Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; May 21, 1980; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
The appeal involves Alton Tassin and Ray Normand challenging a judgment that upheld an Exception of Res Judicata against their claims regarding property ownership. In a prior case, Tassin v. Rhynes, the court addressed ownership of disputed land described as accretion in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana. The court determined the land was accretion as per LSA-C.C. Article 509 and apportioned it among the parties: Tassin was awarded 15.76 acres, Normand 33.02 acres, Johnson 1.41 acres, and Sayes 26.22 acres. It was concluded that Sayes possessed nearly all of the disputed land except 7 acres, which were recognized as owned by Tassin, who could not establish superior title over Sayes for the remaining land. Normand's claims were dismissed for lack of proof of title. After the Supreme Court denied writs, making the judgment final on December 1, 1978, Tassin and Normand initiated a new suit on April 16, 1979, seeking recognition of ownership and partition of a 75-acre tract, which included land previously acknowledged as in Sayes' possession. Sayes responded with Exceptions of Res Judicata and No Cause and No Right of Action, which the trial court accepted, leading to the current appeal.
Defendant Sayes claims that plaintiffs are barred from relitigating their demands due to res judicata under LSA-R.S. C.C. Article 2286. According to Louisiana law, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, res judicata is narrower than in common law. For a res judicata plea to succeed, there must be (1) identity of the parties, (2) identity of 'cause,' and (3) identity of the thing demanded. In this case, there is an identity of parties and the demand, as both suits involve the same plaintiffs seeking land ownership. The critical issue is whether there is an identity of 'cause,' defined as the juridical facts underlying the demand.
The jurisprudence recognizes exceptions to res judicata, highlighted in Hope v. Madison, where a plaintiff could bring forth an issue in a subsequent suit that was not previously pleaded. It was noted that in Louisiana, the general common law principle that res judicata precludes not only what was pleaded but also what could have been pleaded does not typically apply. However, litigants must present all available titles or defenses in a petitory action, as failure to do so may bar future claims related to rights existing at the time of the first suit. The principle established in Gajan v. Patout, Burquieres reinforces that a judgment is not conclusive against non-parties or rights not held by litigants during the initial litigation. Thus, parties are obligated to reveal all relevant claims or defenses, as reserving them for later litigation is not permitted.
Article 302 of the Civil Code does not apply to cases involving a third party claiming property for which they have previously lost a suit, unless the new claim is based on a different title. In Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So.2d 287 (La.1976), the court acknowledged exceptions to this rule, similar to those in Hope v. Madison, indicating that French legal doctrine may lead to different conclusions in Louisiana law regarding competing interests. The jurisprudence clarifies that in petitory actions, res judicata not only bars relitigation of matters explicitly decided but also those that could have been raised. The rationale is to protect immovable property titles from redundant litigation, requiring parties to present all relevant claims in their initial suits.
In the case of Plaintiff Tassin, he argues that the previous case did not determine ownership of the disputed land. However, while the court agreed that Sayes' ownership was not adjudicated, it held that Tassin's ownership was limited to a specified 7 acres. Thus, Tassin is barred by res judicata from relitigating the same title he previously claimed.
Plaintiff Normand contends that res judicata does not apply to him because he acquired a new title from the Mayeux heirs, which was not addressed in the prior suit. He cites jurisprudence stating that if land with attached alluvion or batture is sold, it does not transfer unless explicitly stated in the sale. The court found that the batture was capable of private ownership when sold, but since the Mayeuxs only sold a defined 86.5 acres and did not include the batture, Normand is not entitled to it.
Heirs of Charles J. Mayeux may still hold a claim to a portion of the 'batture,' but this matter is not part of the current lawsuit. Normand contends that the earlier decision reserves any claims of the Mayeux heirs to the accretion and that he acquired their rights through two correction deeds. The first, an 'Act of Ratification, Acknowledgment and Quitclaim,' executed on July 15, 1976, corrected a procedural deficiency in the original 1966 deed transferring 86.50 acres to Normand but did not alter the land description; thus, it does not establish new title. The second document, an 'Act of Correction,' was recorded on October 30, 1978, following the prior court's judgment. This act acknowledges an error in the original description, asserting that all accretions and alluvion were intended to be included. The question arises whether this 1978 Act of Correction establishes a new title for Normand that is not barred by res judicata. The issue is complex and unprecedented in Louisiana law, as res judicata in petitory actions prevents relitigation of not only previously decided causes but also those that could have been raised in earlier proceedings.
A party claiming ownership must plead all titles or defenses available to them and cannot reserve any rights for future litigation, as established in Gajan v. Patout. Normand failed to plead all relevant titles in a prior lawsuit, specifically regarding a 1966 sale from the Mayeux heirs, which did not include any accretion rights from 1940-44. He had the opportunity to seek a reformation of the 1966 deed to include these rights any time until the end of the prior litigation in 1978. The October 1978 Act of Correction, which merely aimed to rectify the 1966 deed's description without introducing a new title, indicates Normand had knowledge of these rights during the earlier case. Normand's claim of not having adjudicated ownership in the previous suit is unfounded, as his ownership was indeed addressed and determined against him. Additionally, the court did not require Normand or Tassin to file an adverse claim of ownership within a specific timeframe because the opposing party, Sayes, did not request such relief, in accordance with LSA-C.C.P. Article 3662. The judgment is affirmed, imposing costs on the plaintiffs.
