Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; August 24, 2007; Florida; State Appellate Court
Marcelo and Aracelly Luque appealed a trial court's summary judgment in favor of Ale House Management, Inc., following an incident where Marcelo Luque was severely injured in a car accident after consuming several beers at the Orlando Ale House. The accident occurred after Luque swerved to avoid a vehicle that cut in front of him, resulting in a blood alcohol content of 0.135. The Luques had previously filed a suit against other parties regarding the same accident before initiating this separate action against Ale House, alleging a breach of duty under Florida Statutes section 768.125, which prohibits serving alcohol to individuals known to be habitually addicted.
Ale House's defense included claims that the accident was solely caused by another driver’s unforeseeable negligence, that Florida Statutes section 768.36 shielded them from liability, and that the Luques were attempting to deceive the court. They also argued that section 768.125 was intended to protect the public, not the intoxicated individual, thus Luque could not claim under this statute. The trial court agreed, concluding that section 768.125 did not create a cause of action, leading to the dismissal of the Luques' claims, including Aracelly's claim for loss of consortium. The ruling was supported by precedent stating that under Florida common law, commercial vendors are not liable for injuries resulting from alcohol consumption by purchasers. The Luques' request for rehearing was denied.
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in *Davis v. Shiappacossee* established that violations of the statute against selling alcohol to minors could lead to civil liability under a negligence per se theory. In response to growing liability for alcohol vendors, the Florida Legislature enacted section 562.51 (now section 768.125) in 1980, which limits vendor liability for selling alcohol to individuals of lawful drinking age. Section 768.125 states that vendors are not liable for injuries caused by the intoxication of legally aged individuals, with exceptions for sales to minors or individuals habitually addicted to alcohol. The Supreme Court in *Ellis* confirmed that vendors could still face civil action for negligent sales to minors that result in injury or death and extended this reasoning to habitual drunks.
The court pointed out that section 768.125 does not negate the existence of a cause of action against alcohol sellers, but rather clarifies the elements required for such claims. The trial court incorrectly concluded that section 768.125 does not define a cause of action. Ale House, a vendor, argued for affirming the judgment in its favor based on alternative grounds, specifically claiming that the intoxication of the individual, Luque, was not a cause of the accident due to the negligence of a third party. However, the court noted that the record is insufficiently developed to definitively support this claim, as discovery is ongoing, and evidence suggests Luque was significantly impaired at the time of the incident.
Establishing a claim under section 768.125 requires proving that intoxication caused or contributed to an accident, and the intoxicated individual’s denial of this contribution does not negate the claim. The court reversed and remanded the case, with Judges Pleus and Lawson concurring. In the complaint, Luque alleged severe injuries from the accident, including paralysis and multiple fractures. During his depositions, Luque consistently maintained that he did not feel impaired by alcohol at the time of driving and believed he could not have avoided the accident, regardless of his alcohol consumption. He described the incident as unavoidable, attributing the cause to another vehicle entering his path without attention.
