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Labayog v. Labayog
Citations: 927 P.2d 420; 83 Haw. 412Docket: 16096, 16310
Court: Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals; December 10, 1996; Hawaii; State Appellate Court
Appeal No. 16096 arises from a divorce case involving Antonette Labayog and Dionicio Labayog, and Appeal No. 16310 concerns a probate matter regarding Dionicio's estate. Both appeals have been consolidated, with Felicitas Labayog, Dionicio's second wife, as the appellant. She seeks a court order to void a provision in the divorce decree requiring Dionicio to convey property to his five children from his first marriage or to establish that rights of an omitted spouse and a pretermitted child take precedence over the property conveyance ordered by the family court. Dionicio, the defendant in the divorce, married Felicitas shortly after the divorce and died thirteen months later. Felicitas's appeals challenge two court orders: one denying her motion to reconsider the substitution of parties in the divorce case and the other denying her petition to remove the co-personal representatives of Dionicio's estate for failing to include property in the estate inventory. Felicitas is also acting on behalf of their minor son, Dionicio Labayog, Jr. The divorce decree awarded specific properties to each spouse and mandated their conveyance to their children, subject to a life interest for Dionicio. Neither Dionicio nor Antonette complied with the conveyance order in their Divorce Decree before Dionicio's death. After his death, Antonette fulfilled the order regarding the 'Apala Property. Key events include their marriage on July 30, 1958, the birth of their five children between 1959 and 1968, and their separation leading to Antonette's divorce filing on October 30, 1984. On July 28, 1987, Dionicio executed a will designating Lyric, Jennifer, and Donna as co-personal representatives (Co-PRs) and beneficiaries, with Lawrence and Marilyn as conditional beneficiaries. On February 16, 1989, Dionicio and Antonette stipulated to terms for their divorce, awarding the Lohilani Property to Dionicio and the 'Apala Property to Antonette, each agreeing to convey their respective properties to their children with a life interest reserved. The family court entered the Divorce Decree on March 31, 1989, specifying that the children were not minors and requiring both parties to execute necessary documents to enforce the decree. If either party failed to comply within 30 days, the court could act on their behalf. Dionicio remarried Felicitas on July 28, 1989, and died on September 6, 1990. Felicitas gave birth to Dionicio's sixth child, Junior, on December 26, 1990. On September 4, 1991, Lyric, Jennifer, and Donna filed a petition for probate, which was granted orally on October 25, 1991. On December 18, 1991, Felicitas petitioned to remove the Co-PRs for not including the Lohilani Property in the estate inventory and alternatively sought a court order to include it. The probate court admitted Dionicio's will on January 16, 1992, appointing the Co-PRs, and denied Felicitas's petition on January 31, 1992. Subsequently, on February 19, 1992, Antonette filed a motion to substitute the Co-PRs in an ongoing case related to the divorce. Felicitas, not a party in FC-D No. 84-1132, filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Substitution of Parties on February 25, 1992. The family court granted the motion for substitution on March 2, 1992. Felicitas later filed a Motion to Reconsider the substitution and to intervene on March 23, 1992. The Co-Personal Representatives (Co-PRs) filed an inventory reporting no real property, a $3,000 car, and $3,000 in personal effects on March 24, 1992. The family court denied Felicitas' motions on March 30, 1992. She subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal on April 29, 1992, initiating Appeal No. 16096. The court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on May 8, 1992. On July 20, 1992, the probate court denied a petition to remove the Co-PRs, affirming the family court's jurisdiction to enforce the Divorce Decree terms in FC-D No. 84-1132. Felicitas filed another Notice of Appeal on July 22, 1992, starting Appeal No. 16310. Dionicio's July 28, 1987 Will appointed Lyric, Donna, and Jennifer Labayog as Co-PRs and specified that his estate would be divided equally among his children, disinheriting his spouse, Antonette Labayog, due to prior financial provisions. Felicitas, married to Dionicio on July 28, 1989, and their son Junior, born December 26, 1990, are considered an omitted spouse and pretermitted child under Hawai'i law, respectively, entitled to shares of Dionicio's estate as if he had died intestate. Together, they hold a seven-twelfths interest in the estate, valued at approximately $277,200 for land and $87,800 for improvements, with a mortgage of $190,940. In Appeal No. 16096, Felicitas argues that the family court erred in substituting the Co-PRs instead of her as defendants and in denying her motion to intervene, claiming she met the requirements under HFCR Rule 24(a)(2). She asserts these actions barred her from filing a motion to void the Divorce Decree’s property award based on jurisdiction issues. In Appeal No. 16310, she contends the probate court misinterpreted HRS 560:3-706(a). The personal representative is required to prepare and file an inventory of the decedent's property but was found to properly exclude the Lohilani Property from this inventory for the administration of Dionicio's estate. The court also incorrectly relied on a void provision of the Divorce Decree, claiming probable jurisdiction for its enforcement. In Appeal No. 