Childs v. State

Citations: 816 P.2d 1079; 107 Nev. 584; 1991 Nev. LEXIS 145Docket: 21373

Court: Nevada Supreme Court; September 6, 1991; Nevada; State Supreme Court

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Timothy John Childs was convicted of cheating at gambling and burglary related to an incident at John Ascuaga's Nugget casino on December 10, 1989. During the trial, operations manager Karen M. Fleiner testified that she observed Childs manipulating a slot machine handle to stop the reels prematurely, a technique known as "handle popping." After Fleiner reported this to the Gaming Control Board, Agent Robert Johnson monitored Childs but did not witness any illegal activity for five minutes. However, he later observed Childs through a monitor and noted instances of him "freezing the reels."

The jury found Childs guilty, leading to a sentence of two concurrent six-year terms in the Nevada State Prison. On appeal, Childs argued that NRS 465.070(7), under which he was convicted, was unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court of Nevada referenced its previous ruling in Lyons v. State, which established that a statute must provide clear notice of prohibited conduct to individuals of ordinary intelligence. The court reiterated that challenges to vagueness are assessed on an as-applied basis when First Amendment rights are not at stake.

The court had previously determined that the statute aimed to prevent intentional unlawful actions that manipulate gambling outcomes, citing examples like card crimping as clear violations. In contrast, the court differentiated handle popping, stating it does not damage or alter the slot machine and can be unintentionally used by novices, thus suggesting it may not constitute cheating under the statute.

Slot machine handle manipulation does not change the physical characteristics or potential payouts of the machines, similar to how a player may exploit a dealer's unintentional card reveal. Intent is a crucial element of cheating, as established in Sheriff v. Martin, which defines cheating under NRS 465.015. The manipulation of slot machine handles, while it may be executed with an understanding of its potential legal implications, does not inherently constitute cheating if it does not alter the machine’s established attributes.

In response to prior court rulings, the Nevada legislature amended NRS 465.070 to criminalize manipulation of gaming devices with the intent to cheat, specifically noting that varying the pull of a slot machine handle in a manner contrary to its normal operation is unlawful if done knowingly. The appellant argues that NRS 465.070(7) is unconstitutionally vague, lacking clear definitions of the prohibited conduct and leaving room for arbitrary enforcement. They further assert that the statute does not explicitly define what constitutes a "normal" pull of the handle, which complicates compliance. Despite these concerns, statutes are presumed valid, and the burden of proving unconstitutionality lies with the challenger. 

In summary, while NRS 465.070(7) outlaws handle manipulation with the intent to cheat, it fails to clarify what constitutes a normal pull, and previous rulings indicate that such manipulation does not equate to cheating as defined by law.

The vagueness of the statute concerning slot machine manipulation was highlighted, indicating that the appellant's intent to play fairly does not constitute criminal behavior. The court noted that without a clear statutory definition of prohibited conduct, the notion of intent becomes irrelevant. For the statute to effectively criminalize handle manipulation, it must be explicitly defined in specific terms. Additionally, the court emphasized the necessity for clear notices on slot machines to inform patrons of lawful versus unlawful manipulation methods. Consequently, the judgment of conviction against the appellant was reversed. 

In dissent, Justice Springer argued that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction, as the appellant's actions involved manipulating a slot machine's reel in a manner contrary to its intended operation. Springer characterized this manipulation as cheating, asserting that any interference disrupting the machine's normal function, when coupled with fraudulent intent, constitutes a crime under Nevada law. The dissent expresses a preference against declaring statutes unconstitutional and supports the conviction instead. 

The dissent also referenced the legal definition of "cheating" under NRS 465.015, which involves altering game outcomes or payment criteria. The decision in Lyons and subsequent legislative amendments related to gaming law were also mentioned.