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City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
Citations: 87 L. Ed. 2d 313; 105 S. Ct. 3249; 473 U.S. 432; 1985 U.S. LEXIS 118; 53 U.S.L.W. 5022Docket: 84-468
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; July 1, 1985; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) sought to lease a building for a group home for the mentally retarded but was denied a special use permit by the City of Cleburne, Texas, which classified the home as a "hospital for the feebleminded." CLC and others sued the city, claiming that the zoning ordinance violated their equal protection rights. The District Court upheld the ordinance, but the Court of Appeals reversed, asserting that mental retardation is a "quasi-suspect" classification requiring heightened scrutiny and found the ordinance invalid as it did not serve a substantial governmental purpose. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in classifying mental retardation as quasi-suspect, indicating that the Equal Protection Clause requires only a rational relationship between the classification and a legitimate state interest for social or economic legislation. It recognized that while mentally retarded individuals face unique challenges necessitating state intervention, the existing legislative measures do not reflect prejudice, thus not warranting heightened judicial scrutiny. The Court concluded that the requirement for a special use permit for the group home violated the equal protection rights of CLC and its potential residents. It determined that any differences between the proposed group home and other facilities permitted without a permit were irrelevant unless the home posed a legitimate threat to city interests, which was not established in this case. Thus, the ordinance's permit requirement was deemed unnecessary for determining its validity concerning the mentally retarded. The case involves a Texas city that denied a special use permit for a group home intended for 13 mentally retarded individuals, citing a municipal zoning ordinance. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that mental retardation constitutes a "quasi-suspect" classification, ruling that the city's ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause as it did not advance a significant governmental interest. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that a lesser standard of scrutiny was appropriate, it ultimately deemed the ordinance invalid in this context. In 1980, Jan Hannah purchased a building for lease to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) to operate the group home, which would comply with all relevant regulations. The city classified the home as a "hospital for the feebleminded," requiring a special use permit for operation. After a public hearing, the City Council denied the permit by a 3-1 vote. CLC subsequently filed a lawsuit against the city, arguing that the zoning ordinance discriminated against the mentally retarded and violated equal protection rights. The District Court found that the ordinance would permit the home if the residents were not mentally retarded, indicating that the denial was motivated by prejudice. However, the court upheld the ordinance as constitutional under minimum scrutiny, asserting that it related rationally to the city's interests. The Fifth Circuit reversed this decision, applying intermediate scrutiny based on the classification of mental retardation as quasi-suspect and highlighting its relevance in legislative contexts. Discrimination against individuals with mental retardation reflects deep-seated prejudice, compounded by their lack of political power and immutable condition. The court found heightened scrutiny appropriate as a city ordinance denied a significant benefit crucial for community integration. The ordinance was ruled invalid both on its face and as applied, as it did not substantially further any important governmental interests. The court's denial of a rehearing en banc was met with dissent advocating for reconsideration of the heightened standard of review. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates equal treatment for individuals similarly situated. While legislation is generally presumed valid if it serves a legitimate state interest, this presumption weakens in cases involving race, alienage, or national origin, which invoke strict scrutiny due to their historical context of prejudice. Laws impacting personal rights or classifications based on gender also undergo heightened review, as gender typically does not justify differential treatment. Statutes that allocate benefits and burdens between genders often reflect outdated views on the capabilities of men and women. Gender classifications require a substantial relation to an important governmental interest to pass scrutiny. Discrimination based on illegitimacy, which is beyond an individual's control, also necessitates heightened review due to its lack of relation to societal contribution capabilities. However, differential treatment based on age does not receive similar heightened scrutiny, as elderly individuals have not experienced a sustained history of purposeful discrimination like other marginalized groups. The case of Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia illustrates that courts are hesitant to closely scrutinize legislative decisions concerning groups with distinguishing characteristics relevant to state interests, requiring only a rational means to achieve legitimate ends. The Court of Appeals incorrectly categorized mental retardation as a quasi-suspect classification warranting