Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; July 27, 1993; Washington; State Appellate Court
Tiffany E. Dimond appeals a jury verdict awarding Rafael and Mary Ramirez $127,443.90 for injuries Mr. Ramirez sustained in a car accident on August 11, 1989, for which Dimond admitted liability. Dimond argues that it was erroneous to instruct the jury on life expectancy due to a lack of evidence of permanent injury. The court affirms the judgment, stating that the jury instructions adequately guided the jury in assessing damages.
Following the accident, Mr. Ramirez experienced pain in multiple areas and lost feeling in his left arm, requiring a two-hour emergency room visit. Subsequent medical consultations revealed ongoing pain, and he was unable to work full-time until late December 1989. Although he resumed some physical activities a year later, he suffered another injury in September 1990 when a chair collapsed. Medical evaluations indicated he had no permanent disability, and while he returned to work full-time by May 1992, he continued to experience pain and had not fully resumed his previous physical activities. Testimonies from medical professionals and family members indicated Mr. Ramirez had not completely recovered from his injuries. The jury’s award included lost wages, medical expenses, general damages, and loss of consortium for Mrs. Ramirez.
Ms. Dimond argues that the court incorrectly instructed the jury on life expectancy, asserting that such instructions should only be given when there is evidence of permanent injury. She contends that the instruction, which referenced mortality tables indicating an average life expectancy for a 41-year-old male, is inappropriate in cases where the evidence only shows ongoing pain without proof of permanent injury. The instruction is aligned with WPI 34.04, and previous case law, particularly Lofgren v. Western Wash. Corp., supports its use when evidence of permanent injury, future earnings loss, or future suffering exists. Despite Ms. Dimond's objections, the Washington Supreme Court has maintained the relevance of this instruction post-Vangemert. The court notes that the jury was instructed to consider various elements of damages, including future pain and loss of enjoyment of life, and that the life expectancy instruction was merely supplementary for assessing future damages, not a directive for a lifetime award. The Ramirez couple claims Ms. Dimond's appeal is frivolous and seeks sanctions; however, the court finds her argument not frivolous and denies the request for sanctions. The judgment is affirmed.
