Court: Oregon Supreme Court; August 1, 1991; Oregon; State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed the case of State v. Johnny J. Counts, addressing whether the affirmative defenses of mental disease or defect (ORS 161.295(1)) and extreme emotional disturbance (ORS 163.135(1)) are mutually exclusive. The trial court had ruled they were mutually exclusive, a decision the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed this ruling, concluding that the defenses are not mutually exclusive.
Defendant Counts, who waived his right to a jury trial, was charged with intentional murder after shooting his wife while she slept, subsequently attempting to stage her death as a suicide. Counts claimed he believed his wife was trying to harm him based on various delusions. He filed notices to assert both affirmative defenses, and psychiatric evaluations indicated he suffered from significant mental health issues, including an organic delusional syndrome and a paranoid disorder.
At trial, while the state acknowledged the mental disease defense was proven, it disputed the extreme emotional disturbance defense. The trial court maintained that proving mental disease or defect precluded consideration of extreme emotional disturbance as a mitigating factor. The Supreme Court's decision allows for both defenses to be considered concurrently.
The court determined that the defendant successfully established the defense of mental disease or defect, resulting in a judgment of guilty except for insanity for intentional murder, as per ORS 161.319 and ORS 161.325(2)(a). The Court of Appeals upheld this decision. Under ORS 161.295(1), for a defendant to be found "guilty except for insanity," they must first be found "guilty" of the crime. This requirement is affirmed by the statute's language, legislative history, and established case law. ORS 161.295(1) stipulates that a person is guilty except for insanity if, due to a mental disease or defect, they lack substantial capacity to understand the criminality of their actions or to comply with the law. The format of the verdict implies that criminal culpability must be assessed first. A trial court typically asks juries to determine if a defendant is "guilty, not guilty, or guilty except for insanity." If the state fails to prove the defendant's guilt or the defendant successfully raises a complete defense, the verdict should be "not guilty," regardless of sanity. Furthermore, the definition of "criminal conduct" necessitates that it meet the elements of an offense, with the state disproving defenses and the defendant failing to prove affirmative defenses. Consequently, proving "criminal conduct" equates to proving "guilt." The statute's language implies that if a defendant's conduct is lawful, it would be illogical to question their understanding of its criminality. Legislative history and case law support that a defendant's guilt must be established prior to addressing issues of sanity. In State v. Olmstead, the court found that the insanity defense could be applied even in strict liability offenses, as it does not concern the defendant's mental state but rather societal views on criminal responsibility. This analysis confirmed that proving all elements of the charged crime, including any necessary mental state, is essential before considering the insanity defense, with any lack of proof mandating an acquittal rather than a "guilty except for insanity" verdict.
The defense of mental disease or defect involves a sequential evaluation of three key questions: 1) Has the state proven all elements of the crime and disproven any defenses beyond a reasonable doubt? 2) Has the defendant failed to establish any affirmative defenses by a preponderance of evidence? 3) Was the defendant 'insane' as defined by ORS 161.295(1) at the time of the crime? A defendant can only be found 'guilty except for insanity' if all three questions are answered affirmatively, indicating that criminal culpability must be established before considering criminal responsibility.
The discussion then shifts to the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in the context of intentional murder, as outlined in ORS 163.135(1). This defense requires proving three components: 1) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance during the homicide; 2) The disturbance was not caused by the defendant’s own intentional or negligent actions; 3) There is a reasonable explanation for the disturbance. The first component focuses on the defendant's subjective experience.
The extreme emotional disturbance defense was introduced in the 1971 criminal code revision, originally referencing 'extreme mental or emotional disturbance.' The term 'mental' was removed to clarify that this defense is distinct from the 'mental disease or defect' defense, as recognized by the Criminal Law Revision Commission. This distinction emphasizes that the two defenses address different psychological conditions, with legislative intent to prevent confusion between them.
Defenses of extreme emotional disturbance and insanity can coexist in a defendant, as recognized by the drafters of the extreme emotional disturbance defense. During discussions by the Criminal Law Revision Commission, it was noted that individuals could possess both mental disease and extreme emotional disturbance. A case highlighted a defendant diagnosed with a mental defect who acted under extreme emotional disturbance during the homicide.
