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Tennessee v. Garner
Citations: 85 L. Ed. 2d 1; 105 S. Ct. 1694; 471 U.S. 1; 1985 U.S. LEXIS 195; 53 U.S.L.W. 4410Docket: 83-1035
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; March 27, 1985; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
A Tennessee statute permits police officers to use necessary means, including deadly force, to arrest fleeing suspects. In this case, a Memphis officer shot and killed Cleamtee Garner's son after he fled from a suspected burglary. The officer believed the suspect was unarmed and of slight build. Garner's father sued in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of his son's constitutional rights. The District Court upheld the statute and the officer's actions, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The Supreme Court held that the statute is unconstitutional when it allows deadly force against apparently unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspects. Deadly force can only be used to prevent escape if the officer has probable cause that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious injury. The Court emphasized that apprehension through deadly force is a seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement, which balances the suspect's rights against governmental interests in law enforcement. The Court rejected the common-law rule that permitted any force necessary to apprehend a felon, noting that the legal and technological context has changed significantly. While burglary is serious, the specifics of this case—an unarmed, young, slight individual—did not justify the use of deadly force. The ruling affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision and highlighted the unconstitutionality of the Tennessee statute in such contexts. At approximately 10:45 p.m. on October 3, 1974, Memphis Police Officers Elton Hymon and Leslie Wright responded to a report of a potential burglary. Upon arrival, they encountered a woman who reported hearing glass breaking next door. While Wright communicated with dispatch, Hymon investigated the rear of the property and observed a figure, later identified as Edward Garner, fleeing from the scene. Garner, who Hymon believed to be unarmed and approximately 17 or 18 years old, attempted to scale a 6-foot fence. Fearing Garner would escape, Hymon shot him in the back of the head. Garner later died from his injuries, with ten dollars and a purse taken from the burglary found on his person. Hymon's use of deadly force was based on Tennessee law, which permits officers to use necessary means to effectuate an arrest when a suspect flees or resists. The Memphis Police Department's policy allowed for deadly force in burglary cases, albeit with some restrictions. After an internal review and grand jury investigation found no wrongdoing, Garner's father filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, alleging violations of Garner's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint cited the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and named Officer Hymon, the Police Department, its Director, and the City of Memphis as defendants. Following a three-day bench trial, the District Court ruled in favor of the defendants, dismissing claims against the Mayor and Director for lack of evidence, and upheld that Hymon's actions were constitutionally justified under the applicable Tennessee statute. The court determined that Garner had recklessly attempted to escape, thus assuming the risk of being shot. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Hymon’s qualified immunity based on good-faith reliance on the statute but remanded the case for reconsideration of the City's liability under the precedent set by Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services. The District Court, upon reconsideration, maintained its original conclusion that Hymon's actions were constitutional and did not further analyze the "policy or custom" aspect of municipal liability. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a case concerning the use of deadly force against a fleeing suspect, asserting that such force constitutes a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, which necessitates reasonableness. The Tennessee statute was found inadequate as it did not differentiate between felonies, failing to justify the use of deadly force based on the specific case facts. Officers may only use deadly force if they have probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a felony and poses a threat to officer safety or the community. The State of Tennessee intervened to defend the statute and appealed, leading to a granted petition for certiorari by the higher court. The excerpt highlights that any restraint of a person's freedom constitutes a seizure, with apprehension by deadly force subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. While probable cause allows an officer to arrest, it does not exempt the method of seizure from reasonableness analysis. The Court emphasizes the necessity of balancing individual rights against governmental interests in assessing the constitutionality of searches and seizures. Various precedents illustrate that the reasonableness of a seizure depends not only on its timing but also on its execution, as evidenced by cases involving inappropriate lengths of detention and methods that