Brooks v. State

Citations: 892 So. 2d 976; 2004 WL 68542Docket: 1020344

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; January 15, 2004; Alabama; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to determine if the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's denial of Rodgrick Cornilius Brooks's second Rule 32 petition for postconviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals had concluded that Brooks may have been entitled to an out-of-time appeal regarding the dismissal of his first Rule 32 petition, referencing prior cases Ex parte Fountain and Ex parte Johnson. Brooks was convicted of murder and first-degree robbery in 1997, receiving consecutive sentences of 30 and 20 years, respectively. His initial Rule 32 petition, filed in March 2000, claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and was summarily dismissed without a proper date. After multiple attempts to address the undated dismissal order, including letters to the circuit judge and clerk, and a motion for correction of clerical error, Brooks filed a second Rule 32 petition in December 2000, seeking an out-of-time appeal. This second petition was also dismissed by the circuit court. The Court of Criminal Appeals initially treated Brooks's appeal as a writ of mandamus and later issued a revised opinion. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the previous ruling and remanded the case.

A recent opinion remanded the case to the trial court to ascertain the date when Brooks's first Rule 32 petition denial order was received by the circuit clerk and whether Brooks received a copy of that order. If it is determined that Brooks received the order after the 42-day appeal period or received no notice of its entry, he is entitled to an out-of-time appeal. Following this remand, the trial court issued an identical order on May 23, 2002, again denying Brooks's petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals later ruled that the circuit court granted Brooks the relief he sought, rendering his appeal moot, and overruled the State’s application for rehearing. The State subsequently filed multiple applications for rehearing, all of which were denied. The opinion emphasized that, under Alabama rules, a notice of appeal must be filed within 42 days of the sentence or the denial of a motion for new trial, and this timeline is jurisdictional—meaning it cannot be extended or waived. The date of entry by the clerk is the relevant date for computing the appeal timeframe, not the date the judgment is pronounced. Timely filing is critical for the appellate process, and failure to comply results in the dismissal of the appeal.

In Alabama case law, the courts have established that a United States District Court does not have the authority to extend a 42-day period for appeals, as noted in Hayden v. Harris and State v. Kebe. A narrow exception to this rule was created in Fountain v. State, where the circuit court allowed an out-of-time appeal after the appellant was not notified of the dismissal of his initial Rule 32 petition. The court found that denying the appellant the opportunity to appeal based on procedural rules would violate his right to due process and fair administration of justice. This principle was further supported by the Alabama Supreme Court's affirmation in Ex parte Fountain.

Additionally, in Ex parte Johnson, the Alabama Supreme Court reinforced that denying a Rule 32 petitioner the chance to appeal based on inadequate notice from the circuit court also constitutes a violation of procedural due process. The court emphasized that procedural due process includes the right to a fair hearing, notice, and the opportunity to present evidence. Although parties generally have a duty to monitor their case status, this duty does not absolve the court from its responsibility to provide notice, particularly when a party's ability to appeal is compromised by the court's negligence in notification.

The circuit court's dismissal of Weeks's appeal was deemed unfair due to a lack of opportunity for all parties to be heard, a critical element of justice. The judicial branch is tasked with protecting citizens' rights to life, liberty, and property, and failing to recognize Weeks's procedural due process rights constitutes 'usurpation and oppression.' Johnson was not notified of the denial of his Rule 32 petition, despite his entitlement to such notification. The trial judge acknowledged Johnson's lack of notice and provided no evidence to the contrary. Consequently, it was ruled that Johnson could not be denied his day in court due to the trial court's failure to inform him. His request for notification of developments in his case mirrored Weeks's situation. The order denying Johnson's Rule 32 petition was vacated, and the trial court was instructed to issue a new order and notify Johnson promptly.

Regarding Brooks, the record lacked a stamped date on the order denying his first Rule 32 petition, and the State admitted uncertainty about the date, referencing only 'August 2000.' Brooks claimed the order was postmarked September 29, 2000. If the order was entered by August 1, 2000, his 42-day appeal period would have expired before he received notification, violating procedural due process standards. The court concluded that fair notice regarding the commencement of the appeal period is essential, and Brooks's inability to appeal due to lack of notice was deemed meritorious. The principles of notice and fair play are fundamental to ensuring procedural due process for inmates.