16096, the family court's March 30, 1992 Order denied Felicitas's motion to intervene and her motion for reconsideration regarding the substitution of parties in the divorce case. Antonette argues that the family court's denial was justified because Felicitas did not meet procedural requirements for intervention and lacked interest in the Lohilani Property. The court's interpretation of HFCR Rule 24 (a)(2) allows for appeal of intervention denials under a right/wrong standard. Regarding the procedural validity of Felicitas's motion, HFCR Rule 24(c) requires that a motion to intervene must be accompanied by a pleading stating the grounds for intervention. The family court noted Felicitas's motion lacked such a pleading. Felicitas contends that her submitted affidavits and exhibits should be sufficient as they presented facts supporting her claim for relief, arguing that the term "pleading" should encompass all relevant documents rather than a specific format. HFCR Rule 24(c) mandates that only pleadings as defined under HFCR Rule 7(a)(1) qualify for intervention. The relevant initial pleadings include a complaint, petition, application, or written request. In this case, a proposed HFCR Rule 60(b)(4) motion attached to the intervention request was deemed sufficient to comply with HFCR Rule 24(c). The motion to intervene articulated its purpose clearly, and any failure to fully adhere to Rule 24(c) was considered a minor procedural error. Felicitas, as the surviving heir of Dionicio, sought to intervene in a divorce case regarding the Lohilani Property, which was ordered to be conveyed to the Five Children upon Dionicio's death. Antonette argued that Felicitas had no interest in the property and thus lacked grounds for intervention. However, HFCR Rule 24(a) allows intervention if the applicant has an interest in the property subject to the action and that interest may be impaired by its disposition. Since the Divorce Decree involved the Lohilani Property and Felicitas' claim as an omitted spouse could potentially be compromised, she had the right to intervene. The family court's denial of her motion was deemed erroneous but ultimately harmless. Regarding the denial of Felicitas' motion for reconsideration of the substitution order, Antonette claimed that the family court had to substitute the Co-PRs to enforce the Divorce Decree, which she argued was valid and enforceable. The appellate jurisdiction over Felicitas' appeal from this denial was contested by Antonette, but the matter of jurisdiction was acknowledged. The motion to substitute Felicitas Labayog as the proper party in place of the Co-Personal Representatives (Co-PRs) should be granted because the Co-PRs do not represent the real party in interest. Felicitas' appeal regarding the denial of her motion for reconsideration is premature, leading to a lack of appellate jurisdiction for that aspect. Under HFCR Rule 25, akin to FRCP Rule 25, orders allowing substitution are considered interlocutory and are typically not appealable. The propriety of such substitution can only be contested in appeals from final judgments, as established in Takayama v. Financial Sec. Ins. Co. Felicitas argues that certain cases allow for review of substitution orders if they introduce a new cause of action; however, the court finds that no new cause of action is presented, as the substitution merely facilitates enforcement of an existing decree. Regarding Appeal No. 16310, concerning the denial of Felicitas' petition to remove the Co-PRs, the court concludes that while the denial of her request to replace the Co-PRs is not appealable, the denial of her request to compel the Co-PRs to include specific property in the estate inventory is appealable. The statutory basis for petitioning the removal of a personal representative under the Hawai'i Uniform Probate Code (HUPC) outlines that a person interested in the estate may seek removal for cause, which includes scenarios where removal is in the estate's best interests or if the Co-PRs have mismanaged the estate or disregarded court orders. Felicitas filed a Petition to Remove the Co-Personal Representatives (Co-PRs) for Cause, asserting that they would submit a false inventory that omits property belonging to the decedent's estate. She claims that upon Dionicio's death, he owned specific real estate, as evidenced by a title report from 1990. Felicitas, as an interested party, contends that the Co-PRs are mismanaging their duties by excluding this property and seeks a court order to remove them and appoint herself as the personal representative, which is supported by HRS § 560:3-611 (1993). The document references the final order rule of appealability established in International Sav. Loan v. Woods, which states that appeals are permitted only through constitutional or statutory provisions, specifically allowing appeals from final judgments, orders, or decrees of circuit courts. It clarifies that not every decision is appealable, emphasizing that only orders that definitively resolve claims separable from the main action are considered final for appeal purposes. This principle is aimed at preventing piecemeal litigation. Examples from case law illustrate that in foreclosure and probate matters, certain orders are regarded as appealable final orders, such as decrees of foreclosure and orders of formal probate. The order in question resolves the merits related to the decedent's domicile and heirs, categorizing subsequent proceedings as enforcement-related. For appeal purposes, probate cases are divided into two appealable parts: the first involves the formal probate order or intestacy, and the second encompasses other orders, culminating in the order