Court: Supreme Court of the United States; April 3, 1989; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
DEA agents stopped Andrew Sokolow at Honolulu International Airport, discovering 1,063 grams of cocaine in his carry-on luggage. Key factors leading to the stop included his payment of $2,100 for tickets in cash, the use of an alias, a brief stay in Miami—a known drug source city—and his nervous demeanor. The District Court upheld the stop based on reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment, but the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, applying a two-part test requiring evidence of ongoing criminal activity combined with probabilistic factors. The Appeals Court argued that without evidence of ongoing criminal behavior, the stop was impermissible.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the agents had reasonable suspicion to stop Sokolow, emphasizing that under *Terry v. Ohio*, reasonable suspicion requires a minimal level of objective justification, which is less stringent than probable cause. The Court criticized the Appeals Court's two-part test for complicating the assessment of reasonable suspicion, asserting that the totality of the circumstances should be considered. It noted that while some evidence may not independently indicate criminality, the combination of Sokolow's actions and characteristics suggested a higher likelihood of illegal activity, particularly his unusual cash payment and travel patterns.
Respondent Andrew Sokolow was stopped by DEA agents at Honolulu International Airport, where 1,063 grams of cocaine were discovered in his carry-on luggage. Prior to the stop, the agents noted several suspicious factors: Sokolow purchased two round-trip tickets to Miami for $2,100 using a roll of $20 bills, traveled under an alias, had a telephone number registered to another individual, and exhibited nervous behavior. Additionally, his flight duration and brief stay in Miami raised concerns, as it is unlikely a resident would travel 20 hours for only 48 hours in the city, suggesting potential illegal activity. The agents' belief that Sokolow matched a DEA "drug courier profile" did not affect the analysis, as the factors themselves were significant regardless of profiling. The court ruled that the reasonableness of the stop does not hinge on whether the least intrusive means were employed, as such a standard would limit officers' decision-making abilities. The Ninth Circuit's prior ruling against the DEA was reversed, affirming the agents had reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop based on the totality of circumstances. The opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, with dissenting opinions from Justices Marshall and Brennan.
Officer McCarthy was unable to locate an individual named "Andrew Kray" in Hawaii but discovered flight reservations for Kray and Norian from Miami to Honolulu, arriving on July 25, three days after the respondent and his companion had departed. The pair were scheduled for stopovers in Denver and Los Angeles. On July 25, during the Los Angeles stopover, DEA agents observed the respondent, who appeared nervous and was scanning the area. Later that day, the respondent and Norian arrived in Honolulu without checked luggage. Upon attempting to hail a cab, they were approached by DEA agents, who identified themselves. The respondent claimed his name was "Sokolow" and he was traveling under his mother's maiden name, "Kray," but could not provide an airline ticket or identification.
The couple was taken to the DEA office, where a narcotics detection dog alerted on the respondent's brown shoulder bag. The agents arrested him, advised him of his rights, and he chose not to make any statements. A search warrant was obtained for the shoulder bag, which contained suspicious documents but no drugs. The dog later alerted on a Louis Vuitton bag, but it was too late to secure a second warrant that evening, so the respondent was allowed to leave but his luggage was retained. The next morning, after a second dog confirmed the alert, a warrant was obtained, revealing 1,063 grams of cocaine in the bag. The respondent was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The U.S. District Court for Hawaii denied his motion to suppress evidence, ruling that the DEA agents had reasonable suspicion for the stop. The respondent then entered a conditional guilty plea.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that the DEA agents lacked reasonable suspicion. The majority categorized the facts into two groups: ongoing criminal activity (like using an alias) and personal characteristics of drug couriers (like nervousness and unchecked luggage). They concluded that without evidence of ongoing criminal behavior, the stop was unjustified. The dissenting opinion criticized the majority's rigid approach, advocating for a case-by-case assessment of reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances.
Certiorari was granted to review the Court of Appeals decision regarding the seizure of a respondent by DEA agents, which had significant implications for federal narcotics law enforcement. The Court of Appeals concluded that a seizure occurred when agents grabbed the respondent and moved him back onto the sidewalk, a conclusion the Government did not contest. The primary issue was whether the agents possessed reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing at the time of the encounter. Citing *Terry v. Ohio*, the Court reiterated that officers can stop and briefly detain individuals if they have reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts, even absent probable cause. The requirement for reasonable suspicion is less stringent than the standard for probable cause, which necessitates a fair probability of finding contraband or evidence of a crime.
The Court criticized the Court of Appeals for complicating the definition of reasonable suspicion, stating that it should be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances rather than rigid categorization of evidence. The Court emphasized that practical judgments about human behavior should inform law enforcement assessments, asserting that the evidence, such as traveling under an alias or evasive behavior, should not be strictly classified as indicative of ongoing criminal activity. Such behaviors may have alternative explanations and should be considered within the broader context of circumstances surrounding the stop.
