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State v. Rowell
Citations: 419 P.2d 966; 77 N.M. 124Docket: 8008
Court: New Mexico Supreme Court; November 7, 1966; New Mexico; State Supreme Court
In State of New Mexico v. Mrs. John W. Rowell, the defendant was charged with uttering a forged check. Her defense relied on an alibi supported by the testimonies of her mother and two other disinterested witnesses, indicating she was not in Raton on the crime date, May 9, 1963. During cross-examination, the district attorney improperly asked the defendant's mother whether she knew that Carol Madelaine Rowell had been convicted of forgery in Texas on the same date. The trial judge denied a motion for mistrial but sustained an objection to the question and instructed the jury to disregard it. The appellate court found that the question posed was improper and could prejudice the jury, as evidence of prior convictions is generally inadmissible and can lead to unfair bias against the defendant. The court emphasized that a defendant should be judged solely based on evidence pertinent to the charged offense, not on unrelated prior actions. The mere asking of such a question, especially directed at a witness other than the defendant, was deemed to risk inflaming the jury's prejudices, regardless of the actual response. The judgment and sentence were challenged on these grounds, reaffirming the importance of protecting defendants from such prejudicial inquiries during trial. In *People v. Wells*, the court addressed the improper questioning of a defendant concerning prior forgeries during a forgery trial. The prosecution's intent behind such questions was deemed to unfairly prejudice the jury against the defendant, as they suggested information that was untrue or unprovable. The court noted that the prosecutor likely anticipated that objections to these questions would be sustained, yet proceeded to ask them to influence the jury's perception. The questioning was characterized as utterly unjustifiable and indicative of a strategy to taint the jury's view of the defendant without any basis in admissible evidence. Despite the trial court's objection to the questions, the damage was done, as jurors may have inferred guilt from the mere asking. The court emphasized that the prejudicial impact of such inquiries cannot be remedied by later instructions or objections; therefore, a reversal and new trial were mandated. The excerpt also distinguished this situation from cases where evidence is admitted and later withdrawn, highlighting that here, the issue was the prejudice caused by the questions themselves rather than any evidence presented. The appellant's prior conviction was introduced improperly, as it could not have been evidenced without the appellant testifying. The court expressed skepticism about the ability of jurors to disregard this information, stating that the term "ex-convict" inherently generates prejudice. The admonition given to the jury was deemed ineffective in mitigating this prejudice, with the court concluding that the harmful effect of the evidence could not be erased. The prosecution's use of the prior conviction was characterized as serious misconduct aimed at unfairly influencing the jury's perception. The court rejected the state's argument that the evidence was relevant to establish a common scheme, emphasizing that it served only to prejudice the defendant. Citing a historical case, the court criticized prosecutorial overreach in admitting incompetent evidence and highlighted the presumption that any improper evidence likely influenced the jury's verdict. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial, indicating that the appellant's second point did not need to be addressed as a result. The decision was concurred by both judges.