approving final accounts. The July 20, 1992 Order Denying Petition falls within the second category but is not the final order, rendering it interlocutory. The appealability of such an order is examined, referencing an annotation that notes orders on applications for the removal of fiduciaries are generally appealable, either under statutes allowing appeals from interlocutory orders or through broader appeal statutes. However, some cases have deemed similar orders non-appealable based on their interlocutory nature or absence in appeal statutes. In Hawai'i, where no relevant statute exists, the International Savings final order rule applies, indicating that the interlocutory order is not appealable unless it meets the collateral order exception or the irreparable injury exception as defined in specific case law. HRCP Rule 54(b) does not apply to probate cases, confirming the limitations on appealability. An interlocutory permanent injunction requiring a plaintiff to deliver leased automobiles to a defendant constitutes an appealable order. This order qualifies under the collateral order exception, as it conclusively determines a separable right that is significant enough to warrant immediate review, independent of the ongoing probate proceedings. Additionally, the irreparable injury exception applies since the order mandates the immediate transfer of property, and delaying appellate review could cause irreparable harm to the losing party. The referenced case, Collins v. Miller, illustrates that an order denying a motion to remove personal representatives is a collateral order, as it ultimately affects the rights of beneficiaries and the administration of the estate. The court emphasized that if the denial is not appealable, it could lead to irreversible consequences for the estate's administration. However, the current analysis concludes that a denial of a petition to remove personal representatives does not meet the criteria for the collateral order exception. Such a denial is not sufficiently independent of the probate case to justify immediate appellate consideration. Similarly, it does not qualify for the irreparable injury exception, as the probate court has the authority to compel co-personal representatives to fulfill their duties, thereby mitigating potential harm. A personal representative who improperly executes their duties may be liable to interested parties in the estate. A writ of mandamus can be sought in situations where immediate and irreparable harm is at risk; however, it is an extraordinary remedy reserved for exceptional cases of judicial overreach. The probate court's denial of Felicitas' request for the inclusion of the Lohilani Property in the estate inventory is appealable as a collateral order. The probate court erred in denying this request, as the Lohilani Property was owned by Dionicio at his death and should be included in the estate inventory according to HRS 560:3-706(a). Although a Divorce Decree mandated that the property be conveyed to Dionicio's five children, it remains part of the estate until the Co-PRs fulfill this obligation. Felicitas argues that the Divorce Decree's requirement is void due to lack of jurisdiction, but the court found the Divorce Decree enforceable. The family court ruled contrary to Felicitas's potential intervention position in the divorce case. A key legal issue in this litigation is whether the family court had the authority to mandate Antonette and Dionicio to transfer the remainder interests of their residential properties to their children. This matter has been thoroughly briefed and argued, leading to a definitive conclusion that the court does possess such authority. The Pretrial Stipulation from February 16, 1989, signed by both parties and their attorneys, details the division of properties: Dionicio is awarded the marital property at 1915 Lohilani Street, and Antonette receives the property at 98-1608 Apala Loop. Each party is required to convey their respective properties to their living children, per stirpes, while retaining a life estate in those properties. The Divorce Decree, approved and signed by the family court judge on March 31, 1989, reiterates these property awards. Felicitas argues that the directive to convey property interests to the children is void. The central legal question revolves around the family court's jurisdiction to enforce the stipulation regarding property conveyance in the divorce decree, focusing on the extent of the court's jurisdictional power rather than its equitable discretion. A court's actions beyond its jurisdiction are void, regardless of the equities involved. In divorce cases where a valid premarital, marital, or divorce agreement exists, the family court is obligated to issue a divorce decree that mandates the transfer of real property interests to the parties' children while reserving life interests. All enforceable agreements, including those made before June 6, 1987, must be upheld in divorce proceedings. Historically, prior to 1955, judges lacked the authority to divide property in divorce cases, but Act 77 permitted judges to equitably distribute property upon granting a divorce. HRS 580-47 allows courts to issue further orders deemed just and equitable, considering various factors related to the parties' situations. Before the enactment of HRS chapter 572D and its amendments in 1987, premarital agreements could not limit the family court's jurisdiction to make equitable property divisions. However, following these changes, the enforcement of valid marital agreements and divorce agreements takes precedence over prior public policy considerations. Additionally, Act 194 allows married individuals to enter contracts