Court: Court of Appeals of Utah; July 11, 1996; Utah; State Appellate Court
The State of Utah, through the Division of Family Services (DFS), appeals a juvenile court decision that denied its petition to terminate the parental rights of J.P.S. regarding her three children: J.L.P., K.M.D., and K.A.D. The court reverses the prior ruling and remands for a new trial. Key facts include J.P.S. voluntarily placing her eldest child, J.L.P., into DFS custody in June 1992 after discovering J.L.P. had sexually abused his younger siblings. Following this, J.P.S. entered a substance abuse program while her two younger children were also taken into custody. Over two years, the State provided numerous services aimed at reunification, which the trial court found sufficient.
Evidence presented established J.P.S.'s unfitness to parent due to her limited intelligence, severe psychological issues, and substance abuse history, compounded by childhood trauma and neglect of her children. Notably, both J.L.P. and the younger children suffered sexual abuse while in J.P.S.'s care. Two evaluators testified in favor of terminating her parental rights, citing her minimal progress despite extensive state intervention. They emphasized the children's need for permanency and the potential negative impact of continued contact with J.P.S. on their well-being.
Dr. Jill Sanders, a licensed clinical psychologist, evaluated J.P.S. in 1994 and acknowledged her lack of parenting capacity due to "severe and long-standing psychiatric difficulties," stating that J.P.S. had just enough resources to remain functional. Despite this, Dr. Sanders did not recommend terminating J.P.S.'s parental rights, suggesting instead a permanent placement for the children with allowed visitation, increasing in duration until J.P.S. could manage unsupervised visits. Dr. Sanders emphasized that a complete cutoff from biological parents is unnecessary without a significant risk, which she did not identify in this case, nor did she find the children's distress during visitations to be abnormal.
Contrastingly, Suzanne Copeland from DFS argued that adoption provides stronger bonding than temporary placements, asserting that the State lacks resources for the long-term visitation arrangement Dr. Sanders proposed. Ms. Copeland indicated that permanent foster care is unsuitable for younger children, typically reserved for those older and presumed unadoptable, and noted a pool of twenty-five prospective adoptive parents for K.M.D. and K.A.D.
DFS caseworkers, including Trish Hartzell and Bridget Seese, observed the visitations and reported concerns about J.P.S.'s parenting skills, including her reliance on her oldest child for care and her inability to protect her children from harm. Cathy Castle, another DFS worker, noted J.P.S.'s continued dependence during visits, her paranoia, and her inadequate child care skills.
J.L.P., at twelve years old during the trial, expressed a desire to stay with her foster mother while also wishing to maintain contact with J.P.S. The foster mother was open to adoption but also willing to facilitate visitation. K.M.D. and K.A.D. were five and three years old, respectively, with their foster parents' interest in adoption unclear. The juvenile court, in its Findings and Order filed on March 21, 1995, and its Amended Findings on April 13, 1995, ultimately favored Dr. Sanders's recommendation for permanent guardianship with visitation, valuing her qualifications over the DFS testimony, which focused more on systemic practices than on the children's long-term best interests.
The court rejected the case-worker's testimony regarding the implications of permanent custody for the children, emphasizing that a permanent guardianship arrangement differs significantly from foster care, particularly in terms of potential parental reunification. It found that the State did not present clear evidence to demonstrate that J.P.S. would pose a substantial risk to the children during visitations, nor was terminating all contact with J.P.S. in the children’s best interest. Consequently, the court denied the State's petition to terminate J.P.S.'s parental rights, instead ordering that the children be permanently placed with custodial families selected by DFS, allowing for bi-monthly supervised visits with J.P.S.
Subsequently, the State discovered that the foster parents of K.M.D. and K.A.D. were interested in adopting the children and filed a Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, citing newly discovered evidence and insufficient justification for the court's original decision. The motion included affidavits from the foster parents indicating their parental bond with the children and their unwillingness to maintain the visitation arrangement with J.P.S., along with a bonding study recommending against continued visitation. The juvenile court denied the State's motion, asserting that the evidence was not available during the trial and that the State did not raise any concerns at that time. The State appealed the court's denial of its termination petition, the order granting permanent custody with visitation to J.P.S., and the denial of its motion for a new trial. The appellate court recognized the juvenile court's discretion but ultimately concluded that it had abused that discretion in denying the new trial motion, given the unique circumstances of the case regarding the children's welfare and parental rights.
To determine the best interests of a child, the juvenile court must maintain continuing jurisdiction and operate free from artificial constraints that prioritize judicial economy. The juvenile court's proceedings are inherently equitable, allowing for a less rigid approach to finality. Under Section 78-3a-46 of the Juvenile Court Act, any affected adult may petition for a rehearing. The Utah Supreme Court has noted similarities between this section and Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly concerning newly discovered evidence, which is essential for retrials.
