Graham v. Connor

Citations: 104 L. Ed. 2d 443; 109 S. Ct. 1865; 490 U.S. 386; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 2467; 57 U.S.L.W. 4513Docket: 87-6571

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; May 15, 1989; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

Combined Opinion SummaryCombined Opinion Original

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Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, experienced an insulin reaction and requested his friend to drive him to a store for orange juice. Upon entering the store and seeing a crowd, he quickly left and asked to go to a friend's house instead. City police officer M.S. Connor, suspecting Graham's behavior, conducted an investigative stop, during which Graham was handcuffed and sustained injuries while being denied assistance for his medical condition. After confirming no incident occurred at the store, Graham was released and subsequently filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming excessive force in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

The District Court granted a directed verdict to the police officers based on a four-factor test from Johnson v. Glick, which assesses excessive force based on whether it was used in good faith to maintain order or with malicious intent to cause harm. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, ruling that Graham did not prove the force was applied maliciously and that a reasonable jury could not find the force excessive under the test.

The Supreme Court held that excessive force claims by law enforcement officials during arrests or investigatory stops should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard, rather than a substantive due process standard. It clarified that claims must be evaluated based on the specific constitutional right allegedly violated, emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable seizures. The "reasonableness" standard focuses on whether an officer's actions are objectively reasonable given the circumstances faced, independent of the officer's intent, and accounts for the necessity of quick decision-making in law enforcement.

The Johnson v. Glick test is deemed incompatible with Fourth Amendment analysis regarding excessive force claims against law enforcement. The notion that the test's "malicious and sadistic" inquiry equates to an assessment of objectively unreasonable conduct is rejected. Additionally, the importance of officers' subjective motivations in Eighth Amendment violations does not translate to Fourth Amendment claims. The Eighth Amendment's language suggests a need for subjective state of mind evaluation, while the Fourth Amendment's "unreasonable" does not. The Eighth Amendment standard applies only after the State has met constitutional requirements associated with criminal prosecutions.

In the case of Dethorne Graham, the Court addresses the constitutional standard for excessive force claims by law enforcement during arrests or investigatory stops, concluding that the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard is appropriate, rather than a substantive due process standard. Graham alleges injuries from excessive force during an investigatory stop initiated after he left a convenience store in distress due to an insulin reaction. Officer Connor, suspicious of Graham's behavior, conducted a stop despite being informed that Graham was experiencing a medical emergency. Graham subsequently exhibited signs of distress, ultimately passing out on the curb.

A series of Charlotte police officers responded to Officer Connor's request for backup during a chaotic incident involving Graham. Officers forcibly rolled him over, cuffed him despite pleas for medical assistance due to diabetes, and dismissed his condition as drunkenness. They then placed him face down on a car hood, ignored his request to check for a diabetic decal, and, after he regained consciousness, shoved his face down again. Graham was subsequently thrown headfirst into a police car, and despite a friend bringing orange juice for him, officers denied it. Ultimately, it was reported that Graham had done nothing wrong, leading to his release at home.

Graham suffered injuries, including a broken foot and cuts, and filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the involved officers, claiming excessive force in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court evaluated a directed verdict motion based on four factors regarding excessive force: necessity of force, relationship between need and force used, extent of injury, and the intent behind the force application. The court found the officers' actions appropriate, with no significant injury and no malicious intent, resulting in a directed verdict in favor of the officers.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing on the legal standard applied by the District Court and endorsing the four-factor test for claims of excessive force against government officials. The majority rejected Graham's argument regarding the need to prove malicious intent and concluded a reasonable jury could not find the force used was constitutionally excessive.

The dissenting judge contended that the Court's precedents in Terry v. Ohio and Tennessee v. Garner mandated the use of the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard for evaluating excessive force claims during investigatory stops. The Court granted certiorari and subsequently reversed prior rulings. In the earlier case of Johnson v. Glick, the Second Circuit had addressed a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim without applying the Fourth or Eighth Amendments, instead invoking "substantive due process" to assert that excessive force by law enforcement violates due process rights. Judge Friendly established four guiding factors for assessing whether a constitutional violation occurred, which many lower courts have since applied indiscriminately to excessive force claims under Section 1983, often overlooking specific constitutional rights that could apply. The Court rejected the idea of a unified standard for all excessive force claims under Section 1983, emphasizing that Section 1983 does not create substantive rights but serves as a vehicle to enforce federal rights defined elsewhere. The appropriate analysis for an excessive force claim must begin with identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly violated—typically the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures or the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment—and then apply the corresponding constitutional standard to assess the validity of the claim.

