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Owens v. DEPT. OF HWY. SAFETY & MOTOR VEHICLES
Citations: 572 So. 2d 953; 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 9324; 1990 WL 199157Docket: 89-1997
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; December 12, 1990; Florida; State Appellate Court
James Owens appeals a directed verdict favoring the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles after sustaining injuries when a state trooper's car ran over him. The incident occurred on July 2, 1987, while Owens and Ken Morse were traveling on I-75; Owens, with a revoked license due to DUI, had asked Morse to pull over so he could relieve himself. As Owens exited the van, he fell and was subsequently struck by Trooper Johnson's vehicle, which was moving at a speed of 2 to 5 MPH. Johnson, who had 23.5 years of experience, saw the van but did not detect Owens in the high grass alongside the road prior to the impact. At trial, the court ruled in favor of the appellee, citing a lack of evidence for negligence on Trooper Johnson's part and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. However, the appellate court reversed this decision, indicating that there was minimal evidence suggesting negligence and that sovereign immunity did not preclude Owens' suit. The court emphasized that when evaluating a directed verdict, the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and if any reasonable interpretation supports the plaintiff's claim, the motion should be denied. The case is remanded for further proceedings. A directed verdict should not be granted if evidence exists that a jury could interpret as negligence by the defendant, as established in Gardella v. Stone. The trial court cannot weigh evidence or assess witness credibility when considering directed verdict motions; it must submit conflicting evidence to the jury. In the current case, conflicting evidence exists regarding whether Owens was lying prone or crouching when struck by Trooper Johnson, with the court required to accept the interpretation most favorable to Owens—that he was crouching. The determination of Owens' credibility and whether Trooper Johnson acted with reasonable care is for the jury. Additionally, the trial court's assertion that Owens' suit was barred by sovereign immunity is incorrect, as actions like a police officer stopping a motorist or securing an accident scene are deemed "operational" and not protected by governmental immunity. Therefore, Trooper Johnson's actions in this context are also operational and subject to legal scrutiny. The decision is reversed and remanded with concurrence from Judges W. Sharp and Peterson.