Court: Court of Appeals of Kansas; May 10, 1991; Kansas; State Appellate Court
Douglas K. Pichon appeals his conviction for aggravated escape from custody, arguing that the district court improperly denied him the right to call key witnesses to support his defense of compulsion and that the evidence was insufficient for his conviction. Pichon, a convicted felon, was serving his sentence at the Kansas Correctional Institution when he was transported with other inmates to a volleyball game. Upon arrival, he recognized Tony DeWitt, whom he believed intended to harm him. Although Pichon testified that he feared for his life due to past incidents involving DeWitt, there was no evidence of any immediate threat from DeWitt at the scene. Pichon fled, hiding in a dumpster for hours, and was later apprehended after attempting to mislead law enforcement about his identity. He acknowledged that once he escaped, he intended to avoid returning to custody. Pichon's defense centered on his belief that failure to flee would result in serious harm, citing past threats and incidents involving DeWitt and another inmate, Bobby Berks. However, the court affirmed the conviction, indicating that the evidence did not substantiate his claims of compulsion.
Pichon testified at trial and sought to call four witnesses to corroborate his claims of a reasonable fear of imminent harm from DeWitt at the community center. The court sustained the State's objection, ruling the witnesses' testimonies irrelevant, which Pichon argues violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Kansas Bill of Rights. The due process clause mandates that criminal defendants have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, including the right to compel witness testimony. However, these rights do not extend to irrelevant or immaterial testimony. Pichon aimed to introduce witness testimonies regarding: 1) a corrections officer about prior threats and Pichon's state of mind; 2) a KSP inmate on prison safety; 3) a unit team counselor on the dangers faced by inmates in protective custody; and 4) his cellmate to affirm his expressed fears of DeWitt. This testimony was intended to support his compulsion defense under K.S.A. 21-3209, which states a person may not be guilty of a crime if acting under imminent threat of death or harm. The defense requires evidence of present, imminent coercion, which the State argued was not supported by events that occurred long before Pichon's actions. The court ultimately agreed with the State's assessment of the testimony's relevance.
Pichon contends that the statute establishes a subjective reasonableness standard regarding the belief of imminent threat to life or significant bodily harm. He argues that his testimony was crucial to illustrate his fear for his life, despite DeWitt's lack of overt threats. Pichon claims corroboration was necessary due to his prison inmate status. However, the trial court rejected this evidence, citing State v. Milum, which involved a defendant attempting to use past threats to justify an escape. In Milum, the court excluded the evidence of threats made at various times, determining they lacked the required imminence for the compulsion defense.
The court maintains that the discretion to admit or exclude evidence rests with the trial judge, guided by relevance and remoteness principles. Relevant evidence is defined as having a tendency to prove a material fact, with all relevant evidence admissible unless otherwise stated by law. Pichon argues that his case differs from Milum because he utilized prior threats not as the sole basis for his defense but to substantiate his belief that DeWitt's presence posed an imminent threat during his escape. Although the court agrees that some of Pichon's evidence could be relevant if he were entitled to a compulsion defense, they ultimately determine he is not entitled to such a defense.
The court notes that while Kansas lacks precedent on this specific issue, other jurisdictions apply a restrictive test for the compulsion defense in escape cases, derived from People v. Lovercamp. This test requires: 1) a specific and imminent threat of serious harm, 2) no viable complaint options to authorities, 3) no opportunity for legal recourse, 4) absence of violence towards others during the escape, and 5) prompt reporting to authorities upon reaching safety. Pichon does not meet these criteria.
The legal test for the defense of compulsion, rooted in common law, is applied even in states like Kansas that have codified this defense. In the referenced case, the parties did not address the precedent set by Lovercamp, which established five conditions necessary for asserting a necessity defense—similar to compulsion—specifically requiring defendants to report to authorities after escaping immediate danger. The Michigan case, People v. Luther, diverges from Lovercamp, suggesting that these conditions should be considered for jury evaluation rather than as prerequisites for the defense. There is a notable split among jurisdictions: while Michigan and two other states align with Luther’s interpretation, the majority of states, including federal cases, uphold the necessity of satisfying the Lovercamp conditions before a defendant can claim necessity in escape situations. Pichon, in his supplemental brief, argues that Kansas law (K.S.A. 21-3209) does not explicitly mandate immediate surrender after the threat subsides, asserting that strict construction principles of criminal statutes support his claim. However, several states have imposed similar requirements despite their statutes not expressly stating them.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the appropriateness of incorporating a common law requirement into the statute regarding escape from custody. It emphasized that a defendant facing imminent bodily harm should not be criminally liable for escaping that threat. However, once the threat is gone, the defendant cannot remain at large indefinitely; the compulsion defense does not equate to amnesty. In the current case, Pichon failed to qualify for this defense as he did not attempt to surrender after the alleged threat ended, and he had a reasonable alternative to escape by seeking refuge in a community center. Consequently, the defense was deemed irrelevant.
Regarding the charge of aggravated escape from custody under K.S.A. 21-3810, Pichon contested the sufficiency of evidence, arguing that he was not in custody as defined in jury instructions, since he left the Leavenworth Community Center rather than the correctional facility itself. The court considered whether he remained in custody while on an authorized outing. The statute defines aggravated escape as escaping from lawful custody following a felony charge or conviction but does not explicitly define "custody." However, K.S.A. 21-3809 provides a definition that includes various forms of detention but excludes general supervision under probation or parole. The court ultimately held that the trial court's judgment should be upheld if correct, even if based on an erroneous rationale.
In State v. Pritchett, the Kansas Supreme Court defined custody, emphasizing that it involves the intent of prison officials to maintain control over a prisoner, with liberty restraint being a critical component. Constant supervision is not necessary; rather, the key factor is the officials' intent to retain custody. The definition has been upheld in subsequent cases, such as State v. Garrett. In the case of Pichon, there was no evidence suggesting that prison officials at KCIL intended to abandon him, thus he remained in custody despite any temporary absence. A series of precedents confirm that prisoners can be considered in custody even when outside the prison for legitimate reasons, such as work release or medical treatment. Ultimately, Pichon was deemed to be in custody at the time of his escape, and the evidence supported a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The court affirmed the decision.