Brooks may not have been aware of the need to file a notice of appeal or to pursue alternative relief avenues regarding his first Rule 32 petition. His efforts to clarify his case status led to a second Rule 32 petition, reiterating his insufficient notice of the circuit court's ruling on the first petition. The confusion stemming from the order's copy warrants recognition of Brooks's letters and second petition as valid assertions of procedural due process rights, as outlined in Fountain and Ex parte Johnson. The current review suggests that Brooks could be entitled to an out-of-time appeal concerning the dismissal of his first Rule 32 petition, indicating the circuit court erred in dismissing the second petition. 

Judge Shaw concurred with the outcome but questioned whether Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., permits seeking an out-of-time appeal from a Rule 32 dismissal, aligning with Judge Baschab's dissent in Fountain. The Court, in following Alabama Supreme Court precedent, previously amended Rule 32 to allow postconviction relief for due process violations. It emphasized that denying such an appeal solely due to procedural gaps would infringe on due process rights. Although the Alabama Supreme Court can amend rules governing court procedures, the current Court feels it lacks similar authority. The Fountain decision indicated that a timely appeal failure due to circuit court error constitutes a due process violation that must be remedied, a principle reaffirmed in Ex parte Johnson. The Court's divided opinion in Fountain highlighted differing views on whether Rule 32.1(f) allows out-of-time appeal requests from Rule 32 dismissals, prompting a reevaluation in light of Ex parte Johnson, which acknowledged mandamus relief for inmates lacking proper notification of Rule 32 rulings.

A majority of the Court determined that Rule 32.1(f) allows for an out-of-time appeal from a conviction or sentence but does not extend to an adverse ruling in a prior collateral proceeding. In its prior ruling from December 21, 2001, the Court had already clarified that Rule 32.1(f) does not support seeking an out-of-time appeal from the dismissal of a Rule 32 petition, leading to the overruling of the Fountain interpretation. However, shortly thereafter, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed part of this decision, affirming the grant of an out-of-time appeal while not addressing the Court's interpretation of Rule 32.1(f). The author expresses confusion over the Supreme Court's affirmation, noting it was unnecessary and lacked engagement with the previous ruling. The author doubts that the Supreme Court intended to overrule the recent decision without discussion. Despite recognizing the legal implications of the Supreme Court's affirmation, the author calls for clarification from the Supreme Court regarding its intent. The excerpt concludes by outlining the criteria for issuing a writ of mandamus, emphasizing the necessity for clarity in legal proceedings.

Legal issues in this case mirror those in *Marshall v. State*, where it was established that a writ of mandamus is the sole remedy for individuals who miss the notification of their Rule 32 petition dismissal and cannot appeal in time. The Court of Criminal Appeals incorrectly concluded that a second Rule 32 petition could address these grievances, which conflicts with the precedent set in *Marshall*. The ruling reverses the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision and remands the case for consistent proceedings.

Justice Johnstone dissents, arguing that limiting defendants to a writ of mandamus excludes necessary factual determinations that should occur at the trial court level before seeking an appeal. Johnstone emphasizes that without the trial court's refusal to grant an out-of-time appeal, there are no grounds for a writ of mandamus. He questions whether defendants can initiate an appeal through informal letters rather than formal petitions, suggesting this undermines the intent of Rule 32, which aims to streamline postconviction procedures.

A Rule 32 petition is deemed the most effective method for a defendant to request and for the trial court to consider an out-of-time appeal. The main opinion seemingly requires the defendant to submit multiple letters to the trial court to establish a clear legal right to an out-of-time appeal, which prioritizes form over substance. It fails to recognize Brooks's second Rule 32 petition as a valid request for an out-of-time appeal and his appeal of its denial as a petition for a writ of mandamus, aligned with precedents set in Ex parte Burch and Ex parte Hutto. Brooks's second petition, filed on December 21, 2000, was supported by Fountain v. State, which validates it as a means to pursue an out-of-time appeal following the denial of his first petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals correctly adhered to this precedent, thus granting Brooks relief. The dissent emphasizes that the remand does not prevent the Court of Criminal Appeals from interpreting Brooks's letters and second Rule 32 petition as valid demands for an out-of-time appeal and as a basis for a mandamus petition, advocating for a due process approach for Brooks and similarly situated defendants.