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Burton v. State
Citations: 651 So. 2d 641; 1993 WL 537459Docket: CR-91-1185
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; December 29, 1993; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Charles Lee Burton was convicted of capital murder committed during a first-degree robbery, as per Alabama Code 13A-5-40(a)(2). The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty, which the trial court imposed. On August 16, 1991, Burton and five co-defendants robbed the Auto Zone store in Talladega, Alabama. During the robbery, customer Doug Battle was shot and killed by co-defendant Derrick DeBruce. Store manager Larry McCardle testified that Burton entered the store, made a purchase, and later brandished a gun, directing McCardle to the safe. Witness LuJuan McCants stated that Burton organized the robbery, instructed the others on their roles, and confirmed that all except one co-defendant were armed. During the robbery, Battle was shot by DeBruce after failing to comply quickly enough with demands. After the robbery, the group regrouped, retrieved a second car, and divided the stolen money. Forensic evidence linked Burton to the crime scene through 17 fingerprints found on various store items, reaffirming his involvement. Barbara Spencer provided testimony indicating that prior to a robbery, six men, including the appellant and Derrick DeBruce, discussed their plans at her home. After leaving in separate vehicles, they returned visibly upset, possessing a large sum of money, and the appellant guided the others on how to distribute it. Spencer received $100, which she later gave to McCants. On appeal, the appellant raised several issues, most of which were not presented to the trial court. However, due to the case involving the death penalty, the appellate court is required to review the record for any plain errors that may have adversely impacted the appellant's substantial rights under Rule 45A, A.R.App.P. This rule allows the court to address errors regardless of whether they were raised during the trial, but it emphasizes caution, applying only in cases where ignoring the error could lead to a miscarriage of justice. The appellant contended that the trial court wrongly denied his motion for a change of venue, arguing that extensive pretrial publicity compromised his ability to receive a fair trial in Talladega County. To justify a change of venue due to pretrial publicity, the appellant must demonstrate that the publicity was so pervasive that it affected the community's ability to provide an impartial jury, as established in Oryang v. State and other precedents. The court noted that mere widespread publicity is insufficient; it must include sensational or accusatory content that biases the public. During jury selection, potential jurors were questioned in groups, revealing that while many were aware of the case details, most claimed they could be impartial. Only one juror expressed bias, and that individual was excused. The court concluded the appellant did not prove the jury pool was so tainted as to prevent a fair trial. The Supreme Court's decisions in Irvin v. Dowd and Murphy v. Florida affirm that jurors do not need to be completely unaware of case facts to maintain impartiality, as long as they can base their verdict solely on trial evidence. The trial judge has broad discretion in deciding motions for a change of venue, as they can best evaluate local prejudicial sentiment and media coverage impacting the defendant's right to a fair trial. The court did not err in denying the appellant's motion for a change of venue. The appellant also claimed that holding a pre-trial motion hearing in his absence violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. However, since the appellant did not object to his absence, the court examined whether plain error occurred. The hearing was brief and focused on evidentiary matters, with no testimony taken and limited to discussions about obtaining evidence. The appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice from his absence, and previous case law indicates that absence in non-critical stages of trial can be deemed harmless. Although the court is cautious about declaring harmless error in capital cases, it found no prejudice in this instance. The appellant further alleged that the trial court erred by not striking two jurors for cause due to their familiarity with witnesses. However, the appellant did not provide sufficient grounds that indicated probable prejudice or an inability of the jurors to remain impartial. During voir dire, jurors V.S. and C.B. disclosed prior interactions with individuals connected to the robbery case but asserted they had not formed opinions on the case and could remain impartial. To challenge a juror for cause, there must be a statutory basis or evident bias, as established in Nettles v. State, and the trial court has discretion based on the juror's demeanor and responses. The trial court determined that neither juror displayed "absolute bias," thus refusing to excuse them. The appellant, a Black defendant, claimed the trial court erred in denying his Batson v. Kentucky motion, which prohibits racial discrimination in jury selection. The Batson ruling, extended to white defendants and civil litigants, requires the party raising the objection to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. In this case, the prosecutor removed six out of twelve Black jurors, leading to a Batson motion by defense counsel. The trial court, without explicitly ruling on the prima facie case, asked the state to justify its strikes against Black jurors. Once the prosecution provides