The defense requires that after proving the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance, the defendant must also demonstrate a "reasonable explanation" for this disturbance, making the ultimate test objective. The jury assesses whether the defendant's actions were reasonable based on specified circumstances, not merely on the defendant's belief in their reasonableness. This objective test bears similarities to the common law 'heat of passion' defense, which evaluated whether a 'reasonable man' would have been provoked under the same circumstances, but the extreme emotional disturbance defense provides a broader scope.
The objective element of the extreme emotional disturbance defense accounts for the defendant's unique situation, allowing for consideration of individual characteristics that may affect their response to provocation. This adjustment reflects a modern understanding of personalities and acknowledges that factors such as trauma or mental state should be considered when evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's actions.
The legislature aimed to balance objectivity and subjectivity in the defense of manslaughter due to extreme emotional disturbance. Initially, the defense was based on section 210.3(1)(b) of the Model Penal Code, which allowed for a subjective assessment of reasonableness based on the actor's beliefs. However, concerns over excessive subjectivity led to amendments that shifted the focus to an "ordinary person" standard, thereby narrowing the subjective inquiry. This change meant that the evaluation of the reasonableness of the actor's explanation was less about the individual's personal beliefs and more about how an average person would perceive the situation.
The defendant argued for the inclusion of mental imbalances constituting insanity within the "actor's situation." However, the legislature's revisions indicated an intention to exclude such considerations to preserve the objective nature of the defense. The commentary on the Model Penal Code acknowledges that while some mental abnormalities might be relevant, others, like temperament, should not be factored in. Ultimately, the court concluded that mental disease or defect, as defined by ORS 161.295, was not intended to be included in the assessment of the actor's situation, as doing so would undermine the objective safeguards established by the legislature. The possibility remains for a defendant to assert both the insanity defense and the extreme emotional disturbance defense, with the trier of fact determining the validity of each based on the evidence presented.
The conclusion arises from a proper application of the insanity and extreme emotional disturbance defenses. The trier of fact first determines the defendant's guilt by evaluating if the state has proven all elements of the crime and whether any defenses have been raised or disproven. Within this context, the trier assesses whether the defendant has established the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. This involves three components: first, determining if the defendant acted under such disturbance; second, whether the circumstances would cause an ordinary person, excluding insanity, to be extremely disturbed; and third, acknowledging that a defendant's insanity does not affect these inquiries. The final determination regarding the defendant's insanity is made after addressing the extreme emotional disturbance defense.
Legislative guidance indicates that judges should interpret statutes to give effect to all provisions without altering their substance. The statutes allow for the application of both defenses, which aligns with the legislative intent to broaden the extreme emotional disturbance defense compared to its common law version. It asserts that an insane defendant should not be deemed more culpable than a non-insane counterpart, despite eventual criminal responsibility being negated.
The Court of Appeals' reasoning, which stated that an insane person cannot claim the extreme emotional disturbance defense because they do not act as an ordinary person, does not preclude the possibility of evaluating how an ordinary person would react in the same situation as the insane defendant. Furthermore, the court's prior ruling in State v. Carson, which addressed the sufficiency of evidence for extreme emotional disturbance in an attempted murder case, does not contradict this interpretation.
Extreme emotional disturbance is defined as an emotional state where an individual has no mental disease or defect as per statutory standards, experiences overwhelming stress, and reacts with intense feelings leading to a loss of self-control. This definition, originating from People v. Patterson, allows defendants to demonstrate that their actions were influenced by a mental condition that does not qualify as insanity, thereby reducing their culpability. The court in Carson indicated that its remarks on this matter were not binding and did not support the state's position. It emphasized that the interpretation of extreme emotional disturbance should not require a finding of insanity. The New York Court of Appeals has previously affirmed that a defendant could be convicted of manslaughter due to extreme emotional disturbance, even in cases involving intentional murder. In People v. Johns, a jury charge that limited the insanity defense to specific crimes was deemed erroneous, leading to the reversal of a conviction based on extreme emotional disturbance.
The trial court in the present case incorrectly concluded that it could not consider the extreme emotional disturbance defense after finding insanity. Although this error necessitates a reversal, it does not automatically mean that the appropriate verdict is "guilty except for insanity of manslaughter in the first degree." A remand is required to ascertain the correct outcome, especially since the trial court acknowledged sufficient evidence supporting the extreme emotional disturbance defense, which could significantly impact the defendant's future under the Psychiatric Security Review Board.
