Bravo v. Dolsen Companies

Citations: 862 P.2d 623; 71 Wash. App. 769; 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2148; 1993 Wash. App. LEXIS 431Docket: 12600-5-III

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; November 30, 1993; Washington; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Jose Israel Bravo and nine agricultural laborers appealed the dismissal of their claims against The Dolsen Companies for interference with concerted activities under RCW 49.32.020 and wrongful discharge based on public policy. The workers, dissatisfied with wages and conditions at Cow Palace Dairy, went on strike. Dolsen responded by hiring replacement workers and denying reinstatement to those who participated in the strike. Prior to the strike, the workers sought to negotiate improved conditions, but Dolsen refused to engage in discussions. Following the strike, Dolsen's management made statements indicating that strikers would be fired, and they videotaped the picket line despite no misconduct. In March 1992, the workers filed a complaint in Yakima County Superior Court, which was dismissed by the trial court under CR 12(b)(6), leading to this appeal. The appellate court reviews such dismissals de novo, affirming that dismissal is appropriate if the plaintiffs cannot prove any set of facts supporting their claims.

Dolsen argues that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the workers' complaint, a point that can be raised at any time. Generally, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) grants exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), preempting state and federal court jurisdiction for matters protected or prohibited by the NLRA. However, preemption may not apply if the conduct is only a peripheral federal concern or if there is a significant state interest that outweighs the NLRB's jurisdiction. The nature of the asserted interest and its impact on national labor policies determine preemption. Notably, while certain conduct may fall under the NLRB's jurisdiction, it does not necessarily bar a common law tort action in state court. Also, only parties classified as employers, employees, or labor organizations are subject to the NLRA; agricultural laborers, including dairy workers, are explicitly excluded from this definition. Consequently, since the workers, including Mr. Bravo, are agricultural laborers, their claims are not preempted by the NLRA. Additionally, their wrongful discharge claims are not subject to preemption, though their status under state law remains unclear due to Washington's lack of a comprehensive labor-management relations statute. The workers mistakenly believe that an implied cause of action under Washington’s RCW 49.32.020 applies to their situation, but under common law, either party can terminate an indefinite employment contract at will.

Washington recognized an exception to the general rule regarding employee rights, establishing an implied cause of action under RCW 49.32.020, which emphasizes the necessity of protecting individual unorganized workers' rights to freedom of association, self-organization, and collective bargaining without employer interference. The Krystad case specifies that this implied cause of action includes two elements: (1) the discharge of an employee, and (2) the discharge due to their membership in and activities related to a labor union. The court concluded that such discharges violate the state's declared public policy, which confers actionable rights on employees to be free from coercion by employers when organizing or joining a union.

The court limited the application of this cause of action to the specific facts of Krystad, focusing on discharges related to union activities. Additionally, it addressed the workers' argument that union membership should not be the only criterion for 'concerted activity' under the statute, asserting that limiting it to union activities would render part of the statute redundant, contrary to principles established in prior case law (Clark v. Pacificorp). However, the court clarified that the statute's mention of 'other concerted activities' is relevant and meaningful, as unions play a critical role in various actions such as picketing, striking, and bargaining.

The workers failed to provide evidence that nonunionized workers are entitled to participate in 'concerted activity' under the statute, and they acknowledged that no Washington case has recognized a distinct right to strike outside of union activities. The cited cases predominantly involve union members exercising their rights to strike and picket, reinforcing the court's position on the integral role of unions in these concerted actions.

Striking and picketing are recognized as concerted activities within a union context; however, there is no legal precedent to extend this definition to nonunionized workers. Courts have consistently limited the application of the Krystad case to its specific facts, which involved union activities and did not address nonunion contexts. In the Culinary Workers case, the court clarified that its holding did not apply beyond its unique circumstances, which included an employer's unilateral agreement with the union. Similarly, the Operating Engineers case declined to impose compulsory collective bargaining, emphasizing that there was no interference with employees' union activities.

The workers argue that federal law recognizes striking and picketing as concerted activities, but these cases pertain exclusively to union involvement and do not establish a right for nonunion workers to engage in such activities independently. The complaint lacks any allegations indicating union participation, and any claims of union involvement were introduced too late in the proceedings to be considered.

The court concludes that agricultural workers' claims under state law are not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) but that the implied cause of action from RCW 49.32.020 pertains solely to union-related discharges. Since the workers were not protected under this statute, their discharge does not constitute a violation. The court affirms that without a clear public policy mandate alleged in the complaint, the workers cannot claim wrongful discharge. The ruling is supported by previous case law establishing that wrongful discharge claims must contravene a definitive public policy, which, in this case, is not substantiated. The court's decision is upheld unanimously.