race-neutral explanations for peremptory challenges in response to a Batson motion, the issue of whether the appellant established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination becomes moot, as established in *Hernandez v. New York*. If the trial court does not explicitly find a prima facie case of discrimination but the prosecution offers explanations, an implied finding is acknowledged, allowing the court to evaluate the prosecutor's reasons directly, as seen in *Williams v. State* and *Currin v. State*. Consequently, the court will not consider whether the defense established a prima facie case and will focus on the prosecutor's explanations for striking black jurors. The prosecutor cited the following reasons for striking specific jurors: 1. **Juror 23**: Opposed to the death penalty and had a family member charged with writing bad checks. 2. **Juror 38**: Had prior misdemeanor convictions and family ties to a prosecuted individual. 3. **Juror 75**: Had prior jury experience and familial connections to a convicted individual, with additional concerns raised by the prosecutor regarding her ties to convicted family members. 4. **Juror 71**: Expressed negative feelings toward law enforcement due to past incidents, including a lawsuit involving a deputy. 5. **Juror 88**: Struck based on prior arrests known to the prosecutor. The appellant did not contest the strike against juror 59, which the court deemed a race-neutral reason, aligning with precedents in *Leonard v. State* and *Powell v. State*. The court found the strike of juror 23 valid due to her opposition to the death penalty, which is considered a legitimate race-neutral reason. Thus, the court concluded that the strike did not violate the principles established in *Batson*. The appellant contests the striking of certain jurors based on law enforcement information indicating prior convictions or familial connections to illegal activities. While historical cases highlight issues with relying solely on law enforcement hearsay for juror strikes, the court finds no Batson violation in this instance. It cites relevant precedents, including *Walker v. State* and *Williams v. State*, emphasizing that prosecutors must not rely on hearsay without further inquiry. This case differs because the prosecutor had verified information regarding the specific veniremembers' arrests or convictions, thus not falling under the same scrutiny as prior cases. The court supports the notion that striking jurors based on prior convictions or familial criminal history is racially neutral. Additionally, the prosecution provided valid, race-neutral justifications for striking jurors 38 and 75, as they disclosed having relatives with prior convictions. Overall, the court concludes that the prosecutor's actions did not violate established legal precedents regarding juror strikes. Reversal of a trial court's decision on a Batson motion occurs only if the ruling is clearly erroneous, which was not the case here. The appellant contends that the search warrant for Derrick DeBruce's car was vague and overbroad, arguing that the gun found during the search should be suppressed. However, for a motion to suppress based on a Fourth Amendment violation, the appellant must demonstrate standing, requiring a possessory interest in the searched premises. The appellant failed to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in DeBruce's vehicle; thus, he lacks standing to contest the search. The court previously upheld the search warrant's validity. The appellant also challenges the identification made by Larry McCardle, claiming it was tainted since McCardle allegedly identified him after seeing his photograph in the newspaper. However, McCardle testified that he identified the appellant prior to seeing any photo, and there was no evidence of taint in the identification process. Moreover, the appellant argues that the prosecution's use of leading questions during LuJuan McCants's testimony constituted reversible error, but no objection was raised at the time, leading to a review under the plain error standard. The prosecutor's questions were deemed attempts to clarify prior testimony and did not infringe on the appellant's substantial rights. The appellant also cited unobjected statements made during closing arguments as grounds for error, but the lack of objections weakened any claims of prejudice. The court assessed the implications of the defense's failure to object to certain prosecutorial comments, suggesting this indicates that the defense did not view the remarks as significantly harmful. The appellant contended that a specific comment by the prosecutor reflected a personal opinion on the appellant's guilt, referencing witness statements and observations made during the trial. The court cited *Darden v. Wainwright*, asserting that the critical issue is whether the comments tainted the trial enough to constitute a denial of due process. It emphasized the need to evaluate such comments within the broader context of the trial, noting that all evidence is subject to legitimate commentary by counsel. The prosecutor's comments were deemed appropriate as they were based on evidence presented during cross-examination and reflected reasonable inferences permissible in legal arguments. Additionally, the appellant's claim that the prosecutor stated facts not in evidence was addressed; the court highlighted that prior to the disputed statement, the prosecutor clarified that the state did not assert the defendant was the trigger-puller, thereby framing the argument within the context of complicity. Overall, the court found no plain error in the prosecutor's statements or arguments. A prosecutor is