exceed justification. The legal analysis highlights several key cases regarding the appropriateness of different types of searches and seizures, emphasizing the need for a totality of circumstances assessment. It distinguishes the use of deadly force in apprehending suspects, arguing that while law enforcement goals may suggest its necessity, the fundamental right to life of nonviolent suspects outweighs those interests. The document asserts that using deadly force is counterproductive, as it undermines the criminal justice process and does not guarantee increased arrests. It notes that the majority of police departments prohibit deadly force against nonviolent suspects, casting doubt on its essentiality in all felony arrests. The text concludes that while the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects is constitutionally unreasonable, it can be justified if the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious harm. Specifically, if an officer has probable cause to believe a suspect is armed or has committed a violent crime, the use of deadly force may be constitutionally permissible, provided a warning is issued when feasible. Thus, the Tennessee statute is deemed unconstitutional for allowing deadly force against fleeing nonviolent suspects, but not unconstitutional in scenarios involving an imminent threat. The Fourth Amendment must be interpreted considering the common-law rule that permitted the use of necessary force, including deadly force, to apprehend fleeing felons, while prohibiting such force against misdemeanants. This principle is rooted in historical texts, such as Hale's "Pleas of the Crown," which indicates that if an officer is unable to apprehend a fleeing felon and ends up killing that person, it is not classified as a felony. Most American jurisdictions historically supported this distinction, allowing deadly force against felons but not misdemeanants. The prevailing argument asserts that since this rule was in place at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted and still exists in some states, the use of deadly force against fleeing felons must be considered "reasonable." While the Court often references common law when evaluating police actions under the Fourth Amendment, it does not rigidly adhere to historical practices, acknowledging significant changes in legal and technological contexts. The justification for the common-law rule was based on the severe punishments historically associated with felonies, which included the death penalty, thus rendering the killing of a resisting felon less consequential. However, this rationale is outdated as most crimes that were once capital offenses no longer carry such penalties, and the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors has diminished over time. As a result, the historical justifications for allowing deadly force against fleeing felons do not hold true in contemporary legal frameworks. Changes in legal and technological contexts have significantly altered the interpretation of the common-law rule regarding the use of deadly force against fleeing felons. Historically, this rule has been called into question, as it assumed that a felon posed a greater danger than a misdemeanant, despite many misdemeanors being more hazardous than certain felonies. The common-law rule originated during a time when law enforcement officers lacked modern weaponry, relying instead on hand-to-hand combat, which posed immediate risks to their safety. The introduction of firearms has transformed the implications and consequences of applying deadly force. Furthermore, the common-law rule prohibits the use of deadly force against misdemeanants, labeling such actions as excessively harsh. Although Tennessee's common-law rule appears straightforward, it has become distorted due to contemporary legal and technological developments. In assessing police procedures under the Fourth Amendment, there is considerable variation among state laws. Nineteen states have codified the common-law rule, with two imposing significant limitations. Four states adhere to the common-law rule without relevant statutes, while two have adopted the Model Penal Code's provisions. Eighteen states permit the use of deadly force only under specific circumstances, such as when a felony involves violence or when a suspect poses a threat of serious injury. Louisiana and Vermont restrict deadly force to violent felonies, lacking pertinent statutes or case law. Many states do not have clear statutes or case law on this issue, and there is no overwhelming trend against the common-law rule, although some states have recently reviewed and reaffirmed it. However, a long-term trend shows a movement away from the permissive use of deadly force against fleeing felons, which is currently accepted in fewer than half the states. Police department policies generally reflect this trend, with many, including the FBI and NYPD, implementing stricter regulations that limit the use of firearms to situations where there is an imminent threat to life or serious injury. A 1974 study revealed that most large U.S. cities permit police to use deadly force only when a felon poses a threat of death or serious bodily harm, with only 7.5% of policies allowing deadly force against any felon. In contrast, 86.8% explicitly prohibit it. The older common-law perspective on the constitutionality of the Tennessee statute is now questionable. Actual departmental policies are critical; declaring long-standing police practices "unreasonable" could hinder law enforcement effectiveness, yet no evidence suggests increased crime in jurisdictions with stricter rules against deadly force. Research indicates that laws permitting deadly force against unarmed, non-violent fleeing felony suspects do not enhance public safety or law enforcement efficacy. The District Court found Officer Hymon's shooting of Garner justified under state law, as the Federal Constitution does not prohibit deadly force to prevent a fleeing felony suspect's escape when no alternatives exist. