California v. Trombetta

Citations: 81 L. Ed. 2d 413; 104 S. Ct. 2528; 467 U.S. 479; 1984 U.S. LEXIS 103; 52 U.S.L.W. 4744Docket: 83-305

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 11, 1984; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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The Supreme Court case California v. Trombetta addresses the obligation of the State under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment regarding the preservation of potentially exculpatory evidence for criminal defendants. Specifically, the Court examines whether law enforcement agencies are required to preserve breath samples from suspected drunken drivers in order for breath-analysis test results to be admissible in court. The Omicron Intoxilyzer is utilized in California to measure blood alcohol concentration through a breath sample, which involves specific procedures including purging the device and ensuring the accuracy of the tests. The tests must yield results that are within 0.02 of each other to be considered admissible, and the Intoxilyzer is calibrated regularly, with calibration results accessible to defendants. The Court ultimately reversed and remanded the previous ruling from the California Court of Appeal.

In 1980 and 1981, the respondents were stopped for suspected drunk driving in California, where each submitted to an Intoxilyzer test, showing blood-alcohol concentrations above 0.10 percent, leading to charges of driving while intoxicated. Before trial, they moved to suppress the Intoxilyzer results due to the failure of officers to preserve breath samples, which they argued could have been used to challenge the test results. California law enforcement typically does not preserve such samples, and the motions to suppress were denied. Respondents Ward and Berry were convicted based on police records, while Trombetta and Cox appealed directly. The California Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the respondents, emphasizing that the preservation of evidence collected by the state, such as breath samples, is essential for due process rights. The court ordered new trials for Ward and Berry and disallowed the Intoxilyzer results for Trombetta and Cox. The State's subsequent petitions for certiorari were initially unsuccessful, but the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately reversed the decision. The Court underscored that under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, defendants must have a fair opportunity to present a complete defense, and the preservation of exculpatory evidence is crucial to maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system.

Prosecutors have a constitutional obligation to inform defendants and the trial court of any perjury committed by government witnesses, as established in Napue v. Illinois and Mooney v. Holohan. Defendants are entitled to access evidence that is material to their guilt or relevant to sentencing, as per Brady v. Maryland. Even without specific requests, prosecutors must disclose exculpatory evidence that could create reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, as affirmed in United States v. Agurs. Additionally, prosecutors must reveal plea agreements involving key witnesses (Giglio v. United States) and may need to disclose the identities of critical undercover informants (Roviaro v. United States).

The extent of the government's responsibility to provide access to exculpatory evidence beyond its possession is less defined. Previous rulings, such as United States v. Marion and United States v. Lovasco, suggest that due process may be violated if the government unduly delays indictments or deport potential witnesses, impairing the defendant's ability to prepare an effective defense. However, the courts have not directly addressed the obligation to take proactive measures to preserve evidence for defendants. The challenges in creating rules around evidence lost due to prosecutorial negligence complicate the matter, as courts struggle to assess the significance of destroyed evidence. Remedies for such violations present difficult choices, such as whether to bar prosecution entirely or suppress critical evidence, as seen in the California Court of Appeal's handling of similar cases.

In Killian v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed due process constraints regarding the destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence. The petitioner, convicted of false testimony, argued that preliminary notes from FBI agents, which were destroyed before his trial, would have aided his defense. Although the Court acknowledged the notes might have been beneficial, it ruled that their destruction did not constitute a constitutional violation, as the agents acted in good faith and according to standard practices.

The current case parallels Killian, as the California authorities' possession of respondents' breath samples was solely for the purpose of providing data to the Intoxilyzer, similar to how Killian sought the agents' notes to challenge final reports. The court disagreed with the California Court of Appeal's view that the failure to retain breath samples violated the Federal Constitution. It found no evidence of intentional destruction to evade disclosure requirements, reaffirming that the officers acted in good faith.

Furthermore, California's policy of not preserving breath samples does not present a constitutional defect. The Constitution's duty to preserve evidence is limited to that which could significantly aid a suspect's defense. To qualify as constitutionally material, evidence must have apparent exculpatory value before its destruction and be irreplaceable by other means. The court concluded that neither condition was satisfied in this case.

The preservation of breath samples is unlikely to have aided the respondents' defenses, as a thorough evaluation of the Intoxilyzer and California's testing procedures indicates that preserved samples would generally confirm the machine's readings of high blood-alcohol concentration rather than exonerate the defendants. The Intoxilyzer's accuracy is validated by the California Department of Health, which has established rigorous testing protocols, including two independent measurements and blank runs to eliminate residual alcohol traces. Even if the Intoxilyzer's results were deemed inaccurate, respondents had alternative means to challenge the test outcomes, such as examining the machine's calibration records and presenting evidence of potential interference or operator error. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not mandate the preservation of breath samples for the admissibility of breath-analysis results in court. As a result, the California Court of Appeal's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Additionally, Justice O'Connor concurs, emphasizing that evidence preservation is primarily a state issue and that the failure to preserve breath samples does not compromise the fairness of the prosecution. The Court's ruling aligns with established legal principles regarding evidentiary preservation.

Under California law, individuals suspected of drunken driving can choose between a blood, urine, or breath test to determine their blood-alcohol concentration; refusal to submit to any test results in a driving license suspension. The California Department of Health has approved the Intoximeter Field Crimper-Indium Tube Encapsulation Kit, which allows officers to preserve breath samples by having suspects breathe into an indium tube that captures samples in three chambers for later analysis using a Gas Chromatograph Intoximeter. However, the Kit cannot preserve the same sample used in an Intoxilyzer test. Other similar devices exist but lack official approval.

The California Court of Appeal expressed uncertainty about the appeal rights of respondents Trombetta and Cox but ultimately dismissed their appeals while addressing the merits. In People v. Hitch, the California Supreme Court established that the intentional destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence violates the Due Process Clause, extending a duty to preserve evidence beyond what was previously required under Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States. 

Uncertainty existed regarding the application of the Hitch ruling to the Intoxilyzer. In People v. Miller, the Court of Appeal declined to extend Hitch due to the Intoxilyzer's inability to preserve breath samples in a retrievable form, a view not followed in Trombetta, where it was determined that the state must preserve breath samples equivalent to those used in Intoxilyzer tests. 

Additionally, it is recognized that defendants have the right to call witnesses and cross-examine government witnesses. The Court of Appeal affirmed that the Intoxilyzer procedure effectively places breath samples in the possession of California officials, equating the capacity to preserve samples with actual possession. In prosecutorial disclosure matters, the requirement of materiality is recognized, and there is no obligation for prosecutors to provide a full account of all investigatory work to the defense. Furthermore, the Intoxilyzer complies with accuracy standards set by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

The reliability of breath samples is contingent upon the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer, indicating that the materiality of preserved samples hinges on its dependability. If the Intoxilyzer is prone to inaccuracies, its results alone may not suffice to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, suggesting a potential constitutional challenge to the evidence used by the State. Additionally, respondents could have opted for urine or blood tests to mitigate the risk of erroneous breath testing, as these samples would have been preserved for retesting. However, they were not adequately informed about the differences among the testing methods when making their choice. State courts and legislatures are permitted to implement stricter standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence than what is required by federal law, as demonstrated in cases like Lauderdale v. State and City of Lodi v. Hine.