permitted to present his interpretation of the law during closing arguments, as established in case law. Specifically, a trial judge can allow comments on conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and the roles of principals and accessories without committing plain error. The prosecutor's assertion during closing that there was substantial evidence supporting the occurrence of a first-degree robbery and intentional killing was deemed a legitimate inference from the evidence presented. Furthermore, the characterization of LuJuan McCants, a 16-year-old involved in the case, as an impressionable child was also supported by the evidence. The trial court had properly instructed the jury that counsel's statements are not evidence. The appellant's claim of instructional error regarding the burden of proof was dismissed, as no objections were raised by defense counsel after the trial court's instructions, leading to the application of the plain error rule. When reviewing jury instructions, they must be considered as a whole, and misinterpretations should not be based on strained readings. The requirement for a "particularized intent to kill" was emphasized in the context of capital murder, aligning with Alabama law. The trial court correctly instructed the jury that to convict for capital murder during a robbery, they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed both the robbery and the intentional killing. To establish a capital offense, the Defendant must have intentionally caused the death of the deceased, as mere involvement during a robbery does not imply intent. Specific intent to kill is required for capital charges. The jury received detailed instructions on intent, particularly regarding complicity, which applies only to the intentional killing aspect of capital murder. If the jury finds that someone other than the Defendant committed the murder, the Defendant may still be guilty if it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that they intentionally induced or aided the perpetrator. The Defendant claimed reversible error due to the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on accomplice corroboration law, which requires that testimony from accomplices must be supported by additional evidence. Although the Defendant argued that Barbara Spencer and LuJuan McCants were accomplices, the court determined that Spencer was not an accomplice as she had no involvement in the conspiracy or crime, despite receiving money afterward. McCants, however, was acknowledged as an accomplice. The court noted that while the jury should have been instructed on the corroboration requirement for McCants's testimony, the failure to do so did not automatically warrant a reversal. Automatic reversals occur only when an error renders the trial fundamentally unfair. Alabama courts apply a harmless error analysis in death penalty cases, meaning if an accomplice's testimony is corroborated, the lack of instruction may not be fatal to the case. Corroborative evidence does not need to confirm every detail but should support the credibility of the accomplice's claims. The appellant argues that the "for hire" aspect of the capital offense lacks independent corroboration, asserting that the State has not met the prima facie standard for capital murder. However, Alabama law does not require corroboration of every material part of an accomplice's testimony. Historical precedent from 1867 established that corroboration must only connect the defendant to the crime, not confirm every detail provided by the accomplice. This principle is supported by more recent cases, which clarify that corroborative evidence strengthens the overall probative force of testimony rather than confirming specific facts. The appellant also contends that the trial court’s instruction on reasonable doubt was flawed due to a lack of definition for "to a moral certainty." The court explained that reasonable doubt does not require proving the crime beyond all conceivable doubt, but rather that it is based on actual doubts arising from evidence or its absence. The instruction provided was deemed similar to a previously validated one and did not violate established legal standards. Additionally, the appellant claims the trial court erred by instructing the jury on their duty to find him guilty if convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of his involvement in the capital murder. This instruction was part of a larger context, and no objections were raised during the trial, leading to a review under the plain error rule. Ultimately, the instruction was found not to be erroneous. A jury is obligated to convict an accused person if it determines guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, adhering strictly to the law as instructed by the trial judge without the power to alter it. The role of the jury is to apply the law to the facts presented during the trial, leading to their verdict. Jurors are encouraged to recognize their significant duties, which includes reconciling testimony and discerning truth based on common sense and everyday understanding. The court's instruction allows jurors to disregard a witness's entire testimony if they find that the witness has willfully or corruptly testified falsely about a material matter, along with considering any biases or interests that may affect credibility. The appellant contended that this instruction unfairly suggested that disbelieving any part of a witness's testimony necessitated doubting all of it, but the court found the instruction permissive rather than mandatory, which aligns with precedent. The appellant's challenge extends to the penalty phase, claiming potential interference