Clinkscale v. Germershausen

Citations: 145 Cal. App. 2d 76; 1956 Cal. App. LEXIS 1303; 302 P.2d 23Docket: Civ. 8750

Court: California Court of Appeal; October 11, 1956; California; State Appellate Court

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Plaintiffs William and Ida Clinkscale filed a lawsuit for damages resulting from a car accident involving W. J. Germershausen, the defendant. The case was heard by the California Court of Appeals on October 11, 1956. The plaintiffs sought compensation for personal injuries and property damage after their vehicle, driven by William, was struck while stopped on the Yolo Causeway. A nonsuit was granted for Ida Clinkscale, and Germershausen did not appeal that decision.

On the day of the incident, the Clinkscales were returning home after a trip to San Francisco when their vehicle experienced mechanical issues, leading to a breakdown in the outside eastbound lane of the causeway. The causeway is a high, straight roadway with four lanes and a walkway separated by a barrier. After attempting to troubleshoot the car, William Clinkscale flagged down other vehicles to warn them of the obstruction, while Ida remained in the passenger seat. 

At the time of the accident, traffic was heavy, and Germershausen was driving in the same lane approximately 50 feet behind another vehicle. As the vehicle ahead swerved into another lane, Germershausen did not notice the Clinkscale's stopped vehicle until it was too late. He deemed it unsafe to swerve and, despite braking hard, skidded into the rear of the Clinkscale's car, leaving a 65-foot skid mark before impact. His vehicle ultimately came to rest on the walkway adjacent to the causeway. The court's judgment favored Germershausen, which the Clinkscales are appealing.

Clinkscale's automobile was propelled 400 feet east after impact. Clinkscale estimated the defendant's car was traveling at 55-60 miles per hour, while the defendant maintained a constant speed of approximately 45 miles per hour. The defendant acknowledged seeing Clinkscale standing at the rear of his vehicle but claimed not to notice any movement. The appellants argued that the evidence did not support the judgment in favor of the respondent, asserting that the respondent was negligent as a matter of law while they were not. The court clarified that an appellate tribunal can only reverse a judgment based on insufficient evidence if, after considering the evidence favorably for the prevailing party and excluding conflicting evidence, it finds the law prohibits recovery for that party. The evidence must be interpreted against the losing party, with favorable inferences going to the prevailing party.

Plaintiffs claimed the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care regarding traffic conditions, followed too closely in violation of section 531 of the Vehicle Code, and was distracted and fatigued. They referenced the case Huetter v. Andrews as precedent for establishing negligence as a matter of law but noted significant factual differences between that case and the current situation. In Huetter, the defendant had a clear view of the road but failed to notice the plaintiff's vehicle until very close. Furthermore, while plaintiffs argued that the defendant violated section 531 by following too closely, the Landrum v. Severin case established that it is generally for the jury to determine if a motorist followed another vehicle at a distance deemed unreasonable, unless the distance clearly indicates a legal violation.

Driver v. Norman and Giles v. Happely establish that a 50-foot distance at a speed of 45 miles per hour is not inherently unreasonable under certain traffic conditions. Negligence is typically a factual issue for the jury unless the evidence overwhelmingly supports a finding of negligence as a matter of law. In this case, the jury had sufficient grounds to consider whether the defendant was negligent, given that he was approximately 100 feet from the plaintiff's vehicle when he first observed it and left 65 feet of skid marks before impact. The defendant maintained he did not see the plaintiff's car until close and could not swerve due to traffic. 

Additionally, the evidence does not incontrovertibly demonstrate the plaintiff, Mr. Clinkscale, was free from negligence. Prior to the accident, Clinkscale experienced engine issues and did not check his temperature gauge after leaving a service station, despite knowing his car was overheating. The jury could infer contributory negligence on Clinkscale's part based on his failure to monitor his vehicle's condition, potentially concluding he either neglected to check the gauge or misrepresented his actions regarding it.

The jury could reasonably determine that Clinkscale did not exercise ordinary care while attempting to cross the causeway, thus his car was not considered "disabled" under section 582 of the California Vehicle Code, which would exempt him from contributory negligence. The defendant contended that Clinkscale was contributorily negligent for not positioning himself further from the rear of his vehicle, potentially allowing oncoming motorists more time to react to his stopped car. Testimony indicated the defendant did not see Clinkscale’s vehicle until another car moved out of the way, leading to speculation that Clinkscale’s visibility could have improved if he had been stationed 50 to 75 feet further back. 

Given the circumstances—heavy traffic on a hot Sunday afternoon at 5 p.m.—the jury had grounds to conclude that the plaintiffs failed to adequately warn approaching traffic. The determination of Clinkscale's contributory negligence was deemed a factual question for the jury, contrary to the defendant's assertion that reasonable individuals could only conclude otherwise. 

