Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; October 23, 1969; Washington; State Appellate Court
The Washington Court of Appeals reviewed an appeal from a summary judgment that dismissed George A. McGough's personal injury lawsuit against the City of Edmonds. The case stemmed from an accident on June 4, 1966, where McGough, riding a Honda motorcycle, was struck by a car driven by Dale E. Sherman at an intersection obscured by underbrush and constructed on a hill, limiting visibility. McGough alleged that the City was grossly and ordinarily negligent for failing to ensure a safe intersection, properly maintain the easement, and place warning signs.
In its defense, the City denied these allegations and asserted that McGough was contributorily negligent. The City supported its motion for summary judgment with affidavits and interrogatories, claiming the intersection was not inherently dangerous, despite visibility issues due to vegetation. McGough's responses indicated he did not see Sherman’s vehicle before the collision, noting he had not exceeded 10 mph before the accident. An investigator’s affidavit presented by McGough argued that the intersection was indeed difficult and dangerous due to the visibility impairment caused by the terrain and vegetation.
Both parties disputed the conclusions in each other's affidavits, which the court deemed irrelevant. The record presented a comprehensive overview of the case as understood by the trial court.
Judgment was entered dismissing the case with prejudice and costs, determining that the City of Edmonds was not negligent, as it had no legal duty to trim vegetation obstructing the view at the intersection in question. Both parties presented factual arguments not supported by evidence in the record, particularly regarding the favored driver's direction of travel, with no testimony about the driver's actions before the accident. The trial and appellate courts were required to draw inferences from photographs without context. The ruling emphasized that summary judgment aims to prevent unnecessary trials by confirming the existence of evidence supporting the allegations. The moving party must demonstrate the absence of genuine material facts, while the nonmoving party must present specific facts to contest this. In this case, undisputed facts showed that the plaintiff, on a motorcycle, approached the intersection slowly and stopped due to obstructed visibility, then proceeded and was struck by a vehicle with the right of way. The defendant argued this established nonliability based on three legal precedents: the absence of a duty to maintain unobstructed views, that a failure to remove natural vegetation does not render a street inherently dangerous, and that the plaintiff had prior notice of the danger, making additional warning signs irrelevant.
In *Lee v. Sievers*, the court held that the plaintiff (the wife) could not claim negligence against the defendants for failing to install barriers or warning signs, as the dangerous conditions were known and apparent to her. The court acknowledged that while defendants argued the plaintiff was contributorily negligent for not yielding the right-of-way, the plaintiff presented evidence (photographs) suggesting the intersection could be deemed "inherently dangerous" due to factors like steep grades, curves, lack of signs, and overgrown vegetation. Citing previous cases, the court noted that municipalities are not insurers of safety but must exercise ordinary care to keep public roads safe and provide appropriate warnings where conditions warrant.
The court expressed doubt regarding whether the intersection was inherently dangerous based on the limited evidence, but also questioned the materiality of this issue. It reiterated that if the plaintiff was arguing for a failure to warn the other driver of inherent dangers, she needed to provide evidence showing how this omission could excuse her duty to yield. However, the plaintiff did not present such evidence, and critical information, like the other driver's testimony and the specifics of the intersection's conditions, were absent from the record.
Factual evidence is lacking to determine if the plaintiff's failure to yield right-of-way is excusable due to the intersection's topography, actions of the favored driver, or the city's failure to warn. According to RCW 46.61.190, a driver must slow and yield at a yield sign. If a collision occurs after failing to stop, it serves as prima facie evidence of this failure. To excuse such a violation, the plaintiff must present evidence related to the "clear stretch of the road" rule, which permits an exception if the disfavored driver could not see the favored vehicle due to street conditions. The disfavored driver is still required to make observations from a position that allows for a clear view. In a referenced case, the plaintiff did not demonstrate an issue of fact under this rule, as he failed to connect his inability to see the favored vehicle with intersection conditions.
The plaintiff cannot invoke the deception doctrine to excuse his statutory violation without demonstrating that he was misled into believing it was safe to proceed. No evidence was provided to show how the favored driver's actions deceived him. Although the plaintiff might argue the intersection was inherently dangerous, he did not prove that its characteristics influenced his actions or caused the accident. The defendant successfully demonstrated the plaintiff's failure to yield, necessitating that the plaintiff provide evidence to excuse this failure to defeat the summary judgment motion. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, emphasizing the need for the nonmoving party to present evidence in intersection collision cases to avoid summary judgment. The petition for rehearing was denied on November 12, 1969.