with one another and with third parties similarly to single individuals. Agreements made between spouses concerning property rights, support payments, and child maintenance in anticipation of divorce or judicial separation are valid, contingent upon court approval in subsequent proceedings. Such agreements can be modified based on demonstrated circumstances. Business partnership agreements are also recognized. All contracts made by spouses, regardless of timing and not invalidated by other laws, are valid under the Hawaii Act. Specifically, premarital agreements are enforceable unless deemed unconscionable; merely inequitable contracts are not automatically unenforceable. Valid agreements regarding support and property division, entered with full knowledge of financial circumstances, do not contradict the principles of equitable awards. Legislative intent supports the enforcement of such contracts, reflecting a shift away from outdated protections for spouses. The House Judiciary Committee report clarifies that while judicial approval is required for certain agreements, this provision was reinstated to ensure clarity in enforcement. Additionally, valid premarital agreements can mandate conveyances to non-parties, with family court authority to enforce such directives. A valid and enforceable marital or divorce agreement allows for conveyances to nonparties, as mandated by HRS 572-22, which requires family courts to order such conveyances. In the Labayogs' divorce case, the agreement included a conveyance to nonparties, thereby obligating the family court to execute the order. Regarding the family court's jurisdiction post-Dionicio's death, it can enforce the Divorce Decree by substituting the Co-Personal Representatives (Co-PRs) of Dionicio's estate in place of Dionicio himself and compelling compliance with the Divorce Decree. Legal precedent affirms that family courts retain jurisdiction to enforce property divisions ordered in divorce judgments. HFCR Rule 70(a) allows the court to appoint another party to execute actions specified in a decree if the original party fails to comply. The HUPC, under HRS chapter 560, governs Co-PRs and probate matters, affirming that upon a person's death, their estate passes to designated heirs or devisees, subject to various claims and liabilities. A personal representative must be appointed before any claims against a decedent’s estate can be enforced. Once appointed, the personal representative gains control of the decedent's property but may leave certain real or tangible personal property with presumed heirs until deemed necessary for administration. The personal representative is responsible for managing the estate, including paying taxes and taking necessary actions for protection and preservation of the property. They possess powers akin to an absolute owner but must act in the interest of creditors and beneficiaries. Actions taken by the personal representative, such as executing contracts or litigation for estate protection, are permissible unless restricted by the will or court order. All claims against the estate arising prior to the decedent's death must be presented within specified limitations to avoid being barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs. Claims are considered barred if not presented according to the outlined procedures. Proceedings to enforce secured interests on estate property must follow specific protocols for presenting claims against a decedent's estate. Claimants can initiate actions against the personal representative in any court with proper jurisdiction, but such actions must be initiated within the specified claim presentation period. Claims stemming from ongoing proceedings at the time of the decedent's death do not require formal presentation. A judgment from another court that enforces a claim against the personal representative is considered an allowance of that claim. If estate assets are encumbered by secured interests, the personal representative has the authority to pay, renew, or transfer these encumbrances to satisfy creditors if deemed beneficial for the estate. Payment of an encumbrance does not enhance the share of any distributee entitled to the encumbered assets unless they are entitled to exoneration. Distributees or claimants who improperly receive distributions or payments are liable for returning the property or its value, as well as any income generated from it, unless the distribution is protected by adjudication, estoppel, or limitation. In a specific case involving Antonette, the Divorce Decree prior to Dionicio's death mandated that Dionicio convey a property, which he failed to do. The family court can compel the Co-Personal Representatives (Co-PRs) to fulfill this obligation and grant Antonette's motion to substitute them as defendants in place of Dionicio. This conclusion is supported by the broad powers granted to personal representatives under the HUPC, which limits court oversight of their actions unless a petition is filed by an interested party. Article III outlines statutory duties and powers for personal representatives to facilitate estate settlement, analogous to a trustee's responsibilities. If Dionicio had a written contract to convey the Lohilani Property to the Five Children that was not included in the Divorce Decree, the Five Children could seek specific performance from the Co-PRs in circuit court under HRS 535-1. This statute allows action for specific performance within one year of administration grant, but it does not clarify whether the action should be against the personal representatives or the individuals who inherit the property. The original version of HRS 535-1 included provisions allowing