Court: Idaho Supreme Court; August 3, 1999; Idaho; State Supreme Court
The case involves an appeal by the Richard J. and Esther E. Wooley Trust (as trustee for Phillippi Plaza Apartments) against DeBest Plumbing, Inc. and Dale Byers, following a jury trial verdict that found DeBest not liable for a fire caused after an employee’s repair attempt in one of the apartments. The main contention is the denial of a motion for a new trial by the district court and the granting of discretionary costs to DeBest under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
The jury was tasked with determining whether Byers, a field superintendent for DeBest, was acting within the scope of his employment when he attempted to fix a leak reported by resident Jason Garlock, who had suggested Byers might help since the usual plumber was unavailable. Garlock engaged Byers without prior discussion of costs or formal authorization from Phillippi Plaza’s management.
Byers, who worked mainly in the office, was not directed by DeBest to perform the repair and did not intend to bill for his work, which he conducted after regular hours and without notifying the apartment manager. When the repair led to a fire, Phillippi Plaza filed suit alleging that Byers was acting on behalf of DeBest; however, the jury ruled that he was not. The appeal primarily focuses on whether the jury instruction defining 'scope of employment' was accurate. A default judgment was entered against Byers, and the final judgment favored DeBest.
Phillippi Plaza filed for a new trial and sought to disallow DeBest's memorandum of costs, but the district court denied the new trial and awarded costs to DeBest. On appeal, Phillippi Plaza claimed errors in both the denial of the new trial and the award of discretionary costs. The appellate court reviews jury instructions to determine if they adequately and fairly present the issues and applicable law, applying an abuse of discretion standard for new trial motions.
Phillippi Plaza argued that Jury Instruction No. 10 was erroneous for including a paragraph that required proof of an affirmative assignment of work to Dale Byers for DeBest to be liable for his negligence. The instruction defined the scope of employment and outlined the criteria for determining whether an employee's actions fall within that scope. Phillippi Plaza contended that this instruction conflicted with Idaho Jury Instruction No. 253, which states that an agent is acting within the scope of authority if engaged in business assigned by the principal or actions reasonably contemplated as part of the employment, without needing express authorization.
Additionally, Phillippi Plaza noted that Jury Instruction No. 10 omitted a disjunctive clause allowing the jury to find scope of employment based on reasonable contemplation of the job. The language in question was taken from Colorado Jury Instructions, prompting the court to evaluate whether this wording misstates Idaho law. The court acknowledged that Byers was an employee of DeBest, which could lead to vicarious liability for Byers' actions.
DeBest's vicarious liability for tortious conduct by an employee is limited to actions within the "scope of employment." The scope of employment encompasses acts closely connected to the employee's duties and reasonably incidental to them. According to *Prosser and Keeton on Torts* and the *Restatement (Second) of Agency*, conduct falls within this scope if it is: (1) of the kind the employee is hired to perform, (2) occurs within authorized time and space limits, (3) is partly motivated by a desire to serve the employer, and (4) if force is used, it is not unexpected by the employer. If an employee's actions are solely for personal reasons and not connected to the employer's interests, the employer is not liable.
The Court of Appeals, in *Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc.*, reiterated that for an act to be within the scope of employment, it must align with the employee's assigned duties and serve the employer's interests. Jury Instruction No. 10 was examined for its adequacy in defining the scope of liability, concluding it was not overly restrictive, as it reasonably interpreted "assigned work" to include tasks aimed at furthering the employer's business.
Additionally, the district court erred by admitting the president of DeBest's opinion on whether Byers was acting within the scope of his employment during a plumbing repair, and in denying a motion for a new trial based on that issue; however, these errors were deemed harmless. The Idaho Rule of Evidence 701 restricts lay witness opinion testimony to perceptions that are rationally based and helpful for understanding the case or determining relevant facts.
