People v. Perez

Citations: 510 P.2d 1026; 9 Cal. 3d 651; 108 Cal. Rptr. 474; 1973 Cal. LEXIS 215Docket: Crim. 16699

Court: California Supreme Court; June 21, 1973; California; State Supreme Court

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The case involves Ernest Perez, who was charged with sodomy alongside Curtis Vann, while Carlos Rodriguez faced charges of attempted sodomy and assault. Perez's case was severed at his request, and following a court trial, he was convicted of sodomy. A jury later found him sane at the time of the offense. The incident occurred in the early morning of September 19, 1970, in a locked cell at the Ventura County jail, which housed six inmates including Perez, Vann, and Rodriguez. 

Key testimony came from Charles K., an 18-year-old inmate who described himself as a non-homosexual and detailed a pattern of harassment from other inmates due to his appearance. After initially moving to a different cell to escape bullying, Charles was coerced by Perez to move into Cell 2 for protection. He later recounted an incident where, after playing cards with Rodriguez, he was propositioned for sexual intercourse. When he refused, Rodriguez revealed a plan involving Perez and Vann to forcibly rape him, suggesting that if he complied with a simulated act of sodomy, they would leave him alone. Charles ultimately agreed to this proposal.

Rodriguez forcibly engaged in sexual acts with Charles by lowering his trousers, applying Groom, Clean hair dressing to Charles' anal area, and simulating sodomy until interrupted by another inmate. Following this, the defendant approached Charles under the pretense of playing cards but coerced him into lying down, threatening that he would be vulnerable without protection. Charles, initially resistant, ultimately complied due to fear of violence and the defendant's threats. The defendant then committed sodomy on Charles, who expressed pain and disbelief but was told to be quiet. After the incident, another inmate, Vann, also assaulted Charles, knocking him unconscious before committing sodomy. Charles testified that he feared severe repercussions if he reported the incidents, as the defendant had threatened to harm him and remove any protection he had. The following day, despite his fear, Charles made a statement to an officer investigating the incident. Vann testified that he witnessed the assaults and admitted to hitting Charles but claimed he could not go through with an assault on him. During trial arguments, the defense contended that both Charles and Vann were accomplices, undermining the credibility of Charles' testimony due to a lack of corroborating evidence. The prosecution countered that Charles was a naive, inexperienced young man who acted under duress and was not an accomplice.

The prosecuting attorney characterized Charles’ situation as perilous, akin to a lamb among wolves, arguing that the trial court's guilty verdict implied either that Charles was not an accomplice or, if he were, that Vann was not, thereby corroborating Charles' testimony. The court found sufficient evidence to support this, as under Penal Code section 1111, an accomplice's testimony requires corroboration. The trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Charles was not an accomplice, making his testimony adequate for the defendant's conviction. 

Regarding the defense of duress (Penal Code section 26, subdivision 8), it is applicable only when the accused acted under threats that instilled a reasonable fear for their life. Although previous cases require fear of death, a precedent suggests that fear of significant bodily harm suffices, provided the threat pertains to immediate harm, not future violence. Charles' testimony indicated no immediate threats from other inmates; his fears were based on potential future violence and threats from the defendant regarding protection and retaliation.

The case law indicates that individuals coerced through fear of harm, especially minors under the influence of an older person, cannot be deemed accomplices if they merely assented rather than consented to the acts due to such fear. This principle was upheld in cases involving minors, where the court ruled that fear and domination by an older person negated the possibility of them being considered accomplices, emphasizing that consent obtained through fear does not equate to voluntary participation in a crime. To qualify as an accomplice, one must knowingly and voluntarily collaborate with the principal offender.

Consent is defined as a voluntary agreement by a person capable of making an intelligent choice, as established in People v. Dong Pok Yip. This definition distinguishes consent from mere assent, which implies passivity rather than active agreement. In People v. Westek, the court found that the jury accepted the testimony of minors who did not "willingly" participate in criminal acts, leading to the conclusion that their involvement constituted assent, not consent, thus freeing them from being classified as accomplices and negating the requirement for corroboration of their testimony. Similarly, in People v. Featherstone, it was asserted that if a minor is not an accomplice, corroboration of their testimony is unnecessary.

The determination of whether a participant consented or merely assented due to fear is a factual question. In cases like People v. Washington, consent obtained through fear of bodily harm is not valid. Victims forced into sexual acts under threats are not deemed accomplices, and their testimonies do not need corroboration. The trial court in the present case took into account the age and background of a young man subjected to sexual perversion, reasonably concluding that he assented through fear rather than consenting, thus not being an accomplice.

Regarding the defendant's sanity, the court correctly interpreted "wrong" in the sanity test as referring to legal wrong, aligning with prior cases like People v. Nash and People v. Wolff. The court found sufficient evidence to support its judgment concerning both consent and sanity evaluations.

The trial court's decision to deny the defendant's motion for funds to investigate potential jury misconduct was upheld. The defendant argued that a poem written by a juror, discovered post-verdict, served as concrete evidence of misconduct. However, the court found no indication that other jurors had seen the poem and determined that the poem itself did not warrant an investigation into jury misconduct. Furthermore, the claims of misconduct were deemed speculative, with the court emphasizing that any violation of constitutional rights leading to unfairness must be demonstrably proven, not based on speculation. The judgment affirming the trial court's decision was supported by relevant case law, including Bardessono v. Michels and Darcy v. Handy. Additional notes referenced testimony and evidence related to the case, including the defendant's age at trial and the nature of the evidence found, but the need to assess this evidence for corroboration was rendered unnecessary given the court's conclusions. The legal standards regarding accomplice testimony and societal compliance with legal norms were also briefly noted.