with attorney-client privilege due to the trial court calling two co-defendants as witnesses, despite the defense attorney indicating their testimony would not aid the appellant’s case. The appellant expressed a desire to call two codefendants as witnesses during the penalty phase of his trial, which the court facilitated after a thorough discussion. According to Rule 1.2 of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney must adhere to a client's decisions regarding representation objectives, while the attorney can only provide guidance. There was no interference with the attorney-client relationship as the court respected the appellant's wishes. The appellant contended that allowing the codefendants to testify introduced irrelevant collateral evidence. However, their testimonies regarding their presence at the bank on the day of the robbery-murder were deemed admissible, as any probative and relevant evidence is acceptable in sentencing hearings per Alabama Code § 13A-5-45(d). The appellant further alleged prosecutorial error during closing arguments in the penalty phase, specifically claiming the prosecutor referenced facts not in evidence by labeling him the leader of the crime. This characterization was supported by testimony from a witness, which the court found permissible. Additionally, the appellant argued that references to his criminal history introduced nonstatutory aggravating factors improperly. The prosecutor's remarks clarified that the jury should consider the appellant’s significant prior criminal activity, countering any potential mitigating circumstance regarding his lack of such a history. This argument emphasized the appellant's longstanding criminal record, thereby asserting the presence of aggravating factors relevant to the jury's decision-making process. The defendant's capacity to understand the criminality of his actions or to comply with legal requirements was significantly impaired, allegedly due to a mental defect, though no evidence supports this claim. The defendant was well-acquainted with the criminal justice system, having prior experiences with courts and law enforcement. The prosecutor's argument, which systematically addressed statutory mitigating circumstances and asserted none applied, was deemed appropriate, referencing the case McWilliams v. State, where similar prosecutorial conduct was not considered erroneous. The appellant contested the prosecutor's statement urging the jury not to let sympathy influence their decision regarding life imprisonment versus the death penalty, but this was upheld as proper conduct based on precedents including DeBruce and Stewart. Furthermore, the trial court's instruction that the jury's decision in the penalty phase was merely a recommendation was not viewed as diminishing the jury's role, aligning with the ruling in White v. State. The appellant, convicted of capital murder during a first-degree robbery, argued that using robbery as both an element of the capital offense and as an aggravating circumstance during sentencing violated his constitutional rights. However, this "double counting" practice has been previously validated by case law, including Haney v. State, and is supported by Section 13A-5-50 of the Code of Alabama, which allows for consideration of elements of capital murder as aggravating circumstances without constituting double jeopardy. A capital punishment scheme allows the same felony to serve as both an essential element of the crime and an aggravating circumstance without violating double jeopardy protections. The appellant was charged with capital murder due to the crime occurring during the commission of a first-degree robbery. The trial court found no mitigating circumstances and determined that aggravating circumstances, specifically the murder committed in the course of a robbery, outweighed any potential mitigating factors. Consequently, the court supported the death sentence based on a thorough evaluation of these circumstances. Upon independent review, this court confirmed that the death sentence was appropriate and not disproportionate to similar cases. The appellant contended that, as a non-triggerman lacking intent to kill, he should not receive the death penalty. However, the legal precedents established in Enmund v. Florida and Tison v. Arizona clarify that the death penalty may be constitutional for those significantly involved in a felony resulting in murder, even if they did not directly commit the act of killing. Applying this reasoning, the court found that the appellant's substantial involvement in the robbery-murder warranted the death penalty, affirming that his sentence was neither excessive nor disproportionate to the crime. The Alabama Supreme Court, in Beck v. State, examined 50 cases and found that 33 were related to robbery-intentional killings, affirming the application of the death penalty in such contexts. Specific cases cited include McMillian v. State, Williams v. State, and Hallford v. State, all of which upheld death sentences for robbery-murders. Under Rule 45A, A.R.App. P., the court reviewed the record and found no errors that adversely affected the appellant's rights, concluding that the appellant received a fair trial. Consequently, the conviction and death sentence were affirmed, with all judges concurring. Additionally, the court noted that the trial court has discretion regarding the allowance of individual voir dire for jurors in death penalty cases, as referenced in Bell v. State. Questions of potential jury discrimination were raised, with approximately 33% of prospective jurors being black and the final jury comprising 50% black members, while the alternates were white.