Milford Terrell, president of DeBest, testified that he did not believe his company was at fault for a fire and asserted that Dale Byers was not operating within the scope of his employment when the fire occurred. Phillippi Plaza objected to this opinion, arguing it invaded the jury's role and sought a legal conclusion. The court overruled the objection. Subsequently, Phillippi Plaza sought a new trial, claiming Terrell's testimony was improperly admitted. However, the district court refused to entertain the motion due to the absence of a transcript of the testimony, stating it would not consider allegations made without context.
Phillippi Plaza referenced Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(7), which requires a party to specify the factual grounds for a new trial with particularity. The court noted that while a transcript may be necessary in some instances, it was not required here since DeBest did not contest the factual basis laid out by Phillippi Plaza in their motion. The court concluded that the factual basis was adequately presented and not disputed, suggesting that the district court should have either reviewed the motion or postponed the hearing for a transcript. Ultimately, the court found that any error in not considering the motion was harmless, as it determined that a new trial would not have been warranted based on the record. DeBest contended that Terrell's testimony was simply a summary of his previous statements.
A lay witness cannot offer opinions meant to summarize prior testimony, as such matters are for the jury to decide. The district court incorrectly allowed Terrell to provide his opinion on whether Byers was acting within the scope of his employment. However, for a new trial to be warranted, any error must be shown to affect substantial justice, as outlined in Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co. Ltd. and I.R.C.P. 61, which allows courts to disregard errors not affecting substantial rights. In this case, the jury recognized Terrell as an interested witness, and it is improbable that his opinion influenced them, given the substantial evidence indicating that Byers was acting in a personal capacity rather than on behalf of DeBest.
Regarding discretionary costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D), a prevailing party may seek costs deemed necessary and exceptional. The trial court must explicitly justify its rulings on such costs, and the burden lies with the opposing party to prove any abuse of discretion on the court's part. The standard for determining abuse of discretion involves assessing whether the court recognized its discretion, acted within its boundaries, and exercised reasonable judgment.
Phillippi Plaza contends that the district court abused its discretion by awarding DeBest costs for a fire expert's consulting fee, photographs, and airfare for depositions, arguing these costs were not exceptional. However, the reference case, Fish v. Smith, does not establish that expert fees and travel costs are inherently non-exceptional; it merely upheld the district court's exercise of discretion. Discretionary costs can legitimately encompass travel expenses alongside other common expenses like photocopying and long-distance calls.
The district court awarded discretionary costs to DeBest, affirming that it acted within its discretion under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D), which allows for additional expert witness fees. The court noted that it found the fees to be 'necessary and reasonable' and provided a rationale for its decision. DeBest's request for attorney fees on appeal, based on I.C. § 12-121, was denied because the appeal was not deemed frivolous or unreasonable. The district court's decisions were ultimately affirmed, with costs awarded to DeBest but no attorney fees.
Justice Silak dissented, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by awarding costs without DeBest's sufficient demonstration of their exceptional necessity. Silak emphasized that DeBest's affidavit lacked detailed factual support for the claimed costs, except for the fire expert's fees, and that DeBest failed to justify why the costs should be assessed against the opposing party in the interest of justice. Thus, according to Silak, the requirements of Rule 54(d)(1)(D) were not met.
DeBest's attorney's statements regarding costs fail to meet the legal standards outlined in I.R.C.P. 54 (d)(1)(D). The Court referenced the precedent set in *Luna v. Shockey Sheet Metal, Welding Co.*, which demonstrated the necessary detail for a valid claim for discretionary costs. Unlike the comprehensive breakdown provided in *Luna*, which specified the purpose and cost of each item, DeBest's submissions are insufficiently detailed. Additionally, the trial court's findings lack clarity, failing to adequately justify the classification of costs as exceptional and necessary. The award of airfare is particularly concerning, as travel expenses for depositions are commonplace in civil litigation, raising questions about what constitutes an 'exceptional' cost. While the district court may have had valid reasons for its decision, the lack of thorough explanation makes it difficult to understand the basis for the award of costs. Therefore, there is a dissent regarding the decision to award costs. Chief Justice Trout concurs with this dissent.
