Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; December 6, 1993; Washington; State Appellate Court
Ronald Fossum appeals a summary judgment favoring the estate of Leo August Rehwinkel. The will, executed in 1968, directs payment of all expenses from the estate and bequeaths the residue to surviving relatives, including siblings and nieces and nephews, with specific provisions for representation through descendants. Leo passed away in November 1991, shortly after the death of his niece, Helene Anderson, a beneficiary. Fossum, Helene's son, petitioned to be declared an heir under Washington's anti-lapse statute (RCW 11.12.110), claiming he was entitled to Helene's share. The estate countered with a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, dismissing Fossum's petition. The appellate court's review focused on the legal interpretation of the will and the anti-lapse statute, which allows lineal descendants to inherit if a beneficiary predeceases the testator. However, the court emphasized that the testator's intent, ascertainable from the will's language, must guide its decisions. The ruling upheld the trial court’s order, affirming that Fossum was not entitled to inherit under the terms of the will.
A presumption favors the application of the anti-lapse statute, and the burden to demonstrate otherwise lies with the opposing party. Doubts regarding the statute's applicability should be resolved in its favor, and it is to be liberally construed. Testators are presumed to be aware of the anti-lapse statute and to intend its application unless clear contrary intent is demonstrated. The statute does not apply if the testator specifies an alternative distribution method. In this case, Fossum argues Leo Rehwinkel's will indicates no intent to preclude the statute's operation, claiming it aims to benefit all branches of his family. The will bequeaths shares to living siblings and gifts to nieces, nephews, and unnamed descendants of deceased relatives, suggesting an intent to include all bloodlines. The Estate contends that the will’s language indicating beneficiaries must be living at the time of death shows a clear intent to exclude the anti-lapse statute, asserting that this language acts as a condition precedent for inheritance. The determination of the testator's intent must consider the will as a whole. The Estate's interpretation aligns with established legal precedents, including cases where similar survivorship language was found to negate the statute's application. The court agrees with the Estate's interpretation, concluding that the phrase “to those of the following who are living at the time of my death” unambiguously indicates the testator's intent to restrict inheritance to surviving beneficiaries, thereby avoiding the anti-lapse statute's effect.
The testator's will specified a gift of thirty percent to certain relatives, conditioned upon their survival at the time of the testator's death. The court in Shalkhauser determined that this language indicated the testator's intent for the gift to only go to beneficiaries who survived, ruling that the anti-lapse statute did not apply in this scenario. Similar conclusions were reached in prior cases such as Slattery v. Kelsch and Day v. Brooks, which emphasized that survivorship language negates the operation of the anti-lapse statute. In contrast, Fossum argued for the application of the anti-lapse statute based on Detzel v. Nieberding, where the will's language was interpreted to allow for the statute's operation. However, the Detzel court's reasoning was later criticized and rejected by Shalkhauser, which stated that the analysis was erroneous. Consequently, the prevailing view supports that the testator's intent in using survivorship language excludes the anti-lapse statute, resulting in the lapse of the gift to Fossum's mother upon her predeceasing the testator. The trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Estate was upheld. Additional cases cited by Fossum were found to be factually distinguishable.