heightened scrutiny. Evidence shows individuals with mental retardation possess varying degrees of functional ability, and states have a legitimate interest in addressing their needs. Legislative responses to mental retardation issues demonstrate a commitment to addressing their unique challenges without evidence of systemic prejudice, indicating that judicial oversight is not warranted. Federal law prohibits discrimination against the mentally retarded in federally funded programs and ensures their access to appropriate services in the least restrictive settings. The Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, along with the Education of the Handicapped Act, mandates that states receiving federal education funds ensure that children with mental retardation are educated alongside their non-retarded peers to the fullest extent appropriate. The government promotes the employment of mentally retarded individuals in federal services by exempting them from competitive examinations. Texas has enacted laws that grant specific rights to the mentally retarded, such as the right to live in the least restrictive environment suited to their needs, including group homes. This special legislative treatment acknowledges inherent differences and reflects societal approval for such measures, suggesting that governmental consideration of these differences is both legitimate and desirable. While legislation aimed at benefiting the mentally retarded may withstand heightened scrutiny, the question remains whether such scrutiny is constitutionally required. Recent laws imply that some restrictions may be necessary for the mentally retarded, as seen in provisions for "appropriate" education, which does not equate to equality with non-retarded peers. This indicates that governmental entities require flexibility in implementing remedial actions without excessive judicial interference. Furthermore, the existence of supportive legislation, which likely relies on public backing, undermines claims that the mentally retarded lack political power. Although no group can directly control legislative actions, many groups experience similar limitations without triggering heightened scrutiny. If the mentally retarded were classified as a quasi-suspect class, it would complicate the legal landscape for other groups with immutable disabilities, such as the aging and mentally ill. Finally, while discrimination against the mentally retarded does occur, it is subject to correction under constitutional standards. The legal analysis emphasizes that the classification of individuals with mental retardation should not be treated as a quasi-suspect class, allowing for governmental actions that may disadvantage them, as long as these actions are rationally related to legitimate state interests. Legislation affecting the mentally retarded must not be arbitrary or irrational, as established by relevant case law. While the government can consider mental retardation in its policies, it must not enact measures driven by a desire to harm this group. The document then addresses the specific issue of a zoning ordinance requiring a special use permit for homes for the mentally retarded. It questions whether this requirement constitutes a violation of equal protection, particularly in light of the fact that similar facilities for other groups do not require such permits. The city allows various types of housing without special permits but mandates one for the Featherston home designated for mentally retarded individuals. This raises the critical question of whether the city can impose different standards based on the nature of the clientele, despite the overarching equal protection principles. The excerpt concludes by acknowledging the inherent differences between the mentally retarded and others, which complicates the equal treatment analysis. The Featherston home and its potential occupants do not pose a unique threat to the city's legitimate interests compared to other permitted uses, such as boarding houses or hospitals. The court affirmed the judgment that the city ordinance is invalid as applied to this case. The City Council's insistence on requiring a permit was based on unsubstantiated negative sentiments from nearby property owners and fears from elderly residents, which do not constitute valid grounds for differential treatment under zoning laws. The court emphasized that the law must not be influenced by private biases, as demonstrated in precedent cases. The Council raised concerns about the home's proximity to a junior high school, fearing harassment of residents by students, despite the school already serving mentally retarded students. Such vague fears were deemed insufficient to justify denying the permit. Additionally, the Council cited the home's location in a flood plain and uncertainties regarding legal responsibility for actions of mentally retarded individuals, yet similar facilities like nursing homes could be established without special permits, undermining the rationale for different treatment based on occupancy. Finally, the Council expressed worries about the size of the home and its occupancy. However, the court noted that if the home were occupied by individuals without disabilities, it would not face the same zoning restrictions. Thus, the rationale for treating mentally retarded individuals differently concerning occupancy limits was not supported by the record, which did not clarify why their characteristics warranted such distinctions. Individuals intending to reside in the Featherston home meet federal and state group housing standards, and the home satisfies the federal