For a new trial to be granted under Rule 59, three criteria must be satisfied: (1) the evidence must be material, competent, and newly discovered; (2) it must not have been discoverable with due diligence before the trial; and (3) it must be significant enough to potentially change the trial outcome. Newly discovered evidence must also pertain to facts existing at the time of trial.
In this case, the State presented qualified evidence regarding the foster parents' willingness to adopt K.M.D. and K.A.D., which was only confirmed shortly after the trial concluded. This evidence was not merely cumulative and directly addressed the juvenile court's expressed concerns regarding the foster parents' commitment to adoption. Given the court's previous doubts and the unique circumstances of the case, the new evidence could have influenced the court's decision regarding the children's best interests, indicating a potential for a different outcome if reconsidered.
The trial raised the question of the foster parents' willingness to adopt, which was pivotal at the time of the trial. Newly discovered evidence regarding this willingness is pertinent, as the Termination of Parental Rights Act allows interested parties, including foster parents, to file petitions for termination of parental rights. The State could refile a petition including this new evidence, as established by case law indicating that res judicata does not prevent subsequent petitions when new facts emerge. The trial court's denial of the State's Motion for a New Trial was deemed an abuse of discretion, leading to a remand for a new trial.
On remand, the court highlighted concerns regarding the juvenile court's dispositional order, which appeared to exceed its statutory authority and demonstrated a misunderstanding of permanent guardianship within Utah's child welfare laws. The State contended that the juvenile court lacked authority under the Juvenile Court Act to enact the disposition made, as it must first terminate parental rights before placing children for adoption or making other authorized dispositions. The court referenced prior legal precedent, asserting that the juvenile court's role is strictly to determine the termination of parental rights before any custody decisions can be made.
The court found that the order exceeded the authority granted by statute, leading to a reversal and remand to juvenile court for further proceedings. The court expressed agreement with the previous determination that the rights of the natural parents should not be terminated based on the evidence available. If the father seeks custody, he must demonstrate a change in circumstances to modify the custody order. Although the legislative framework has expanded, the relevant provisions remain largely unchanged. The Juvenile Courts Act distinguishes between termination of parental rights and custody proceedings, necessitating compliance with statutory procedures on remand.
The court criticized the juvenile court's misconception that permanent guardianship provides the same permanence as termination of parental rights or adoption. The juvenile court misinterpreted the nature of permanent custody, believing it to be unmodifiable; however, parents can petition for restoration of custody under state law if circumstances change. The court emphasized that guardianship is not infallible, as guardians can opt to terminate the arrangement if challenges arise.
Additionally, the juvenile court's order appears misaligned with Utah's child welfare policy, which mandates timely efforts to provide children with a stable and permanent environment after unsuccessful attempts to reunify them with their families.
DFS is mandated to ensure children are raised in stable, permanent homes, focusing on achieving permanency, especially when a parent is deemed unfit. In this case, J.P.S. was found unfit to parent her children despite the State's extensive efforts for reunification. The court placed the children in guardianship while allowing continued visitation with J.P.S., which risks prolonging their time in the system and failing to provide a truly permanent environment. The trial court's denial of the State's motion for a new trial is deemed an abuse of discretion, warranting a remand for a new trial.
Judge Orme dissents, arguing that the trial court erred by leaving the two younger children in a state of uncertainty, contrary to the law's intent for permanency. He criticizes the reliance on a questionable recommendation from Dr. Sanders and contends that the mother’s parental rights should have been terminated based on clear evidence of her unfitness. The situation for the older child differs due to her background, including her own abuse of the younger siblings and her relationship with a different father, suggesting that maintaining her connection with her mother while ensuring her stability in a separate home may be beneficial. However, he recognizes that the current guardianship arrangement lacks specific statutory authorization. He agrees to remand the older child's case for the trial court to create a legally compliant disposition that serves the children's best interests.
A proctor home offers more comprehensive services than a foster home. Under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court has the authority to grant a new trial, take additional testimony, amend findings, or create new conclusions. According to Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-46, a parent or affected adult can petition for a new hearing based on newly discovered evidence that could influence the original decree, prompting the court to order a new hearing if the evidence is deemed significant. The dissenting opinion advocates for a summary reversal of the juvenile court's decision, but the majority prefers to provide legal guidance to the trial court, emphasizing its role as the fact-finder, particularly in juvenile matters. Additionally, for children aged three or younger, if returning home is not the goal, the permanency plan should be adoption, barring special circumstances that may necessitate long-term foster care or guardianship.