Factors indicating reasonable suspicion in this case include the unusual cash payment of $2,100 for airplane tickets, especially when drawn from a roll of $20 bills totaling nearly double that amount. Typically, business travelers use credit cards or checks for airline purchases, and it is atypical for vacationers to carry large amounts of cash. The agents had reasonable grounds to suspect the respondent was traveling under an alias, supported by the unusual nature of the trip from Honolulu to Miami—20 hours of travel for just 48 hours in Miami during July. While each factor alone does not prove illegal conduct and could be consistent with innocent travel, when considered collectively, they establish reasonable suspicion. Previous rulings, such as in Reid v. Georgia and Terry v. Ohio, affirm that lawful conduct can sometimes justify suspicion of criminal activity when viewed in context. The agents' belief that the respondent's actions aligned with a DEA "drug courier profile" does not diminish the relevance of these factors as perceived by trained agents. Additionally, the argument that agents should have used less intrusive means to verify their suspicions is rejected; the reasonableness of the stop does not depend on the availability of alternative investigatory techniques, particularly given the urgency of the situation as the respondent was about to enter a taxi.
Agents had reasonable suspicion that Andrew Sokolow was transporting illegal drugs, leading to the reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings. Justice Marshall, dissenting, emphasized that the Fourth Amendment's protections apply equally to the innocent and guilty, arguing that the ruling undermines citizens' rights to personal security as they travel. He articulated that the Fourth Amendment limits government intrusion, requiring probable cause for searches and seizures, while the reasonable-suspicion standard applies only to brief detentions during law enforcement exigencies. This standard is meant to protect against arbitrary police behavior based on stereotypes or irrelevant characteristics. Marshall insisted that reasonable suspicion must derive from specific, articulable facts indicating ongoing criminal activity, rather than vague suspicions of past crimes or criminal tendencies. He contended that merely suspecting an individual without concrete evidence should prompt routine investigation, not immediate detention.
The DEA agents' decision to stop Andrew Sokolow lacked sufficient factual basis to reasonably suspect criminal activity. The agents relied on a drug courier profile that identified Sokolow as fitting typical characteristics of drug traffickers. This mechanistic use of profiles is criticized for undermining officers' ability to make nuanced, experience-based judgments, especially in ambiguous situations, increasing the risk of unjustified detentions of innocent individuals. The profile's adaptability to various scenarios further complicates its reliability.
The excerpt references multiple cases illustrating how reliance on specific traits can lead to arbitrary detentions, as seen in Reid v. Georgia, where a combination of factors was deemed insufficient for reasonable suspicion. The court emphasized that many innocent travelers could match such profiles, highlighting the potential for random and unjustified law enforcement actions if minimal evidence is accepted as valid grounds for detention.
The observation of traveler Reid, who looked back at another person while walking through the concourse, did not provide a reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity, reflecting merely an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'" Similarly, the facts known to DEA agents regarding traveler Sokolow did not suggest ongoing criminal activity. Unlike Reid, who attempted to evade DEA agents, Sokolow displayed no evasive behavior, aside from being nervous, which could be attributed to common anxiety related to air travel.
Sokolow's brief trip to a resort city with only carry-on luggage and his departure from Miami, a known drug source city, are not indicative of wrongdoing, as many innocent travelers fit this description. The fact that Sokolow's phone was registered in another person's name is also common and does not imply he was using an alias. His attire, including a black jumpsuit and gold jewelry, and payment for tickets in cash do not provide reasonable grounds for suspecting criminal activity. The majority's focus on business travelers purchasing tickets with credit cards does not warrant an inference of crime based solely on Sokolow's cash transaction, as cash use can stem from various non-criminal motivations.
Lastly, the assertion that Sokolow would have been unreachable had he left the airport is unfounded, as he provided his phone number to the airline, allowing for further investigation if necessary.
The excerpt critiques the majority's conclusion regarding the suspicion of criminal activity based on the characteristics of airport traveler Sokolow. It argues that, unlike previous cases where specific behaviors indicated evasive action or wrongdoing, Sokolow's attributes do not reasonably suggest criminality. The dissenting opinion emphasizes that constitutional rights should not be compromised in drug-related cases, highlighting the necessity for law enforcement to have reasonable suspicion before detaining individuals, as mandated by the Fourth Amendment. The dissent references prior case law, including Florida v. Rodriguez, Florida v. Royer, and Illinois v. Gates, to illustrate the importance of basing seizures on evidence of criminal conduct. Additionally, it notes that the facts of the case were developed through hearings and stipulations, and discusses previous appellate decisions that addressed the totality of circumstances in assessing reasonable suspicion. The excerpt concludes by recalling specific past cases that failed to establish reasonable suspicion based on similar facts, reinforcing the dissent's argument against the majority's decision.
Agent Kempshall characterized the respondent's behavior as indicative of a drug courier, referencing DEA training that began in 1974 to identify drug smugglers based on circumstantial evidence. However, the effectiveness of such profiles may be limited as couriers often modify their behavior to avoid detection. The case of Reid is highlighted, where eight Justices deemed the detention unjustifiable, with a majority reversing the lower court's decision in a per curiam opinion. Justice Powell, along with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, concurred that the evidence used by DEA agents was insufficient for detention. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the police actions did not violate Reid's constitutional rights. It was also noted that the DEA agents were unaware that Sokolow was using an alias at the time of his detention, rendering this information irrelevant to the justification for the seizure. The majority opinion argued that the agents’ use of force rather than less intrusive means was not pertinent; however, the manner of conducting a search, particularly the use of intrusive methods, is crucial in assessing reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, as established in Winston v. Lee.