square-footage-per-resident requirement. The Court of Appeals highlighted the City’s failure to justify its view that mentally retarded individuals cannot live in what it considers "crowded" conditions when others can. The City argued that the ordinance aims to prevent population concentration and street congestion, but this rationale does not hold, as other types of housing do not require permits in the same area. Concerns about fire hazards and neighborhood serenity also fail to rationally justify imposing special use permit requirements on the Featherston home while exempting various other permitted uses. The court concluded that requiring the permit appears to stem from an irrational prejudice against mentally retarded individuals, affirming the Court of Appeals' judgment that invalidates the zoning ordinance as applied to the Featherston home. Justice Stevens, concurring, expressed skepticism about the application of rigid equal protection standards and suggested that a rational basis should be found for legislative classifications, emphasizing that any classification should serve a legitimate public purpose without discriminating against disadvantaged groups. He argued that a rational-basis test suffices to evaluate laws that discriminate based on characteristics unrelated to an individual's ability to exercise rights, such as race or physical attributes. Equal protection cases require analysis of which class is adversely affected by legislation and whether it has faced a "tradition of disfavor." The law's public purpose and the characteristics justifying disparate treatment must also be evaluated. Typically, statutes involving racial classifications face invalidation, while economic classifications are upheld. Classifications based on alienage, gender, or illegitimacy yield varied results due to the relevance of group characteristics to public purpose. Legislation affecting mentally retarded individuals isn’t automatically irrational; differences from others can justify certain legal decisions, such as for special education funding. Rational limitations could include restrictions on driving or operating hazardous equipment for safety reasons. However, there exists a history of discrimination against the mentally retarded, exemplified by a city's requirement for a special use permit for group homes, driven by irrational fears rather than legitimate safety concerns. The city’s argument for neighbor protection as justification for this discrimination was rejected by the Court of Appeals, and the current Court finds it unconvincing. In conclusion, the Court asserts that mentally retarded individuals cannot be broadly categorized as unfit to live in communities, emphasizing that mental retardation should not automatically result in the deprivation of rights without considering individual abilities. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, concurs with this principle, highlighting the necessity of recognizing individual capacities and needs under the Equal Protection Clause. The dissenting opinion critiques the Court's ruling invalidating the city of Cleburne's zoning ordinance on rational-basis grounds, arguing that the ordinance could have been upheld under traditional rational-basis analysis applicable to economic regulation. The dissent emphasizes the need for a more thorough examination justifying the application of heightened scrutiny, which the Court fails to provide. It also contends that the Court's decision to invalidate the ordinance only as applied to specific respondents, rather than on its face, strays from established equal protection precedents. Additionally, the dissent points out two significant issues with the Court's approach: first, the unnecessary dual constitutional rulings when one suffices, which undermines judicial principles regarding constitutional law; and second, the contradiction in applying a rigorous review while simultaneously denying that heightened scrutiny was employed. The dissent argues that the methodology used resembles heightened scrutiny despite the Court's labeling it as a form of rational-basis review, suggesting that this "second order" rational-basis analysis deviates from established standards. The excerpt addresses the case of Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers and critiques the application of the rational-basis test in evaluating zoning ordinances. The Court concludes that concerns over fire hazards and neighborhood serenity cannot justify singling out certain respondents when similar uses pose comparable risks. It emphasizes that under the minimal rational-basis standard, legislative reform may address issues incrementally and that courts do not typically scrutinize the factual underpinnings of legislative classifications. The text argues that the burden of proof does not lie with the legislature to demonstrate the sensibility of its classifications, which are presumed constitutional unless proven otherwise. However, it acknowledges issues with the broad classifications in Cleburne's zoning ordinance, arguing that if it is to be invalidated, a more stringent level of scrutiny should apply than what is used for economic and commercial classifications. The dissenting opinion expresses concern that applying a more searching review could set a dangerous precedent reminiscent of Lochner v. New York and criticizes the Court for not clearly articulating the criteria for invoking such scrutiny. It advocates that the level of scrutiny should align with the constitutional significance of the interest affected and the discriminatory basis of the classification. Zoning ordinances that exclude mentally