actions against heirs and personal representatives, but these were removed in a 1977 amendment, suggesting that actions should be solely against personal representatives due to their broad powers. This amendment did not alter existing case law, which holds that specific performance of a real estate contract is not subject to nonclaim provisions. Consequently, the Divorce Decree can also be enforced against the Co-PRs in family court, not just probate court. In Magoon v. Magoon, the Hawai'i Supreme Court ruled that if a divorce decree reserves property division for later determination and one party dies before this occurs, the property division should follow divorce statutes rather than the Probate Code. The family court retains jurisdiction to divide the property despite the death of one party, emphasizing the preference for family court authority in property matters linked to divorce. The family court's jurisdiction to enforce a Divorce Decree persists after a party's death, superseding both the Probate Code and the dower statute. Consequently, both the family court and the probate court can enforce the Divorce Decree. The definition of "claims" under the Hawaii Uniform Probate Code (HUPC) excludes demands regarding a decedent's title, indicating that the motion to enforce the Divorce Decree requiring Dionicio to transfer the Lohilani Property to his five children is not subject to the HUPC claims procedure. Even if considered a claim, HRS 560:3-804(2) allows such claims to be presented in various ways, permitting presentation outside the probate case. Therefore, without any statute denying jurisdiction to the family court or granting exclusive jurisdiction to the probate court, the family court retains enforcement authority until either compliance with the Divorce Decree or the expiration of the statute of limitations for enforcement actions. Furthermore, enforcement of the Divorce Decree impacts the estate's distributable size, giving priority to individuals successfully suing the personal representative for specific performance of a contract or a claim against the estate, thus reducing the estate's assets available to heirs, omitted spouses, and pretermitted children. Dionicio had a pre-existing obligation to convey the Lohilani Property, which was subject to both a mortgage and a Divorce Decree. The Divorce Decree takes precedence over Dionicio's written contract regarding the property, meaning that his estate cannot benefit his heirs, omitted spouse, or pretermitted child at the expense of the Divorce Decree's beneficiaries. The rights of those entitled to the property under the Divorce Decree supersede the rights of Dionicio's heirs and family members. This principle is supported by the Illinois Appellate Court case Shilvock v. Shilvock, where the court upheld the enforcement of a divorce decree requiring the conveyance of property despite claims from the second wife regarding her interests. The appellate court found concurrent jurisdiction between Family and Probate Courts and deemed the second wife's attempt to intervene as a harmless error. The court ultimately mandated the enforcement of the Divorce Decree, directing the Co-Personal Representatives (Co-PRs) of Dionicio's estate to comply with the order to convey the property to the children from his first marriage. Additionally, the court dismissed appeals related to the denial of the second wife's intervention and the removal of the Co-PRs for lack of jurisdiction. The order is to vacate the part that declined to require the Co-PRs to include the Lohilani Property (Tax Map Key No. 1-3-7-75) in Dionicio's estate inventory and to remand for an order mandating the inclusion of this property, noting it is subject to a mortgage and a Divorce Decree requiring Dionicio to convey it to the Five Children, while reserving a life interest. Judge Acoba dissents, arguing the probate court improperly deferred jurisdiction to the family court over a probate asset. He contends that the probate court should have exercised its inherent subject matter jurisdiction and that the family court should have deferred to the probate court for enforcement of the divorce decree. The probate court had initial jurisdiction over the Co-PRs and the property; however, it incorrectly acknowledged "probable jurisdiction" of the family court, leading to the denial of Felicitas's motion to compel the listing of the property as part of the estate. The family court's involvement was unnecessary, as the Co-PRs failed to fulfill their legal duty to include the property in the probate estate, rendering any action by the family court ineffective. Judge Acoba argues for the case to return to the probate court for proper handling, emphasizing that the current majority opinion creates conflicting jurisdictions over the same asset. The probate case is remanded to the probate court to include the property in the probate estate, which must be listed as encumbered by the divorce decree mandating conveyance to the Five Children. Simultaneously, the family court case is also remanded, with instructions to enforce the divorce decree by substituting the Co-Personal Representatives (Co-PRs) for Dionicio and ordering them to comply with the decree. The dissenting opinion expresses concern that this dual approach may lead to confusion, inter-court conflict, forum shopping, and increased expenses and delays for the parties involved. It argues that concurrent judicial handling of the same issues is inefficient and could result in discord between the courts. The dissent highlights that the case should have been resolved solely in probate court, as per Act 288 (1996), which grants the probate court exclusive jurisdiction over