Excessive force claims related to arrests or investigatory stops are governed by the Fourth Amendment, which protects citizens from unreasonable seizures. This principle is reinforced by the ruling in Tennessee v. Garner, where it was established that the use of deadly force against a non-threatening suspect, despite probable cause, can violate constitutional rights. The court clarifies that all excessive force claims by law enforcement, whether involving deadly or non-deadly force, should be assessed under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard rather than substantive due process. 

The reasonableness of force used in a seizure is determined by balancing the nature of the intrusion against governmental interests, considering factors such as the severity of the crime, the suspect's threat level, and any resistance to arrest. Evaluations of reasonableness are made from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, not with hindsight. An arrest based on probable cause is constitutional, even if later shown to be wrongful. The reasonableness standard accommodates the reality that police often make split-second decisions in high-pressure situations. Not every minor use of force constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation; context and circumstances must be taken into account.

The standard for evaluating excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment is based on "objective reasonableness," focusing solely on the actions of the officers in light of the circumstances, independent of their intentions or motivations. An officer's malice does not render an objectively reasonable use of force unconstitutional, nor do good intentions justify an unreasonable use of force. The Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the Johnson v. Glick test, which evaluates officers' actions based on subjective criteria such as "good faith" or "malicious" intent, rather than the objective standard required under the Fourth Amendment. The Court emphasized that subjective motivations are irrelevant in determining whether a seizure is unreasonable. The differing standards between the Fourth and Eighth Amendments highlight that the Fourth Amendment’s inquiry is inherently objective, while the Eighth Amendment involves subjective considerations like cruelty and punishment. Consequently, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration based on the correct Fourth Amendment standard. Justice Blackmun concurred, agreeing with the application of the Fourth Amendment to prearrest excessive force claims but noted that the Court did not need to extend its decision beyond the scope of the case at hand. He also pointed out that the prior case Tennessee v. Garner does not imply a substantive due process standard for evaluating excessive force.

Petitioner opted to disavow substantive due process analysis for prearrest excessive force claims, a strategic choice beneficial for his case but not necessarily applicable to other plaintiffs. The Court suggested that the reasonable use of force under the Fourth Amendment seldom raises substantive due process issues, yet refrained from dismissing such analysis entirely for future cases. The city of Charlotte, an additional defendant, was granted a directed verdict, and this ruling was not contested, thus removing it from current proceedings. Petitioner’s state-law claims for assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress were dismissed and are not part of the Court's considerations. The majority acknowledged that excessive force claims do not arise under the Eighth Amendment for non-incarcerated individuals but failed to clarify the constitutional basis for the claim. Petitioner’s argument was primarily based on Kidd v. O'Neil, which suggested applying a Fourth Amendment "objective reasonableness" standard; however, this reasoning was rejected by the en banc Fourth Circuit. The majority referenced Whitley v. Albers regarding the Eighth Amendment's application to convicted prisoners and questioned the relevance of that standard to excessive force claims in different contexts. Judge Friendly did not apply the Eighth Amendment to the detainee's claim, reasoning that its protections begin post-conviction, and expressed skepticism about whether unauthorized guard actions constituted "punishments." His failure to analyze the claim under the Fourth Amendment likely stemmed from a belief that its protections do not extend to pretrial detainees. Basic principles in section 1983 jurisprudence regarding excessive force claims remain applicable regardless of the detainee's status as an arrestee, pretrial detainee, or prisoner, and the same principles apply to federal officials under Bivens.

A "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment occurs when government actors physically restrain a citizen's liberty. The question of whether the Fourth Amendment protects against excessive force after arrest but before pretrial detention remains unresolved. However, the Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees from excessive force that constitutes punishment. For convicted prisoners, the Eighth Amendment is the primary source of protection against excessive force, and any substantive due process protections are largely redundant. In the case of Whitley, involving a convicted prisoner shot during a riot, the Eighth Amendment violation requires proof of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. The evaluation of excessive force in prisons hinges on whether the force was used in good faith to restore order or maliciously to inflict harm. Although the Johnson v. Glick test provides useful factors for assessing excessive force claims under the Eighth Amendment, it is not universally applicable. The credibility of an officer's account can be influenced by evidence of ill-will, and an officer's good faith may affect the qualified immunity defense in 1983 claims; however, since qualified immunity is not raised in this case, its relevance in excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment is not addressed.