Hunter v. Underwood

Citations: 85 L. Ed. 2d 222; 105 S. Ct. 1916; 471 U.S. 222; 1985 U.S. LEXIS 2740; 53 U.S.L.W. 4468Docket: 84-76

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; April 16, 1985; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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Article VIII, Section 182 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 allows for the disenfranchisement of individuals convicted of certain felonies and misdemeanors, specifically including crimes of moral turpitude. Appellees Carmen Edwards (black) and Victor Underwood (white) were disenfranchised by County Registrars after being convicted of presenting a worthless check, which the Registrars classified as a crime involving moral turpitude. They filed a lawsuit in Federal District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the inclusion of misdemeanors in Section 182 was racially motivated to disenfranchise black voters.

The District Court acknowledged that disenfranchising blacks was a significant purpose of the Alabama Constitutional Convention in 1901 but concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Section 182 itself was adopted with a racist intent. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed this decision, finding that discriminatory intent was indeed a motivating factor for Section 182's adoption, and thus it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court highlighted that the racially discriminatory motivation for enacting Section 182 overshadowed any other permissible intent.

The Supreme Court held that Section 182 is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, affirming the Court of Appeals' ruling. It clarified that even if the section was also applied discriminatorily against poor whites, the primary motivation remained the disenfranchisement of black individuals. The Court further stated that the events following the adoption of Section 182 could not legitimize it and emphasized that the Tenth Amendment does not exempt legislation from the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ruling was delivered by Justice Rehnquist, and the case was affirmed based on these findings.

The trial involved claims that the misdemeanors listed in Section 182 of the Alabama Constitution were intentionally enacted to disenfranchise Black voters. The District Court recognized Edwards as a representative of a subclass of Black plaintiffs and found that disenfranchisement was a significant motive behind the 1901 constitutional convention. However, the court did not establish that the disenfranchisement provisions were racially motivated, citing the permissible goal of regulating voting rights for convicted criminals, as per the precedent set in Palmer v. Thompson.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed this decision, applying the legal standards from Arlington Heights and Mt. Healthy, which require plaintiffs to demonstrate that racial discrimination was a substantial factor in the creation of the law. The appellate court found the District Court's lack of recognition of discriminatory intent as erroneous, concluding that racial discrimination was indeed a motivating factor behind the enactment of Section 182. The court determined that there was no legitimate competing intent for the provision and held that Section 182, as applied to misdemeanants, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. It ordered the District Court to mandate the registration of eligible Black voters who requested it.

Section 182, adopted in 1901, expanded the list of offenses barring voting rights from the previous Alabama Constitution of 1875, which had primarily included felonies. The 1901 drafters included a broader range of crimes, including various misdemeanors and a catchall phrase for "any crime involving moral turpitude," interpreted by the Alabama Supreme Court as any immoral act, regardless of legality.

Moral turpitude is determined by the act itself rather than its prohibition by statute, as established in Pippin v. State. Various misdemeanors are included in the crimes enumerated under Alabama law. If a crime is not explicitly listed, the Alabama Boards of Registrars refer to case law or Attorney General opinions to assess its inclusion under section 182. Minor offenses like presenting a worthless check fall under this section, while serious nonfelony offenses such as second-degree manslaughter do not, as they are not enumerated or deemed to involve moral turpitude. Evidence suggests that section 182 disproportionately affects black individuals, with estimates indicating that by January 1903, it had disfranchised ten times more blacks than whites. This disparity continues, particularly in counties like Jefferson and Montgomery, where black individuals are significantly more likely to face disfranchisement for nonprison offenses. Although the law is racially neutral on its face, claims of discriminatory impact have been acknowledged by the Court of Appeals, which applied the Arlington Heights framework to assess potential violations of the Equal Protection Clause. To prove such a violation, evidence of discriminatory intent must be established, shifting the burden to defenders of the law if such intent is shown. The text highlights the complexities in determining legislative motivations, particularly within a large body like the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901, and cautions against hasty conclusions about legislative purpose based solely on the statements of a few members.

Motivations for legislative action can vary among legislators, and conjecture should be avoided due to the high stakes involved. In this case, the difficulties noted in O'Brien are not present. Although no eyewitnesses from the 1901 Alabama Constitutional Convention testified, historians provided unchallenged testimony indicating that the convention aimed to disenfranchise black voters as part of a broader post-Reconstruction movement in the South. John B. Knox, the convention president, explicitly stated the intention to establish white supremacy within constitutional limits. 

Both the District Court and appellants did not contest the evidence of racial intent at the convention. However, the District Court initially found that the crimes provision in Section 182 was not motivated by racial animus, a conclusion overturned by the Court of Appeals, which applied the clearly-erroneous standard of review yet concluded there was a definite impression of error regarding legislative intent. The evidence considered included convention proceedings, historical studies, and expert historian testimonies. The Court of Appeals established that Section 182 was enacted with the intent to disenfranchise black voters.

Appellants' counsel conceded that race was a significant factor in the enactment of Section 182, despite arguing that the provision also aimed to disenfranchise poor whites to counteract the threat of Populism. The aim of the 1901 Constitutional Convention was portrayed as limiting the franchise to those deemed "intelligent and virtuous," effectively targeting both black voters and lower-class whites. Knox acknowledged that the suffrage provisions would disproportionately affect blacks, but he contended that this did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment. Throughout the debates, convention delegates explicitly expressed their focus on disenfranchising black voters while claiming no intent to disenfranchise whites.

The document critiques the motivations behind a constitutional provision, referred to as "182," asserting that it was crafted to appeal to a white electorate while attempting to downplay its discriminatory intent against Black voters. Delegates claimed they did not aim to disenfranchise whites, although the author argues this is misleading. The provision was primarily intended to disenfranchise most Black individuals, despite the claim that it also targeted poor whites. The argument that a permissible motive exists—disenfranchising poor whites—does not negate the clear racial discrimination against Blacks, which was a fundamental motivation for enacting 182. Case law, including *Palmer v. Thompson* and *Michael M. v. Superior Court*, is cited to support this assertion, emphasizing that the presence of both permissible and impermissible motives must be analyzed under frameworks established in *Arlington Heights* and *Mt. Healthy*. The suffrage committee's choice of crimes for disenfranchisement reflects a discriminatory intent, with many of the offenses disproportionately affecting Black individuals. Although the appellants argue that subsequent legal changes have legitimized the provision, the document concludes that the original intent of 182 was to discriminate based on race, violating equal protection principles.

Appellants argue that the State has the authority under the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments to restrict voting rights for individuals convicted of misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. However, the enactment of Section 182 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment cannot validate legislation that contravenes a later-enacted amendment. The critical issue is whether Section 182 is exempt from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment due to its "other crime" provision. While the provision allows for voting disenfranchisement in cases of rebellion or other crimes, it does not permit racial discrimination in the implementation of Section 182, which conflicts with the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. No contrary interpretation is found in the ruling of Richardson v. Ramirez. The Court of Appeals' judgment is affirmed, with Justice Powell not participating in the decision. Section 182 outlines various disqualifications for voting, including crimes such as treason, murder, and those involving moral turpitude, along with specific offenses related to electoral integrity.