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, agreeing that the facts did not warrant deadly force, as Garner was young, slight, and appeared unarmed. Hymon’s justification for the shooting was solely based on preventing escape, not on any perceived danger from Garner. The dissent argued that probable cause for burglary justified the shooting, but the majority disagreed, noting that burglary is classified as a property crime, not a violent one, and an unarmed suspect does not automatically pose a danger. The complaint against all individual defendants has been dismissed, with the State included only under 28 U.S.C. 2403(b) and not liable. The potential liability of the remaining defendants, the Police Department and the city of Memphis, is based on Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services and will be addressed on remand. The statute granting Officer Hymon authority to act as he did has been deemed invalid. The validity of the Police Department's policy is not addressed due to the lack of discussion in lower courts and an unclear record. The Court of Appeals' judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, dissents, arguing that the Fourth Amendment should permit police officers to use deadly force as a last resort to apprehend fleeing criminal suspects, particularly in cases of serious offenses like burglary. O'Connor contends that the majority's ruling undermines established common-law principles and allows suspects to escape when officers have probable cause to arrest. The dissent emphasizes the challenging decisions police face in high-stakes situations, illustrated by the case of Officer Hymon, who, responding to a burglary in progress, fatally shot 15-year-old Edward Eugene Garner, who was unarmed and fleeing. Appellee-respondent, the father of the deceased, initiated a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit in federal court against Officer Hymon, the city of Memphis, and others, alleging violations of Garner's constitutional rights. The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee ruled that Officer Hymon's actions were justified under a Tennessee statute permitting police to use necessary means for arrest if a suspect flees or resists. This statute, as interpreted by Tennessee courts, allows deadly force only if the officer has probable cause of a felony, warns the suspect of the impending arrest, and believes that no lesser force will suffice to prevent escape. The District Court found the statute constitutional and determined that Hymon's actions did not violate Garner's rights. However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, claiming that the statute, which allows police to kill an unarmed, nonviolent fleeing felon to prevent escape, violates the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling, stating that Officer Hymon's use of deadly force constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Court emphasized that the key issue was not the statute's constitutional validity in general, but whether Hymon's actions in this specific case violated Garner's rights. The Court noted that while a police officer with probable cause may seize a suspect, it does not justify killing them. The Court recognized the need to balance the public interest in crime prevention against the individual's rights and highlighted that police use of deadly force involves swift decisions based on an officer's immediate observations. Judicial evaluation of police actions should account for the uncertainties and dangers present during the time of the incident, rather than the clarity of hindsight. The dissent expresses caution in declaring police practices unconstitutional, especially when these practices were accepted at the time the Fourth Amendment was drafted and have since enjoyed legislative support. The dissent emphasizes that the Fourth Amendment must adapt to social and technological changes but insists on a strong burden of proof for claims that long-accepted practices are now unconstitutional. The dissent highlights the serious risks associated with burglary, noting that it often leads to violent crimes, including rapes and assaults, based on Department of Justice statistics. It argues that the potential for violence during a burglary makes it a serious felony, justifying the use of deadly force by police as a last resort for apprehending suspects. The dissent asserts that immediate action is crucial for effective law enforcement, as delayed apprehension often results in the suspect evading capture. The urgency for police intervention in burglary cases stems from the need to protect public safety and prevent further harm. Tennessee law reflects a legislative decision that allows the use of deadly