurisdiction. The ruling acknowledged that while historical practices may support jurisdiction based on property presence, they cannot be the sole determinant. Furthermore, the court asserted that perpetuating outdated jurisdictional doctrines without substantial justification is inconsistent with constitutional values. The *Shaffer* decision, which limited its holding to quasi in rem jurisdiction, indicated a willingness to reassess long-accepted jurisdictional rules. The opinion also noted that lower courts and legal commentators have interpreted these rulings to mean that all forms of jurisdiction must now adhere to modern due process standards, regardless of their traditional origins. The critique of Justice Scalia's position highlights a divergence from the principles established in *Shaffer*. Tradition is relevant in assessing whether transient jurisdiction aligns with due process, though not determinative. The legitimacy of transient jurisdiction is debated, particularly given its weak historical foundation in American common law and its limited recognition in the 19th century, especially around the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868. While the rule became more accepted after the Pennoyer v. Neff decision in 1878, its historical origins remain unclear. However, the consistent application of transient jurisdiction by American courts for over a century provides defendants with clear notice of their susceptibility to lawsuits in a state where they are present. This understanding aligns with the notion that jurisdiction often depends on geography, and a transient defendant assumes certain risks by being in a state, even with minimal contact. The presence of a defendant within a state enhances their connection and the foreseeability of legal action against them. Proposed revisions to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws support the idea that states can exercise jurisdiction over individuals present in their territory, unless the relationship is so tenuous that it would be unreasonable to do so. Additionally, a transient defendant benefits from the state's services and protections, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause prevents discrimination against them in accessing the state's law and courts. An out-of-state plaintiff is permitted to utilize state courts under the same conditions as state citizens, subject only to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Without transient jurisdiction, a disparity would exist where a transient plaintiff could leverage the forum state's judicial power while avoiding its authority as a defendant. The potential inconvenience for a transient defendant is minimal due to advancements in transportation and communication, which lessen the burden of defending against a lawsuit in a foreign state. Evidence that the defendant has previously traveled to the forum state, as demonstrated by being served there, suggests that litigation in that forum is not excessively burdensome. Any legitimate burdens can be mitigated through various procedural means, indicating that personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on their voluntary presence in the forum generally meets due process standards. In this particular case, it is acknowledged that the petitioner was appropriately served while voluntarily in California, leading to a concurring judgment. Additionally, while previous cases have established that due process is not violated even if a cause of action does not relate to a foreign corporation's activities in the forum, there must be sufficient contacts between the state and the corporation. Past rulings have primarily addressed jurisdiction in the context of in-person service upon corporate representatives within the forum. The discussion also notes that the established rule regarding "continuous and systematic" contacts may uniquely apply to corporations, which complicates the jurisdictional framework based on personal power over a defendant. The opinions expressed do not delve into these complexities further. Justice Brennan's claim that certain cases involved dicta rather than holdings is inaccurate, as each case cited relied solely on personal service within the State to establish jurisdiction. The assertion that this rule was "weakly implanted" in American jurisprudence is also challenged, given the strong support from both historical cases and commentators prior to the landmark decision in *Pennoyer v. Neff*. Numerous pre-*Pennoyer* cases from nine states affirm the in-state service rule, contradicting Brennan's view. Furthermore, Brennan's reliance on modern secondary sources fails to adequately address the historical context, as he does not cite relevant cases or commentators from the time. The cases he references, such as *Coleman's Appeal*, do not support his argument, as they address situations without personal service. Other cases like *Gardner v. Thomas* and *Molony v. Dows* are deemed irrelevant; *Gardner* emphasized discretion in jurisdictional matters, while *Molony* based its decision on public policy concerns rather than jurisdictional propriety. The discussion underscores that historical understanding and precedents strongly favor the in-state service rule, contrary to Brennan's assertions. Justice Brennan references John Cleland Wells' 1880 commentary, highlighting that common law allows for service of process on non-resident defendants who voluntarily enter a jurisdiction. The state of Delaware uniquely considers the place of incorporation as the situs of corporate stock, which was noted in the context of the Shaffer decision. Brennan critiques the notion that constitutional protections for out-of-staters should compel states to abandon outdated jurisdictional bases, arguing that due process should reflect the traditional views of American society rather than fluctuating judicial opinions. He introduces the concept of "transient jurisdiction," which is based solely on a defendant being served while present in the state. The excerpt discusses the balance between traditional legal principles and contemporary societal norms, suggesting that evolution in legal standards is necessary. Brennan acknowledges differing opinions in lower courts regarding the survival of transient jurisdiction post-Shaffer, with some courts abandoning it and others maintaining it, yet