Ex Parte Barrows

Docket: 1030359

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; May 7, 2004; Alabama; State Supreme Court

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Jamie Kay Shields Barrows petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge William E. Hereford of the St. Clair Circuit Court to vacate his order denying her motion to dismiss a will contest filed by James Shields, Jr. Barrows argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the will contest, as it was not filed in accordance with Alabama law. 

On January 21, 2003, Barrows, as executrix, sought to probate the will of James Edward Shields, which the probate court admitted on February 10, 2003. James Shields, Jr. contested the will on July 30, 2003, but the probate court transferred the case to the circuit court the same day. Barrows contended that Shields Jr.'s contest was filed too late, as it did not comply with the requirements of Alabama Code § 43-8-190, which mandates that a will contest must be filed in the court where the will is offered for probate before its admission. 

The Supreme Court ultimately denied the petition, reiterating the criteria for granting a writ of mandamus and emphasizing that such a writ is an extraordinary remedy, granted only when the petitioner demonstrates a clear legal right to relief and the trial court has clearly abused its discretion. The court found that the circuit court's refusal to dismiss the contest did not exceed its authority, as the timing of the will contest did not invalidate the jurisdictional transfer.

The probate court lacked jurisdiction over the will contest, rendering its order to transfer the case to the circuit court ineffective, as established in Ex parte Pearson, 241 Ala. 467, 3 So.2d 5 (1941). Consequently, the chief clerk's filing of the complaint from the probate court with the circuit court did not establish jurisdiction. Under Section 43-8-199, Ala. Code 1975, an interested person may contest a will within six months of its probate by filing a complaint in the circuit court where the will was probated. Shields Jr. argued that his counsel's submission of a modified copy of the will-contest complaint, which replaced "probate" with "circuit," along with a circuit court cover sheet, constituted a proper filing in the circuit court. The court agreed, referencing Dunning v. New England Life Insurance Co., 890 So.2d 92 (Ala.2003), which affirmed that a timely filed copy of a notice of appeal suffices under the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court noted that the absence of an original signature on a copy does not affect its validity, and various methods of affixing a signature are acceptable. Thus, the modifications made to the complaint were sufficient for proper pleading and documentation for the will contest in the circuit court.

The complaint in question is a copy of the original filed in probate court and correctly includes the court's name, action title, file number, and identifies itself as a "complaint contesting will," in accordance with Rule 10 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure (Ala. R. Civ. P.). The attorney's signature, though not original, validly certifies the complaint's allegations based on the Dunning principle that allows for varied signature methods, and aligns with Rule 11. Furthermore, Shields Jr. submitted a cover sheet as required by Rule 3(b) and timely filed the docket fee following the admission of the will to probate on February 10, 2003. The fee was submitted on August 11, 2003, which was permissible since August 10 was a Sunday, adhering to § 1-1-4 of the Alabama Code 1975 that extends filing deadlines that fall on weekends or holidays. Thus, Shields Jr. filed the will contest within the six-month timeframe set after the will's probate, successfully invoking the circuit court's jurisdiction. Although Barrows invoked jurisdiction as well, she failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to dismiss the contest. The circuit court holds subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the petition for a writ of mandamus is denied.