The court remands the case to the trial court for reconsideration of the defendant's claim of extreme emotional disturbance (EED) in light of the definition of 'actor's situation.' It highlights two issues: the trial court may not have properly considered the defendant's insanity when evaluating the EED defense, and it only indicated sufficient evidence existed to support a finding of EED rather than conclusively stating the defense was proven.
The judgment of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals is reversed. The dissenting opinion by Justice Gillette argues that the majority's decision misinterprets statutes and precedents, potentially complicating the adjudication of insanity and EED defenses. The majority concludes that the insanity and EED defenses are not mutually exclusive, emphasizing that a defendant must first be found criminally culpable before addressing insanity.
The majority also establishes that EED involves both subjective and objective components, focusing on the ordinary person's viewpoint and the actor's situation. However, Gillette contends that the majority neglects the necessity of the defendant reasonably perceiving all circumstances at the time of the act, which is incompatible with a finding of insanity.
Both the insanity defense and the Extreme Emotional Disturbance (EED) defense are affirmative defenses, requiring the defendant to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence under ORS 161.055(2). The insanity defense, as defined by ORS 161.295, applies to defendants who do not understand their actions or cannot control their behavior. In contrast, the EED defense under ORS 163.135 is for defendants who understand their actions but cannot control them, provided they offer a reasonable explanation to lessen their culpability. For the insanity defense, the defendant must demonstrate an inability to appreciate the criminality of their conduct, while for the EED defense, they must show that they reasonably believed they were in a situation that would overwhelm an ordinary person with emotion.
The legislative amendment adding "reasonably" to the EED defense indicates that it is not available to defendants who are unable to perceive reality due to insanity. This distinction emphasizes that the EED defense is intended solely for those who were sane at the time of the offense. The majority opinion in the court appears to misinterpret this, treating the EED defense as applicable to individuals with mental illness, which contradicts the legislative intent. The logical requirement that a defendant must "reasonably believe" certain facts must be prioritized in evaluating the defense. The text argues that the two defenses contain inconsistent elements, making them mutually exclusive, thus reinforcing the necessity for clarity in their application within legal proceedings.
An actor who murders due to insanity must prove this condition is more probable than not, rendering any inconsistent cause less probable. The majority opinion conflates concurrent causation with "but for" causation, mistakenly stating that a defendant is entitled to the extreme emotional disturbance (EED) defense only if they acted under such disturbance. While acknowledging that suffering from emotional disturbance is not equivalent to acting under it, the excerpt emphasizes that the EED defense requires the disturbance to be the cause of the murder. Similarly, the insanity defense necessitates that the criminal act results directly from a mental disease or defect.
The argument posits a logical inconsistency in claiming a murder could simultaneously stem from both an extreme emotional disturbance and insanity; one psychological occurrence must predominate. The excerpt critiques the majority for not addressing this issue and asserts that while an insane defendant may present both defenses, only one can be validly found by the trier of fact. Once it is established that the murder was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, the defendant cannot claim a lack of capacity tied to insanity. The text calls for clarity in the law, arguing that the current framework is unnecessarily complicated.
The decision's timing will complicate murder trials for the next two years, a situation attributed to no specific fault. The majority's conclusion lacks support from the cited legislative history. The relevant history includes a statement by then-Representative Carson regarding the test for the current Extreme Emotional Disturbance (EED) defense, which focuses on whether the jury finds the defendant's actions reasonable under the circumstances they believe to exist. The statute (ORS 163.135(1)) clarifies that this assessment is based on the actor's reasonable beliefs regarding the circumstances.
The majority's reliance on persuasive authority is flawed; the first two cited cases contradict its position, the third case is distinguishable, and the fourth is incorrect. The majority interprets People v. Ford and People v. Patterson to suggest that extreme emotional disturbance does not need to reach the level of insanity to mitigate a charge, but this misrepresents their earlier assertion that insanity and extreme emotional disturbance differ in kind, not degree.
Furthermore, the majority cites People v. Young, which involved a defendant charged with second-degree murder who presented both insanity and EED defenses. The trial court allowed a charge of first-degree manslaughter but did not provide jury instructions on EED. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the decision for failing to instruct the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of manslaughter and insane. However, this case does not support the majority's argument because the defendant was not obligated to prove the EED definition, as it was not available as an affirmative defense in that case.