The record suggested that the evidence favored the plaintiffs regarding the defendant's negligence and the plaintiffs’ contributory negligence. The trial court could have granted a new trial based on its evaluation of the evidence, independent of the appellate court's standard of review. The trial judge, who observes witness credibility and demeanor, has the discretion to set aside a verdict if he believes it contradicts the weight of the evidence, even when substantial evidence supports the jury's decision. This discretion reflects the trial judge's unique position to discern the nuances of testified evidence that may mislead the jury.

Parties are entitled to both a jury's judgment and the judge's independent assessment on a motion for a new trial regarding the evidence supporting the verdict. While the trial court could have granted the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, there is no legal basis to claim the verdict lacks substantial support. The plaintiffs argue that the trial judge should have applied the doctrine of last clear chance, which requires that the plaintiffs be negligent, unable to escape their perilous situation, and that the defendant be aware of their danger with a clear chance to avoid harm. The defendant testified he tried to stop his vehicle upon seeing the plaintiffs and could not change lanes due to traffic conditions; thus, whether he had the last clear chance remains uncertain. The plaintiffs did not rely on this doctrine during the trial and did not request related instructions. It is not reversible error for the court to omit such instructions when they are not requested. The trial court could have considered the doctrine during the new trial motion but was not obligated to grant a new trial based on it.

Additionally, the plaintiffs claim that erroneous instructions were given, specifically Instruction Number 10, which stated that if Mr. Clinkscale was careless in stopping and parking his car, contributing to the accident, the plaintiffs could not recover. This instruction correctly included elements of negligence and proximate cause and was a proper legal statement. The jury needed to determine whether the plaintiffs were justified in stopping and parking on the causeway, which was a factual issue. The instruction addressed both the manner of parking and the appropriateness of stopping before reaching the causeway.

Plaintiffs assert that there was prejudicial error in the jury instruction regarding William Clinkscale's negligence (Instruction Number 11), which indicated that if Clinkscale was found careless in warning Mr. Germershausen about a stopped Studebaker automobile and this contributed to the accident, the plaintiffs could not recover damages. This instruction was deemed appropriate as it accurately reflected the legal standards of negligence and proximate cause. The court found that Clinkscale's negligence was a factual issue, thereby affirming the correctness of the instruction.

The plaintiffs raised a more significant concern regarding Instruction Number 17, which was based on section 582 of the Vehicle Code. This instruction established that if a vehicle is stopped or parked in a way that obstructs traffic or is not visible from 200 feet away, it constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence, unless the driver can prove it was impracticable to move the vehicle or that it was disabled. The plaintiffs argued that this instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof regarding contributory negligence onto them, contradicting the established legal principle that the defendant bears this burden. The plaintiffs contend that this violated fundamental legal standards concerning the burden of proof in negligence cases.

The instruction in question does not alter the burden of proof regarding the defendant's negligence or the plaintiffs' contributory negligence. The plaintiffs contend that the instruction is improper based on section 582 of the Vehicle Code, which excludes its application on highways with adjacent curbs. The determination of whether the roadway on the causeway is "bounded by adjacent curbs" is essential. On the north side, there is a steel pipe barrier with openings for water drainage, while the south side has a 2-foot walkway separated from the roadway by wooden boards about 8 inches high. The Vehicle Code lacks a definition for "curb," and no California case provides one. However, a definition from Illinois law describes a curb as a stone or similar structure that serves as a boundary for the roadway and protection for the sidewalk. A Washington case illustrates that a fence marking a boundary can function as a curb for legal purposes. The defendant claims that the existence of curbs is a factual issue for the jury, but it is concluded as a matter of law that the causeway's roadway is bounded by curbs on the south side. Consequently, it is determined that section 582 does not apply, rendering the instruction improper. The court has granted a rehearing to assess whether the error in giving this instruction warrants a reversal of the judgment.

The court previously overlooked section 586 of the California Vehicle Code, which prohibits stopping, parking, or leaving a vehicle on a bridge, tunnel, or similar structure unless necessary to avoid traffic conflicts or comply with law enforcement. The roadway across the causeway is considered a bridge under this provision, meaning stopping a vehicle there constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence. Instruction Number 17, which referenced section 582, was deemed unnecessary but not prejudicial because it informed the jury that if a vehicle is disabled, the driver may demonstrate impracticability to avoid a negligence finding. The court cited section 4 1/2 of Article VI of the California Constitution, stating that misdirection of the jury or procedural errors do not warrant a new trial unless they result in a miscarriage of justice. Given the evidence presented, the court found no such miscarriage occurred, and the instruction ultimately favored the plaintiffs. Regarding the defendant's cross-appeal, which aimed to preserve rights in case of a reversal, sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding of contributory negligence against the defendant, leading to the affirmation of both judgments: in favor of the defendant against the plaintiffs and in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendant's cross-complaint.