force by police under specific circumstances to enhance public safety and assist in the apprehension of serious crime suspects. Such laws signal that failing to comply with lawful police orders to stop may lead to serious consequences. The court critiques a dismissal of the deterrent effect of deadly force, arguing that while some jurisdictions may not authorize its use, this does not inherently make such practices unconstitutional. The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit states from differing in their criminal law administration, and the state is not required to provide empirical evidence to justify its practices in constitutional challenges. Furthermore, public interests in law enforcement must be balanced against individual rights, particularly the suspect's right to life. The dissent emphasizes that a suspect's interest in life does not equate to an unrestricted right to escape and that compliance with police orders is a means to avoid deadly force. The dissent argues that the police should not be hindered in their duties by the potential for non-cooperation from suspects. The Tennessee statute appropriately allows for the use of force, contingent upon the suspect's adherence to police commands. Use of deadly force by law enforcement to apprehend a fleeing suspect during a nighttime burglary is deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, with the understanding that such force should be a last resort. The circumstances surrounding the incident, particularly the death of an unarmed 15-year-old, are regrettable but do not inform the assessment of the officer's actions. Officer Hymon pursued a suspect in a dark yard of a recently burglarized home, uncertain if the suspect was armed or alone. When the suspect refused to halt and attempted to escape, the officer fired his weapon. The evaluation of this action focuses not on the tragic outcome but on whether the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible in these circumstances. Additionally, claims under other constitutional provisions, including due process, the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, were considered but rejected. The Court of Appeals emphasized that laws affecting the fundamental interest in life must be narrowly defined, concluding that deadly force is constitutional only when the suspect poses an immediate threat. However, the author disagrees with this interpretation, asserting that the application of Tennessee's statute did not result in a due process violation in this specific case. Claims related to the Sixth and Eighth Amendments were also dismissed, as there was no evidence of intent to punish the suspect rather than to capture him. Ultimately, the author supports the District Court's judgment against the appellee-respondent and would reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision. The author also critiques the Court's opinion that restricts deadly force to situations where suspects threaten officers with weapons or have committed serious crimes, arguing that this perspective overlooks broader implications. The majority opinion holds that using deadly force against fleeing criminal suspects who do not pose a serious threat is constitutionally unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It implies that this limitation applies not only to firearms but to any police practices that could be lethal, regardless of the risk involved. The author presumes that the majority intends for "use" of deadly force to apply only when a suspect is actually apprehended, as a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment occurs only upon apprehension. The opinion specifically addresses the shooting of a non-threatening burglary suspect, suggesting it could support a civil rights claim under § 1983. The author criticizes the majority for failing to clarify key factors regarding the decision to use deadly force, which may lead to excessive litigation over police actions taken in high-pressure situations. There is a lack of guidance for officers on what constitutes a significant threat justifying deadly force, potentially leading to confusion in rapidly evolving scenarios. The author argues that even if the use of deadly force is limited, it should encompass suspects fleeing from residential burglaries. The majority's ruling introduces a new standard for evaluating the constitutionality of deadly force against fleeing felons, which undermines established police practices that have been accepted by many state legislatures. The author dissents, asserting that the constitutional limits on police use of deadly force are not exceeded when an officer with probable cause to arrest a burglary suspect orders the suspect to halt and fires to prevent escape. The author emphasizes the importance of balancing police authority and constitutional rights, particularly in urgent situations. Garner, a 15-year-old eighth-grader, was 5'4" tall and weighed approximately 100 to 110 pounds. During the trial, Hymon explained that he fired his weapon because he believed Garner would escape. Hymon noted that he was unable to pursue Garner due to a fence and the darkness of the area, which made it difficult to navigate while carrying equipment and wearing heavy boots. He acknowledged that Garner, being younger and more agile, could easily outrun him. Garner had entered a home and caused significant disarray, although the homeowner reported that valuables were mostly untouched, aside from a missing ring and a small amount of cash. Tennessee law prohibits the use of deadly force in the arrest of a misdemeanant, as established in Johnson v. State. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that the Model Penal Code outlines limitations on the use of deadly force against fleeing felons. The Model Penal Code stipulates that deadly force is only justifiable under certain conditions: the arrest must be for a felony, the individual must be acting as a peace officer or assisting one, the force must not pose a substantial risk to innocents, and there must be a threat of serious harm if apprehension is delayed. The court determined that the statute was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, emphasizing that a compelling interest in law enforcement is only justified when the suspect poses a danger. The city was found not to be immune under Owen v. City of Independence. The dissenting opinion noted that without the possibility of immediate apprehension, subsequent investigation could not justify the use of deadly force. Failure to apprehend a suspect at the scene does not preclude their eventual capture. The dissent critiques the effectiveness of later investigations, referencing the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which proposed a policy on the use of deadly force that is stricter than the current policy. This proposal allows deadly force only when a suspect has threatened deadly force during a crime or poses a significant risk of causing harm if not promptly apprehended. Additionally, the officer must have a near-certain belief that the suspect committed an offense warranting such force. The document highlights that the typical deterrent of punishment for illegal conduct is often disregarded regarding flight from arrest. For instance, Arkansas excludes flight from arrest from the definition of "obstruction of governmental operations," indicating that evading apprehension without the use of violence does not constitute an independent offense. In states that do criminalize flight, it is typically classified as a misdemeanor, even for forceful resistance, which prevents the escalation of fleeing misdemeanants to fleeing felons subject to deadly force solely based on their flight. However, this leniency contrasts sharply with the severe penalties associated with cases where deadly force is applied. For example, while Tennessee does not prohibit fleeing from arrest, the Memphis City Code imposes fines for such actions. The document illustrates this with reference to a specific case where the attempt to escape resulted in both a fine and the potential for being shot. Lastly, it discusses the historical connection between felonies and capital punishment, noting that not all felonies were historically punishable by death, despite the deep-rooted association in legal interpretation. White-collar crime is characterized as posing a lesser physical threat compared to offenses like drunken driving, as noted in Welsh v. Wisconsin. Increased police communication and apprehension techniques have allegedly made it easier to capture escapees, potentially affecting the reasonableness of using deadly force to prevent escape. However, there is no concrete data to evaluate this claim, and current arrest rates raise doubts about the effectiveness of past policing methods. In 1983, only 21% of offenses in the FBI crime index were cleared by arrest, with burglary's clearance rate at 15%. Various state statutes govern the use of deadly force in arrests; for instance, Oregon restricts it to violent felons, while California permits it only for serious crimes or imminent threats. Indiana allows deadly force to prevent injury but not merely to prevent escape. Other states, including Michigan, Ohio, Virginia, and West Virginia, have similar restrictions regarding the use of deadly force in law enforcement. The text outlines various legal standards and interpretations regarding the use of deadly force by law enforcement and private citizens in the context of arresting fleeing suspects. Key points include: - The adoption of Model Penal Code standards in Massachusetts, extending similar limitations to police officers. - References to multiple state statutes (e.g., Alaska, Georgia, Illinois, and others) that allow the use of deadly force under specific circumstances, primarily when there is a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. - A Federal District Court's interpretation of Louisiana law, which limits deadly force to situations where life is endangered or great bodily harm is threatened. - Notable cases from Maryland and Missouri that indicate a preference for common-law rules over restrictive provisions regarding the use of deadly force. - A commentary from the D.C. Department of Corrections highlighting the non-violent nature of certain property crimes. - A dissenting opinion discussing the correlation between burglary and violent crimes, emphasizing that the relevant cases involve a small subset of incidents where violence has actually occurred and an officer lacks alternative means to apprehend the suspect. This summary captures the essence of the legal standards and judicial interpretations regarding the use of force, emphasizing the balance between upholding law enforcement authority and protecting individual rights.