all engaging in due process analysis regardless of their stance on its viability. Numerous case citations illustrate the debate surrounding transient jurisdiction and its consistency with modern due process principles, notably influenced by Justice Scalia's opinions. Commentators have engaged in discussions questioning the viability of the transient rule established in *Shaffer v. Heitner*, emphasizing the need for a reasonable basis for state jurisdiction, as articulated in *International Shoe*. The Supreme Court's ruling in *Shaffer* shifted the focus from mere physical presence to "minimum contacts" as the foundational criterion for establishing personal jurisdiction. This reflects a broader principle that jurisdiction must align with contemporary notions of fair play and substantial justice, ensuring that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. The *Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws* supports this understanding, asserting that jurisdiction cannot exist without a reasonable basis, and underscores the importance of reasonableness in assessing jurisdiction over individuals based on their physical presence. A jurisdictional rule must align with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," as established in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California. Key factors for analysis include the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief. This analysis should not be purely mechanical or based on personal whim. Historical interpretations, particularly those by Justice Story regarding transient jurisdiction, are critiqued for lacking authoritative support and being at odds with English common law principles that prioritize fair play and substantial justice. An example is provided from Molony v. Dows, where the court dismissed a tort action despite the defendant's presence in the forum state, emphasizing that jurisdiction cannot extend merely because parties are present in the state; it must consider the context of the injury and the parties' domiciles. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized that individuals should only be held liable for civil wrongs in their local jurisdiction. In Gardner v. Thomas, the court examined whether it could address a tort committed on the high seas involving a foreign vessel after docking in New York. The court referenced Lord Mansfield's skepticism about maintaining actions for injuries in foreign jurisdictions, asserting that while courts could recognize torts on the high seas involving foreign parties, jurisdiction often depended on the specific circumstances of each case. Ultimately, the court found it lacked jurisdiction in the case at hand. Additionally, historical context is provided, illustrating that state courts may exercise jurisdiction over torts involving non-residents if the defendant is served within the state, although dissenting opinions questioned this approach. The analysis highlights the evolving understanding of jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and choice of law, noting that common law did not clearly define jurisdiction as understood today, with significant complexities related to venue, pleading, and substantive law that persisted until legal reforms in the Victorian era. English jurisdictional law historically tends to resist generalization, particularly under a territorial framework, leading American courts in the nineteenth century to find English precedents largely irrelevant. Many American courts adopted English principles, limiting where certain actions could be initiated, irrespective of the defendant's presence or service in that location. A noted legal historian remarked that despite the often-quoted transient service rule, it was seldom applied by appellate courts. Cases referenced in Justice Scalia's opinion frequently involved either mere affirmations of jurisdictional rules in dictum or circumstances where additional factors justified the jurisdiction. Specific instances noted include cases where defendants were residents of the forum, actions arose within the forum, or prior interactions established grounds for jurisdiction. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws suggests that a defendant's involuntary or unaware presence in a state might not support personal jurisdiction. The current case does not necessitate a determination of the limits of transient jurisdiction. Constitutional privileges must be considered when evaluating the fairness of transient jurisdiction, particularly regarding a defendant's engagement with the forum state’s business and legal benefits, as illustrated in landmark cases. A transient defendant in federal court can effectively avoid lengthy litigation by utilizing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim or motions for summary judgment, as provided under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules 12(b)(6) and 56). They have access to cost-effective discovery methods, including telephone depositions, written questions, interrogatories, and requests for admission, while also being protected from harassment and potentially recovering costs and attorney's fees. A change of venue may also be pursued under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. Similar protections exist in state courts, including the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which allows for dismissal of suits. Justice Scalia’s opinion characterizes transient jurisdiction as a contractual bargain, viewing it as "unconscionable" under contemporary fairness standards, yet insists that its historical basis validates it as a reasonable practice. This perspective suggests that if a jurisdictional rule becomes unfair, the Court cannot modify it and instead defers to individual states to possibly limit or abandon such rules. However, this reliance on states is criticized, as they have little incentive to curtail rules like transient jurisdiction that facilitate lawsuits against out-of-state defendants. The trend among states to adopt long-arm statutes demonstrates a tendency to expand, rather than limit, jurisdiction. The opinion neglects foundational constitutional principles designed to protect out-of-state individuals, such as the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause, indicating a disconnect with fairness considerations for non-residents.