When a defendant is charged with first-degree manslaughter in New York, "extreme emotional disturbance" (EED) is not an element of the crime or a defense that needs to be alleged or proven by either party. Unlike Oregon's EED defense, New York's definition does not impose a limitation on what constitutes a "reasonable" explanation or excuse; it assesses reasonableness from the defendant's perspective based on their beliefs about the circumstances. The excerpt highlights a misapplication of precedent in the case of *People v. Johns*, where the court incorrectly extended the insanity defense to situations involving EED, despite EED not being at issue in the referenced case of *Young*. This misapplication undermines the distinction between the two defenses, suggesting that both a partial and complete responsibility for a crime could coexist, which contradicts the statutory language, legislative intent, and lacks persuasive authority. The dissenting opinion emphasizes that the majority's interpretation is flawed and calls for a clear differentiation between EED and insanity defenses.
Jurisdiction of the board corresponds to the maximum statutory sentence for the crime, unless the defendant is found guilty except for insanity. In cases of intentional murder, such a defendant remains under the board's jurisdiction for life. However, if the defendant can demonstrate that the crime should be mitigated to first-degree manslaughter due to extreme emotional disturbance, the jurisdiction is limited to 20 years. There is no evidence that the defendant's wife attempted to kill him. The state clarified to the trial court that the defenses of mental disease or defect and extreme emotional disturbance are not necessarily mutually exclusive, though they argued that in this case, they did not apply together. "Guilt" means that the prosecution has established all crime elements and disproven defenses beyond a reasonable doubt, while the defendant must prove any affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. The term "conduct" in ORS 161.295(1) refers to "criminal conduct." Legislative history indicates that a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if they meet the insanity defense criteria, implying that the state must first prove criminal conduct. A defendant found guilty except for insanity is not acquitted but has committed all elements of the crime. The insanity defense is applicable only after all crime elements are established. The case’s second element is not further discussed, and the responsibility provisions are codified in ORS 161.290 et seq. Prior cases explored the relationship between extreme emotional disturbance and the common law "heat of passion" test but did not rule out considering lesser mental infirmities. The Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers assert that the case's resolution should focus on the dispositional rather than the guilt phase.
ORS 161.327 mandates that if a trial judge determines a defendant is insane and would have been guilty of a felony or misdemeanor causing physical injury or risk thereof, the judge must place the defendant under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board. To establish the length of the Board’s jurisdiction, ORS 161.325(2)(a) requires the judge to record the offense the defendant would have been convicted of. Amici argue that at this stage, the court should consider additional defenses; however, this position overlooks the established verdict of "guilty except for insanity." The determination of guilt must occur prior to the dispositional phase. In State v. Ott, the court referenced the definition of "extreme emotional disturbance" (EED) but omitted a critical factor relied upon by the state. The defendant had argued for the inclusion of mental imbalance in assessing the actor's situation. The majority cited Ott for legislative history but failed to incorporate a key component of the definition of a "reasonable explanation." The omission of "reasonably" is crucial, particularly in cases involving delusions, where the defendant cannot "reasonably believe" the circumstances. The majority concluded that under EED, the trier of fact assesses whether an ordinary person, excluding insanity, would be extremely emotionally disturbed. However, ORS 163.135(1) specifies that the inquiry must consider the circumstances as the actor reasonably perceives them, indicating a misinterpretation by the majority. The distinction between insanity and EED is emphasized, affirming their different psychological implications.
Extreme emotional disturbance is characterized as an emotional state in which an individual does not have a mental disease or defect that meets the statutory definition for lack of criminal responsibility. This definition was established in *People v. Patterson*. Under New York Penal Law § 40.15, a defendant may assert an affirmative defense for lack of criminal responsibility due to mental disease or defect, indicating an inability to understand the nature of their conduct or that it was wrong.
New York Penal Law § 125.25 defines second-degree murder, stating that a person is guilty if they intend to cause death and do so, but may assert an affirmative defense if they acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance with a reasonable explanation, judged from the defendant's perspective. However, this defense does not apply to manslaughter or other crimes.
Manslaughter in the first degree, as per New York Penal Law § 125.20, occurs when a person either intends to cause serious physical injury or causes death under circumstances that do not amount to murder due to extreme emotional disturbance. This state of mind is a mitigating factor that reduces murder to manslaughter and does not need to be proven in prosecutions for this offense.