estate administration and concurrent jurisdiction over related actions. This alignment with the Uniform Probate Code suggests that all matters pertinent to the decedent's estate should fall under the probate court's jurisdiction to ensure comprehensive resolution. The court's majority opinion rules that the probate court's denial of Felicitas's motion to remove a personal representative is not an appealable collateral order. However, it asserts without legal citation that appellate jurisdiction is instead based on whether a parcel of real property is included in the decedent's estate inventory. The dissenting opinion contends that the issue of the appealability of the denial should be reserved for future consideration, highlighting the potential injustices and hardships that could arise from not allowing appellate review of personal representative appointments. Citing precedent, the dissent emphasizes that deferring appeals on such matters can lead to irreversible harm, including the dissipation of estate assets. The dissent argues that while personal representatives may face personal liability for improper actions, this remedy may be ineffective if they become insolvent, particularly if appeals occur after the estate administration is nearly complete. The dissent concludes with a note of resignation from the Hawai'i State Bar and references relevant statutes and rules pertaining to probate and estate management. If a testator does not include any children born or adopted after the execution of their will, those omitted children are entitled to a share of the estate as if the testator had died intestate, unless: 1) the omission was intentional as indicated in the will; 2) at the time of the will's execution, the testator had children and left most of the estate to the other parent of the omitted child; or 3) the testator made provisions for the child outside the will, with clear evidence of intent for that transfer to replace a testamentary provision. If a testator mistakenly believes a living child is deceased at the time the will is executed, that child is also entitled to a share equivalent to what they would receive if the testator had died intestate. The distribution of shares under this provision will lead to the abatement of devises as outlined in section 560:3-902. Additionally, the document outlines procedural rules regarding the substitution of parties in legal cases following a party's death, including a requirement for timely motion for substitution within 180 days. It also details the responsibilities and liabilities of personal representatives of an estate, emphasizing their fiduciary duties, the conditions under which they may be surcharged for their administration actions, and the legal recourse available to address breaches of fiduciary duty, including individual liability in specific proceedings. Finally, it notes an amendment to the relevant statute which will take effect on January 1, 1997, although it is not pertinent to the current appeal. In various jurisdictions, statutes do not permit courts in divorce cases to distribute property to third parties, citing multiple cases such as Patterson v. Patterson and Levine v. Levine, which emphasize that "divide" implies separating into two parts. Some jurisdictions have statutory language differing from Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) 580-47. For instance, in Levine v. Levine, the statute allows courts to assign property between spouses but not to third parties. Michigan's perspective asserts that courts lack authority to compel property transfers to third parties in divorce, although parties may create and have the court confirm property settlement agreements. Act 288 (1996), effective January 1, 1997, amends HRS Chapter 560 but is not pertinent to the current appeal. The amendment clarifies the court's exclusive jurisdiction over formal proceedings regarding the administration and distribution of decedents' estates and concurrent jurisdiction over related actions. Additionally, HRS 571-3 designates family courts as divisions of circuit courts. The majority opinion's discussion on contracts between spouses is deemed unnecessary, given that the divorce decree is an enforceable judgment. HRS 560:3-706 mandates personal representatives to inventory decedents' property, detailing fair market value and encumbrances at the time of death. A divorce decree requiring the conveyance of a remainder interest in land to third parties raises questions about whether it constitutes an "encumbrance" under HRS 560:3-706, which lists encumbrances such as mortgages and liens. The majority opinion asserts that Felicitas's ability to challenge the family court's order, regarding her rights as an omitted spouse and her son's rights as a pretermitted child to the Lohilani property, was potentially hindered due to the court's denial of her intervention motion. While the majority recognizes her right to intervene under Hawai'i Family Court Rules Rule 24(a), it preempts her intervention on remand by classifying the denial of her motion as "harmless error." Additionally, a letter from the Co-PRs' attorney indicated that Antonette intended to address the property issue in family court, leading to her subsequent motion to replace the Co-PRs. Finally, Act 288 (1996), effective January 1, 1997, will amend HRS 560:3-105 to clarify the court's exclusive jurisdiction over formal proceedings related to decedents' estates, while also allowing concurrent jurisdiction for related actions regarding estate properties and creditor claims. The Judicial Council Committee on the Uniform Probate Code endorsed Articles 1-4 of the 1993 UPC without recommending changes to section 3-105.