retarded individuals from residential districts must be convincingly justified by legitimate and important purposes, as established in Plyler v. Doe and other cases. The right to establish a home is fundamental under the Due Process Clause, reflecting the importance of group homes for mentally retarded adults, particularly as deinstitutionalization progresses. The District Court recognized that the availability of group homes is crucial for normal living patterns and integration into the community. Exclusion from such homes significantly restricts the freedom and fulfillment of mentally retarded individuals by preventing them from forming social bonds and participating in community life. Historically, individuals with mental retardation have faced severe discrimination and segregation, stemming from harmful societal views that transformed in the late 19th century. Influenced by Social Darwinism and eugenics, they were wrongfully labeled a societal menace, leading to their segregation in massive institutions aimed at preventing reproduction among them. Public schools excluded retarded children based on the unfounded belief that they were ineducable, and laws deemed them unfit for citizenship. Eugenic laws further stripped them of basic civil rights, including the right to marry and procreate, paralleling the discriminatory practices of Jim Crow laws. Marriages involving individuals deemed mentally retarded have historically been voidable and, in many states, criminalized, particularly targeting women of child-bearing age to prevent them from procreating, reflecting eugenic motivations. Between 1907 and 1931, 29 states enacted compulsory eugenic sterilization laws to enforce this objective. Despite some legislative progress, such as the Education of the Handicapped Act of 1975, which improved educational access for handicapped children, systemic discrimination has persisted. As of 1979, many states still disqualified individuals labeled as "idiots" from voting, leaving discretion to low-level election officials. The prolonged isolation of the mentally retarded has fostered ignorance and prejudice against them. The Equal Protection Clause necessitates a rigorous review of discriminatory practices, such as the Cleburne zoning ordinance, which unfairly classifies the "feeble-minded" alongside drug addicts and alcoholics. The justifications presented by the Court for not providing heightened scrutiny to this group fail to align with established legal precedents and overlook the historical discrimination faced by the retarded, undermining claims that they are politically empowered or do not need greater judicial protection. Only discrimination recognized by courts can be remedied, as courts do not operate in a social vacuum. As society evolves and recognizes certain practices as discriminatory—often due to political mobilization by previously marginalized groups—courts may not apply heightened scrutiny to those practices. Constitutional principles of equality, like those regarding liberty and property, evolve over time, shifting societal perceptions of what constitutes discrimination. Historical cases illustrate this evolution, as views that were once considered "self-evident" have changed to reveal past practices as unjust constraints on freedom. Legislation often reflects these changing standards of equality, and courts should consider such legislative developments as important indicators of evolving principles. The Court previously acknowledged this when it extended heightened scrutiny to gender classifications, noting Congress's growing sensitivity to sex-based discrimination. Legislative changes do not negate the constitutional principle at stake, as demonstrated by the continued scrutiny of race-based classifications despite significant legislative action. For individuals with intellectual disabilities, there has been progress, but outdated laws and societal ignorance persist. Therefore, heightened judicial scrutiny is necessary to address unnecessary barriers they face, as these barriers contradict the evolving principles of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the Court's current perspective on heightened scrutiny focuses more on its limitations rather than its applications, highlighting two key principles central to the Court's theory. Heightened scrutiny is generally deemed unsuitable when a group has distinct characteristics that legislatures may validly consider, and when many legislative classifications affecting that group are likely valid. The Court argues that the decision to apply heightened scrutiny should focus on the overall validity of governmental action based on a classification, rather than the specifics of individual cases. If this principle were strictly followed, heightened scrutiny would only apply to groups with homogenous traits. For example, while women have diverse characteristics, heightened scrutiny applies because gender is rarely a valid proxy for these variations. Similarly, using retardation as a blanket proxy for reduced capacity across individuals is inappropriate due to significant individual differences. The Court's assertion that the number of valid classifications determines the relevance of a characteristic is flawed; just because a characteristic may be relevant in some instances does not mean it is valid in all contexts. Precedents indicate that characteristics do not need to be entirely irrelevant to warrant heightened scrutiny. For instance, the classification of undocumented aliens has been recognized as relevant, and gender-based classifications have been upheld in certain contexts. Heightened scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, is appropriate for classifications like gender and alienage because these traits can be relevant in some situations but not in others. This perspective contradicts the view that heightened scrutiny should not apply to individuals with mental retardation, given that government actions may be valid in some cases while requiring careful review in others to distinguish permissible from impermissible classifications. Retardation's constitutional irrelevance in some contexts necessitates careful judicial scrutiny of classifications that impose special burdens on the retarded, given the historical discrimination they have faced. The Court recognizes ongoing invidious discrimination against the retarded but contends that, in most situations, special treatment is both legitimate and desirable. This raises questions about the methodology for determining when heightened scrutiny is warranted; it should be based on constitutional principles rather than a numerical assessment of valid versus invalid classifications. Discriminatory classifications, as understood in the Fourteenth Amendment, require a constitutional basis for asserting equal rights. However, in economic and commercial contexts, such a basis is lacking, allowing the government flexibility in policy direction without violating constitutional principles. The Fourteenth Amendment does impose restrictions against legal distinctions based on race or ethnicity and places limits on government actions concerning gender and illegitimacy. When historical inequalities are evident, a more rigorous judicial inquiry is warranted. This inquiry, referred to as heightened scrutiny or "second order" rational-basis review, requires that the government demonstrate that a classification serves important and legitimate objectives. Heightened scrutiny necessitates that valid policies justify departures from equality, specifically regarding groups vulnerable to prejudice, such as the mentally retarded. Courts must ensure that legislative actions are not driven by hostility or thoughtlessness. Historical discrimination against the mentally retarded underscores the need for such scrutiny, particularly concerning the right to establish a community home, which is often denied based on irrational fears. The ordinance in question is deemed overly broad, suggesting a desire to exclude the retarded from the community. The Court's decision to invalidate the ordinance only as applied to certain respondents, rather than striking it down entirely, is criticized for perpetuating discrimination by allowing a potentially irrational ordinance to remain in effect. The key issue is whether a blanket requirement for a special permit for the mentally retarded is valid, rather than whether some subgroup might justifiably require one. The ruling fails to specify which characteristics of the respondents could exempt them from needing a special permit, leaving ambiguity that could lead to arbitrary enforcement by local officials. A more effective solution would be to invalidate the ordinance outright, compelling the city to create a more precise regulation if a genuine need for special permits exists. This would ensure that any future legislative actions are appropriately tailored and based on reasoned policy decisions. The ordinance in question may need significant revision, potentially distinguishing group homes from hospitals and possibly excluding a specific subset of individuals with mental retardation from such homes. The current ordinance's broadness requires judicial intervention to address complex issues affecting individuals with mental disabilities, which is unsuitable; a legislative approach would provide clearer standards and certainty for affected parties. The existing ordinance is overly broad, as it lacks a clear definition of which individuals might require permits in the designated zone, making the legal challenge based on an "as-applied" approach inappropriate. Historically, the Court has invalidated overly broad statutes on their face rather than through piecemeal judicial rulings. Previous rulings, such as in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, demonstrate the Court's preference for invalidating broad policies entirely instead of allowing case-by-case exceptions, indicating a need for legislative reform to ensure compliance with constitutional standards. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), invalidated a law requiring unwed mothers to obtain parental consent for adoption while exempting unwed fathers, a distinction justified by the difficulty of locating unwed fathers. The court suggested legislative adjustments to improve proof of abandonment or paternity but mandated a new, more precise statute addressing the locating of unwed fathers. The ruling emphasized that when a presumption is unconstitutionally overbroad, it should be struck down rather than left intact for specific cases. The opinion critiques the Court's unprecedented remedial approach in equal protection cases, noting that it was not advocated by the parties involved and lacked robust reasoning. The dissent argues that the Court's focus on labeling obscured the identification of crucial interests at stake, particularly regarding classifications based on mental retardation, and calls for a more rigorous examination of such classifications. It underscores the inadequacy of the Court's narrow remedy in addressing the underlying overbroad presumption and advocates for a complete invalidation of the contested provision. The document also notes the rebranding of Cleburne Living Center, Inc. to Community Living