Robinson v. PEMCO INSURANCE COMPANY

Citations: 862 P.2d 614; 71 Wash. App. 746; 1993 Wash. App. LEXIS 428Docket: 12487-8-III

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; November 30, 1993; Washington; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Craig Robinson sustained injuries on August 11, 1989, while riding in a 1974 Chevrolet pickup driven by Cory Morley. Marlene Robinson filed a declaratory judgment action to clarify insurance coverage on behalf of her son. The court ruled against Dairyland Insurance Company, determining that Cory had coverage for Craig's injuries under the nonowned vehicle provision of his Dairyland policy. Dairyland appealed, arguing that Cory either did not have the "permission of the owner" to drive the vehicle or exceeded the scope of that permission.

The pickup was owned by Ronald and Delaine Trim, with their daughter Shana having regular use and permission to drive it. Shana was aware of her father's restriction against non-family members driving the vehicle but had previously allowed friends to use it without her parents' knowledge. On the day of the accident, while her parents were away, Shana and Cory, both having consumed alcohol, decided to drive to a party. Shana, intoxicated, handed the keys to Cory, who drove the group to the party. After a short time, Cory attempted to locate Shana and, under pressure to return home, decided to drive others back. During this drive, he lost control of the pickup, resulting in Craig's injuries.

The court found that Cory was driving with Shana's permission at the time of the accident, which Dairyland contested on appeal. The Spokane County Superior Court had previously ruled that a separate PEMCO insurance policy did not cover the incident, but that ruling was not challenged in this appeal.

Dairyland contests the court's ruling that Shana is deemed the "owner" under the Dairyland policy based on her possession and exclusive control of the vehicle at the time of the accident, as well as the determination that the policy covers Craig's injuries. The term "owner" is acknowledged as ambiguous, and its interpretation is subject to de novo review. Courts are instructed to interpret insurance policies in a manner that reflects the understanding of an average insurance purchaser, with any ambiguous language favorably construed for the insured. The nonowned vehicle clause in question is inclusionary and should be liberally interpreted to ensure coverage.

In a relevant case, Farmers Ins. Co. v. U.S.F.&G. Co., the court found that the term "owner" could include both the title holder and the possessor of a vehicle, as long as the driver reasonably believes they have the owner's permission. This ruling emphasized that requiring proof of ownership each time a vehicle is used would create uncertainty for drivers regarding their permission to operate the vehicle.

In another case, Progressive Northwest Ins. Co. v. Haker, the court ruled that the driver did not have permission to use the vehicle as the owner had expressly prohibited it. Dairyland argues that even if Shana had given any form of permission, Cory lacked coverage under his policy because he was aware that the title owners would not permit him to drive the vehicle under the given circumstances.

Dairyland's interpretation of its nonowned vehicle clause is deemed overly strict, particularly when compared to interpretations in Farmers and Haker cases, which focused on different policy provisions. The nonowned vehicle clause is designed to protect the insured during rare instances of driving others' vehicles that may lack insurance. This clause denies coverage if the insured steals or knowingly drives a vehicle without consent, as this behavior suggests a disregard for the care expected by the insurer. Conversely, if the insured mistakenly believes they have permission, they are entitled to protection.

In contrast, the omnibus clause in the vehicle owner's policy is meant to protect third parties using the vehicle with the owner's permission, giving the named insured broad discretion in selecting additional insureds, which can increase the insurer's risk due to the lack of control over who drives the vehicle. Therefore, a more restrictive interpretation of "permission" and "owner" is warranted for the omnibus clause, focusing on the owner's state of mind regarding consent.

In this case, it is established that Cory lacked permission from the Trim owners to drive their pickup. However, he reasonably believed that Shana, who had previously allowed friends to drive the pickup, had the authority to permit him to do so. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled that Shana should be considered the "owner" under the nonowned vehicle clause, thereby granting Cory permission to drive the vehicle.

The court found that Cory was driving Shana's pickup truck with her express or implied permission during the accident, a determination based on factual evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as sufficient to persuade a reasonable person of the truth of a premise. Dairyland argued that Cory exceeded the scope of Shana's permission when he left her at a party, referencing a prior case. However, the court clarified that permission can be express or implied and may encompass uses that align with the owner's intent. Evidence supporting the finding included Shana's testimony that she allowed Cory to drive due to her intoxication and their prior practice of him driving. Cory's decision to drive others home, intending to return for Shana, was deemed consistent with the spirit of Shana's permission. This finding supports the conclusion that Cory is covered under his Dairyland insurance policy. The judgment was affirmed, with concurrence from other judges. Additionally, it was noted that Judge Evan E. Sperline is serving as a pro tempore judge.