Concepts, Inc., with Hannah as its vice president and part owner, and references Advocacy, Inc., a nonprofit providing legal services to developmentally disabled individuals. The home was intended to function as a private Level I Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded (ICF-MR), eligible for joint federal-state reimbursement under 42 U.S.C. 1396d(a)(15) and Texas Human Resources Code. ICF-MRs are subject to comprehensive regulations from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and Texas state agencies. The site is located in an R-3 zoned area, which permits various uses including apartment houses and nursing homes, but specifically excludes facilities for the insane or mentally challenged without a special use permit. The city's zoning ordinance requires a special use permit for such facilities, which can only be issued after a public hearing and recommendation from the Planning Commission, along with signatures from nearby property owners. The Planning and Zoning Commission previously denied the permit for the CLC home. The District Court dismissed CLC's claims, including due process violations regarding zoning powers. The court acknowledged that group homes are vital for community integration of mentally retarded individuals. The city cited a new state regulation limiting group homes to six residents as justification for denying the permit for CLC's proposed 13 residents; however, the Court of Appeals noted the city failed to adequately justify this distinction. It clarified that the new regulation applied only to applications made after May 1, 1982, and thus did not pertain to the CLC home, which conceded it could not meet the new certification requirements. The regulation in question lacks a grandfather clause, and the District Court did not address this specifically. The State of Texas, through an amici brief, contends that the six-bed rule would not hinder the establishment of the Featherston Street group home. If the rule were enforced, CLC might lose interest in seeking injunctive relief, as CLC's officer David Southern indicated that a minimum of ten or eleven residents is necessary for financial viability. However, CLC's request for damages ensures the case remains relevant. A new Texas statute, effective September 1, 1985, allows "family homes" as permitted uses in all residential zones, defining them as residences for up to six disabled persons, including two supervisors. This statute does not impact the city's ability to regulate group homes with more than six residents. Previous cases, such as Macon Assn. for Retarded Citizens, which dealt with ordinances limiting occupancy to four unrelated persons, have been deemed non-discriminatory towards the mentally retarded. The mentally retarded population is categorized into four groups based on IQ, with the majority classified as "mildly" retarded. Mental retardation is characterized not solely by IQ but also by deficits in adaptive behavior, as defined by the American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD). These deficits stem from various genetic, environmental, and unknown factors. A sentiment of empathy is expressed for individuals with disabilities, yet there is no indication that elected officials are less likely to share this sentiment. Classifications based on physical disabilities and intelligence are often deemed legitimate, even by those who argue that immutability matters, as these traits can serve legitimate state interests. The immutability theory is called into question when such characteristics are relevant to legitimate purposes. The excerpt notes that CLC initially sought relief under the Act but withdrew its state claim at the District Court's suggestion to avoid abstention, as Texas courts had not previously interpreted the Act. Several states have enacted laws to prevent zoning discrimination against individuals with intellectual disabilities, referencing various state codes. The Act includes the mentally retarded in its definition of handicapped individuals and mandates that educational programs be individualized to meet the needs of these children. The Developmental Disabilities Assistance Act stipulates that public funds may be withheld from programs that do not limit physical restraint usage. The excerpt alludes to the absence of information regarding the validity of requiring special use permits for certain ordinance uses. It discusses three levels of judicial scrutiny—rational basis, heightened review, and strict scrutiny—while highlighting the inconsistencies in applying these standards as noted in previous court cases. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Craig v. Boren raises concerns about introducing additional standards of review, questioning how courts can determine the importance of legislative objectives and the nature of their relationship to those objectives. Marshall, J. dissents, joined by Douglas, J., critiquing the Court's inflexible equal protection analysis. He advocates for establishing a correlation between legislative classifications and the statute's actual or presumed legitimate purpose. If a law's adverse impact on a marginalized group appears intentional, the legislature's impartiality is questionable. Conversely, if such impact is seen as a necessary cost for achieving a broader goal, an impartial lawmaker might rationally accept that cost. Marshall emphasizes the need for vigilance when assessing classifications affecting historically disadvantaged groups, as entrenched biases can lead to unexamined discriminatory practices. He cites several precedents to illustrate the risks of habitual classification based on stereotypes rather than rational justification. Marshall acknowledges that differences between genders in the adoption process post-birth may warrant some differential treatment, reflecting the complexity of equal protection analysis. Additionally, he notes procedural requirements for obtaining special use permits, which include securing signatures from nearby property owners, highlighting the practical implications of legislative measures. Constitutional adjudication fundamentally adheres to the principle of refraining from addressing constitutional questions unless absolutely necessary. This tenet is reinforced by precedents such as *Burton v. United States* and *Ashwander v. TVA*, which emphasize that courts typically avoid constitutional determinations when possible. The current Court's references to these principles are seen with irony, especially considering its extensive commentary on heightened scrutiny, which suggests a need for more rigorous examination than the traditional rational-basis test to assess the validity of specific ordinances. The excerpt also critiques the rational-basis standard as applied in recent equal protection cases, noting that decisions like *Zobel v. Williams* and *United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno* function more as intermediate scrutiny than true rational-basis evaluations. Furthermore, it highlights the context of group homes, emphasizing their strategic location to provide residents access to community resources. The passage reflects on historical attitudes towards individuals labeled as feebleminded, discussing how societal perceptions have evolved from considering them a significant social threat to recognizing their rights and needs. The State Charities Aid Association sponsored a book highlighting historical segregationist laws aimed at excluding individuals deemed "feeble-minded" from society. Specific legislative acts, such as the 1915 Texas law, were designed to alleviate perceived economic and moral burdens caused by these individuals. Notable cases, including Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, illustrate ongoing discrimination against the mentally disabled, underpinning the legal context for contemporary challenges. Several historical laws remain in effect, perpetuating discriminatory practices from earlier statutes. A detailed examination reveals that Cleburne's zoning ordinance, which excludes the "feeble-minded," reflects a lineage of segregationist policies dating back to the 1940s and 1920s, suggesting that these laws continue to violate the Equal Protection Clause due to their discriminatory origins. The term "feebleminded" was prevalent during an era of significant discrimination, and the document notes that laws with discriminatory intent remain problematic, even if they could be lawful if enacted without such motives. Additionally, established precedents indicate that gender classifications face heightened scrutiny under the law, further emphasizing the need for careful examination of discriminatory practices. The Court's approach to heightened scrutiny relies predominantly on the precedent set by Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, which clarified that age-based distinctions do not trigger strict scrutiny but does not address whether heightened scrutiny is warranted. Subsequent cases have not resolved this issue. Alienage classifications receive strict scrutiny in economic and social contexts, but only heightened scrutiny in political functions, necessitating a contextual understanding of how these classifications are justified. The document notes that it does not endorse extending strict scrutiny to alienage classifications. Other constitutional provisions, like the Contracts Clause and the Due Process Clause, may limit government actions that alter established expectations. A classification may meet the minimal rational-basis standard unless it is deemed arbitrary and devoid of substantive policy. The text emphasizes that no singular criterion defines groups deserving heightened scrutiny; rather, historical experience should inform this understanding. Factors such as "political powerlessness" and the immutability of traits can be pertinent, yet they are not definitive, as illustrated by cases involving minors and other immutable characteristics that do not consistently invoke heightened scrutiny. Ultimately, the political powerlessness and immutability of a group may indicate its social and cultural isolation, affecting majority concerns for its interests. Statutes that discriminate against the youth are rare and generally not a cause for concern, as legislators and voters typically have personal connections to children and minors. This social integration results in minors receiving legislative consideration, despite their lack of electoral participation, unlike more insular minority groups that require closer judicial scrutiny. Historical context reveals that prejudice can perpetuate stereotypes and limitations, necessitating awareness of past unequal treatment. The court references the need to evaluate legislation not only politically but also socially and culturally. It highlights that if an ordinance is found to be based on irrational prejudice, it may be deemed unconstitutional. This is exemplified by cases like Hunter v. Underwood, where a law that disenfranchised felons was invalidated due to its racially discriminatory motivation. The ruling indicates that if a legislative act is tainted by discriminatory intent, it violates the Equal Protection Clause and cannot be applied to anyone, regardless of the original intent behind its enactment.